Nathan Allen
The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
Keywords: corruption, institutions, party systems, elections, Indonesia
DOI: 10.5509/2014872221
The party system in Indonesia has expanded in the post-Suharto era. With each successive election, voters have spread their support across a wider array of parties. This has occurred despite deliberate institutional tweaks designed to consolidate the system by privileging large parties. Why has the party system expanded despite increasing institutional incentives to consolidate? This article places party system change in a broader context of decentralization and corruption. The decentralization and deconcentration of political power has opened multiple avenues for voters and elites to access state resources. Whereas major parties were expected to dominate resources in the immediate aftermath of the transition, changes to the formal and informal institutions eroded their control over the state. This has caused previously consolidated subnational party systems to fracture. The argument is demonstrated using narrative and newly constructed cross-district datasets. The paper develops the concept of rent opportunities, defined as the ability to access and abuse state resources. Party system expansion has been greatest in areas with high rent opportunities, where both voters and elites are particularly motivated by the competition for state resources. In these areas, characterized by large state sectors, the formerly authoritarian party (Golkar) initially won large electoral victories due, in part, to its control over patronage. As Golkar lost its ability to monopolize resources, the party system fractured. Voting for small parties surged and the party machine was replaced by a partisan melee. My argument exposes the limits of institutional engineering and underlines the formative role corruption has had on the evolution of Indonesia’s party system.
印尼的政黨制度在後蘇哈托時代得到了擴展。儘管為鞏固系統爾進行的蓄意調整有意賦予大政黨以特權,在隨後接連不斷的選舉中,選民的支持仍然分流到了更廣泛的一系列政黨上。為什麼 儘管有著日益加強的機構激勵機制, 政黨體系還是擴展了?本文從地方分權和腐敗的大背景出發來考察政黨制度的演變。政治權力的下放和分散化為選民和精英獲取國家資源開闢了多種渠道。儘管在轉型後的短期内主要政黨預計會掌控資源,隨後的正式的和非正式的制度改變卻削弱了它們對國家的控制。這導致曾經被統一的地方政當系統的斷裂。以有關敘事和新建的跨區數據集為基礎,本文提出了尋租機會這一概念--即獲取和濫用國家資源的能力。在尋租機會最大的地區,由於選民和精英們激烈爭奪國家資源, 政黨體系的擴展因而也最廣泛。這些地區通常擁有大型的國有部門,前獨裁黨(專業集團黨)之所以最初奪得大選的勝利,在某種程度上要歸功於它所擁有的贊助人。當專業集團黨失去其壟斷資源的能力後,其黨派體系也隨之瓦解。小黨的投票率開始飆升,取代大黨機器的是黨派混戰。本文顯示了體制操縱的侷限, 並凸顯了腐敗對印尼政黨制度的演變的影響。 Translated from English by Xin Huang
從惠顧機器到黨派混戰:地方腐敗與印尼政黨制度的演變