Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2019. xvi, 308 pp. (Tables, graphs, figures.) US$32.95, paper. ISBN 978-1-5017-3298-0.
It is widely known that Indonesia continues to struggle with corruption, collusion, and nepotism. Despite the promise of democracy and decentralization to combat these ills, the result has been more competitive and decentralized forms of corruption. In contemporary Indonesia, vote-buying, patronage appointments, and the use of public office to amass private fortunes make for an incredibly complex political landscape. Happily, Ed Aspinall and Ward Berenschot’s Democracy for Sale: Elections, Clientelism, and the State in Indonesia provides a definitive guide. Written for a broad audience, this impressive book explains how clientelism works, making for essential reading in the growing comparative literature on corruption.
Democracy for Sale illuminates the opaque world of informal systems of exchange that are sometimes illegal, but widespread. It features ten chapters, beginning by introducing the study and some key theories. The next four chapters discuss clientelist networks and discretionary budgets, charting the life-cycle of clientelism from nomination to victory or defeat. The final two chapters explore variation in the forms and degrees of clientelism across Indonesia.
To help unpack clientelist systems, the authors carried out extensive firsthand research. Their data consist of interviews with stakeholders from various districts, cities, and provinces, as well as a survey of 509 experts (journalists, scholars, campaign teams, and civil society leaders) across 38 districts in 16 provinces. It is sometimes shocking how much respondents are willing to say, providing specific prices and expressing outrage when clientelist etiquette is breached. One candidate explains that he approached various political parties to support his candidacy; after articulating his vision, “they only asked me how much money I was willing to pay” (80). The transparency of money politics in Indonesia makes for great reading: “he gave them so many cows, and they didn’t vote for him” (144)!
While it offers a detailed study of a single case, this book is written for broader audiences. There are few acronyms or Indonesian terms, and the book contains numerous references to broader theory, the United States, Argentina, and India. The authors identify various scholarly approaches, from early work on patron-client relations and American machine politics to more recent studies of economic exchanges and institutional factors. The book borrows from multiple approaches, with institutions shaping patterns of vote-buying, which operate through personal networks and social organizations. While political parties are at the nexus of clientelism in India and Argentina, open-list proportional representation and independent executive candidates have led to a “freewheeling” clientelism in Indonesia in which parties matter less than personal campaign teams and brokerage networks. To succeed, candidates must become sociologists, identifying who holds social sway and how these social networks might be hijacked.
The book maintains a neutral tone when approaching these exchanges. It documents a system, and as such does not seem to cast blame on individual candidates or voters. However, the authors still draw attention to the destructive effects of clientelist practices, transactions which reflect as well as reinforce wealth inequalities. Expensive campaigns lead elected officials to use state resources to reward supporters and recoup losses. At several points, the reader may sympathize with losing candidates. One candidate explains how village leaders joined his team, asking for expenses to hold events: “Then when you, the candidate, go there, the people will kiss you, they will cheer you, and that’s when you are convinced. But on D-day—you don’t get one single lousy vote” (122). Sometimes, a candidate’s sense of betrayal can lead them to take gifts back, removing water pipes, streetlights, and mosque tiles (144). For losing candidates, the result is financial disaster. Meanwhile, winners are inundated with requests, even from those who falsely claim to have supported their campaign, while sometimes real supporters are not rewarded.
It is challenging to provide meaningful critiques of Democracy for Sale. One might see some references to Argentina and Italy as asides, and wish for a more systematic comparison. Readers may also look for more discussion of distinctive local systems in different regions, a topic saved for the final chapters. In chapter 10, the authors show how clientelism varies across Indonesian provinces. They also provide a clientelism perception index. It is surprising to see a quantitative index developed through 500 observations in a single country divided into 16 provinces. The survey shows that clientelism is less significant in Java compared to the Outer Islands. The authors then utilize statistical regression to suggest that lower clientelism scores are related to greater economic development and diversification. The survey provides a useful measure, but we could have arrived here without the formality of an index.
All told, Democracy for Sale succeeds brilliantly in explaining clientelism in Indonesian democracy. There is no doubt that the book will be influential. For practitioners, it will result in more informed efforts to combat clientelism, and perhaps more informed clientelism. This book should and will be read widely by scholars and policy makers. The authors should be congratulated on what will become a staple in the literature.
Shane Barter
Soka University of America, Aliso Viejo