Canberra: ANU Press, 2022. ix, 325 pp. US$60.00, paper; free ebook. ISBN 9781760464981.
In international relations, various countries are associated with distinctively named forms of diplomacy, such as Chinese “ping pong” diplomacy and South Africa’s “quiet diplomacy.” However, perhaps none of these have had the lasting power of Thailand, whose foreign relations have long been synonymous with the concept of “bamboo diplomacy” or “bending in the wind.” In his thought-provoking book, A Genealogy of Bamboo Diplomacy: The Politics of Thai Détente with Russia and China, Jittipat Poonkham effectively challenges this common perception of Thai foreign relations, questioning its basis both strategically and epistemologically. He argues that, rather than a lasting national doctrine, “bamboo diplomacy” is a myth that guides Thai foreign policy on mistaken and essentialized assumptions. By critically examining the origins of bamboo diplomacy and exploring Thai détente with Russia and China during the 1970s, the author offers a nuanced analysis that reshapes our understanding of Thailand’s foreign policy discourse.
Poonkham’s exploration of the origins of bamboo diplomacy delves into a discursive rupture that challenged Thailand’s prevailing narrative of anti-communism and pro-Americanism in the 1970s. He argues that fundamental shifts in Southeast Asia’s geopolitics gave rise to new discourses that exerted considerable influence over Thai elites. These discourses included America-skepticism, “equidistance,” and regional cooperation, all of which pushed Thailand towards a policy of détente with China and the Soviet Union.
The book highlights three key episodes of Thai détente—under Prime Ministers Thanat Khoman (1968–1971), M. R. Kukrit Pramoj (1975–1976), and General Kriangsak Chomanan (1977–1980)—and examines the diplomatic and discursive practices involved in each case. The author’s research reveals, through a compelling analysis of discourses and diplomatic maneuvers, that Thailand’s perception of a long-standing tradition of balancing major powers is, in fact, a more recent transformation driven by changing international contexts.
Poonkham presents a dialectic of détente as the antithesis to anti-communism, which had been Thailand’s predominant thesis throughout the Cold War (293). The clash between these two ideologies resulted in a synthesis, which became known as “equidistance” or “bamboo diplomacy.” Historically framed as a unique national strategy, this diplomacy was (and continues to be) justified and discussed as a distinctive Thai form of diplomacy. However, Poonkham’s genealogical approach suggests that any longstanding tradition of bamboo diplomacy is more myth than reality. Indeed, the book even establishes a discursive struggle within equidistance and détente themselves, as the “balanced” and “unbalanced” camps disagreed over relations with the Soviet Union, leading to varying relations between Bangkok and the two communist powers, belying the idea of equal “bending” in the wind.
Central to this narrative was the pivotal summit between M. R. Kukrit Pramoj and Mao Zedong in 1975, which marked a decisive turning point in Thailand’s diplomatic practices (as well as an amusing example of the Thai sense of humour: upon hearing Mao complain that he was not long for this world, Kukrit “reassured” him that “[t]he world cannot afford to lose its number one bad man, as you know you are yourself” [200]). Despite being removed from office in a coup that attempted to restore anti-communism to a dominant position in Thai discourse, Kukrit’s meeting solidified détente as the dominant narrative in Thailand’s foreign policy. Indeed, Poonkham presents the coup d’état of 1976 that removed Kukrit as a coup against “diplomacy” just as much as one against democracy (127). Anxieties surrounding the rapid furthering of détente with the communist powers led even the Thai king to declare that Thailand risked becoming “Dieland” as the next domino to fall in a regional communist conspiracy (227). Yet, détente outlasted these reactionary attempts to return to an anti-communist strategy of international relations. The outcome of the dialectic proved lasting, and even conservative governments accepted the new synthesis of détente.
Poonkham’s methodology employs extensive multi-archival research, and incorporates the use of press materials as major sources. The genealogical approach enables a comprehensive exploration of the discursive shifts in Thai foreign policy, while the incorporation of archival press material provides valuable insights into the public discourse surrounding these shifts. Through the utilization of multiple archival sources, including diplomatic correspondence, official records, and archival press material, the author draws upon a rich collection of primary materials, enhancing the credibility and comprehensiveness of the research.
The extensive historical data involved in a genealogical analysis presents some challenges in maintaining a clear analytical thread. Additionally, the reliance on multiple archival sources and archival press material introduces some potential for biases and gaps in the available information, especially considering the importance of certain key individuals to Poonkham’s analysis. Despite these limitations, the author’s selection of primary sources, including archival press material, contributes to the comprehensive and credible nature of the study. However, Poonkham’s assessment may also slightly downplay the significance of regional cooperation, namely within ASEAN, as a crucial factor in shaping Thai foreign policy during the 1970s. A more balanced emphasis on both great power dynamics and ASEAN’s rising influence would enhance the book’s overall perspective.
Nevertheless, A Genealogy of Bamboo Diplomacy is a highly valuable contribution to the field, as it critically examines ideas surrounding “Thai” diplomacy that are too often accepted at face value. Poonkham provides a convincing argument that bamboo diplomacy is better understood as an invented tradition. The fact that this framework has become a metanarrative for multiple generations of Thai scholars underscores the significance of this work. As Poonkham notes, the bamboo diplomacy framework is now the standard against which Thai governments are evaluated in terms of their foreign policies. This perpetuates and essentializes Thai foreign policy, rather than recognizing it as the product of a recent discursive struggle. Thus, bamboo diplomacy functions as a heuristic device that overemphasizes transactional foreign policy and a sense of essentialist Thai “realism,” while conveniently suggesting a far-sighted genius within Thailand’s governing elites that spans multiple generations.
Ryan Ashley
University of Texas, Austin