Balance of Incentives: Why North Korea Interacts with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change

This study is concerned with motivations driving North Korea’s interaction with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, drawing on information from treaty reporting documents, along with project reports compiled by international agencies and official statements released by the North Korean government. The article draws on causal inference to explore the hypothesis that the leadership perpetuation and state survival imperatives of the North Korean government represent the most likely explanation for North Korea’s interaction with the international climate change regime. It finds a strong probability that North Korea is utilising the UNFCCC as a capacity-building vehicle across its agricultural and energy sectors, a weak possibility that North Korea’s climate change vulnerability is a compelling incentive for greenhouse gas mitigation, and the weak possibility that North Korea is using the Clean Development Mechanism under the UNFCCC as a means for generating foreign currency revenue. The paper argues that the balance of incentives underpinning these motivations can be linked to the leadership perpetuation and state survival imperatives of the North Korean government.

动机盘点：北韩为何与《联合国气候变化框架公约》进行互动

本研究利用合约执行情况报告文献中的信息、国际机构编写的项目报告以及北韩政府发布的官方声明，考察了驱动北韩与《联合国气候变化框架公约》进行互动背后的动机。本论文利用因果推论，探讨了一个理论假设：北韩政府迫切追求领袖权力永固以及国家之生存，这是最能解释北韩决定与国际气候变化组织进行互动的原因。本研究发现，最可能的解释是，北韩利用《联合国气候变化框架公约》作为其在农业和能源部门进行能力建设的工具； 而北韩易受气候变化影响的弱点是促成其温室气体减排的强大动力，这个解释成立的可能性很低；同样可能性很低的解释还有：北韩利用《联合国气候变化框架公约》下的清洁发展机制作为创造外汇收入的手段。本论文提出，对这些动机权衡考察后得出的诱因指向北韩政府迫切追求巩固领袖权力和确保国家生存。

Translated from English by Li Guo