Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2019. vi, 249 pp. (Tables, graph, figure.) US$32.00, paper. ISBN 978-981-4722-89-6.
This edited volume is a timely effort to examine an important question: What is the extent of China’s “soft power” influence in Southeast Asia? The book addresses this question by examining aspects of China’s economic relations with specific Southeast Asian states (Myanmar, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines) and its cultural impact in others (Indonesia, and in a chapter on Confucius Institutes in the region, Thailand, Singapore, and Cambodia). This approach allows for a broad examination of different aspects of China’s “soft footprints” in Southeast Asia, but it also makes for a scattershot analysis. At the end of the book, the extent of China’s regional ideological and cultural influence remains unclear. This may be inevitable in such a diverse region with a variety of historical, social, political, and institutional responses to China, but it is an aspect of the analysis that needs further context and development.
The book draws on Joseph Nye’s understanding of “soft power”: “the ability to achieve goals through attraction rather than coercion” (35). Nye’s elaboration of the term is in the context of trying to explain and justify American hegemony. However, China conceptualizes the concept of soft power very differently than the US. China’s most obvious effort to utilize soft power is through the Confucius Institutes (CI), which teach the Chinese language in foreign countries. The CIs also function as important instruments of China’s propaganda, as they are designed to explain China to the rest of the world. The vision of China that they propagate is a country that is benevolent and respectful of others, but also unique. China is not trying to make any other country into China and does not think this is possible anyway. It respects the distinctiveness and sovereignty of other states. This message contrasts dramatically with the American use of soft power, which presents the US as a bastion of liberal democratic inclusiveness. Putting aside how badly that American image has suffered in recent years, the US explicitly argues that it embodies and actively promotes certain universal values. Is China really “attracting” others to its worldview? Does the idea of “live and let live” inspire much soft power? The book needs a more comprehensive and critical examination of how China’s soft power fits into a larger discussion of the concept.
Chapter 2, by Teng-Chi Chang, provides the bulk of the book’s conceptual apparatus. It is mostly a good discussion of China’s changing foreign policy approaches. Its elaboration of China’s soft power focuses on China’s past efforts to present its rise as non-threatening vs. its more assertive position today. China is still trying to decide how to manage its image and position in a rapidly changing world.
The book’s discussion of China’s economic impact in various Southeast Asian states provides fascinating case studies but the connection to soft power is sometimes uncertain. Chapter 3, by Ian Tsung-yen Chen, examines how China’s economic influence in Myanmar has faltered in the face of popular democratic pressures. However, China’s use of economic power to buy influence is more demonstrative of hard power than soft. Chapter 4, by Ngeow Chow Bing, discusses how domestic political concerns in Malaysia short-circuited China’s efforts to enhance its economic ties with that state. In this case, China is more of a bystander to domestic forces it cannot control. Chapter 5, by Natalia Soebagjo, is a fascinating study of Indonesia’s problems in getting Chinese companies, many of them state-owned enterprises, to complete a number of coal-fired power plants they have been contracted to build. Soebagio argues that Indonesia did not understand how China’s business culture worked and ended up with unreliable business partners that provided shoddy customer service. This situation reflected cultural differences but was a failure of Chinese soft power, insofar as soft power was an issue at all. In chapter 6, Dennis Trinidad explains how the Philippines has problems accepting and utilizing Chinese aid because it is adapted to dealing with aid following the standards laid out by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. In all of these cases, the use of Chinese economic levers to gain standing in the targeted states is associated with hard power more than soft. The soft power connection needs to be drawn more clearly and with elaboration.
Chapter 7, by Yumi Kitamura, studies how Chinese Indonesians used China’s growing regional presence as leverage to get Confucianism “re-recognized” as a religion in Indonesia. However, the chapter suggests that China played no direct role in this situation. Chapter 8, by H. H. Michael Hsiao and Alan H. Yang, provides an overview of how Confucius Institutes operate and are funded, before focusing on the activities of CIs in Thailand, Singapore, and Cambodia. The chapter briefly discusses the many controversies around the institutes, and leaves most of that to the very end. A key part of the discussion is how CIs help to establish “guanxi” in the three Southeast Asian states. Here, however, the analysis needs to be more complete. For example, one strategy of the CIs is to build on ties with the local Chinese community. Given the often awkward position of ethnic Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, is this a wise or uncontroversial move? The chapter also suggests that Singapore is unconcerned with China’s outreach to the local Chinese community. However, Singapore is managing ethnic tensions and is committed to keeping the US engaged in the region. The Singaporean government is leery of China’s ethnic appeal.
China’s Footprints in Southeast Asia addresses a critically important question but does so in a way that leaves considerable room for a more comprehensive analysis. The book’s chapters provide considerable material for such an analysis but the book itself needs to draw the material together in a manner that connects the many disparate pieces.
Shaun Narine
St. Thomas University, Fredericton