A NARRATIVE OF DENIAL: Australia and the Indonesian Violation of East Timor | By Peter Job

In the years between 1974 and 1983, the conflict between the Indonesian military and the Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente /Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) reached its height, as Indonesia sought to forcibly incorporate East Timor and prevent its independence. In A Narrative of Denial: Australia and the Indonesian Violation of East Timor, Peter Job argues that during this period, the Australian government, led by Prime Minister Gough Whitlam followed by Malcolm Fraser, adopted a two-tier approach whereby officials privately supported Indonesian incorporation, and publicly projected a narrative for domestic and international audiences that denied the evidence of the humanitarian and military situation inside the territory and protected Indonesia from significant scrutiny. Whilst Australia was not the only country to articulate such a narrative, Job contends that Australia’s two-tier position was influential and significant: it helped to crystallize Indonesian attitudes in favour of incorporation; foreclosed multiple opportunities available to Australia to cooperate with Portugal and the East Timorese to support a decolonization process; and tempered domestic and international concern, discouraging more serious investigation and delaying the provision of international assistance to East Timor at a time when human rights abuses associated with Indonesian military campaigns were occurring. Through this argument, Job critically engages with the flawed yet popular assumption that Indonesian incorporation of East Timor was inevitable, and that Australia was not a “party principal” to the conflict, had little influence over events, and no viable policy alternatives. This book provides a chronological, detailed account of the establishment and maintenance of Australia’s foreign policy, with a strong focus on the policy enacted under the Fraser government, and successfully demonstrates that “both of these contentions are wrong” (3).

Through rigorous analysis of the historical record and interviews with key stakeholders, Job enhances the understanding of Australia’s role in the Indonesian occupation of East Timor under the Whitlam and Fraser governments in significant ways. First, Job offers additional empirical evidence of the depth of the Whitlam and Fraser governments’ knowledge of Indonesian policy on East Timor that was obtained through several channels, including Indonesian sources. For example, although the development of Australian policy under the Whitlam government is a topic that has been covered previously, Job offers great insight into how Indonesian officials from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Operasi Khusus (Special Operations, OPSUS) provided a combination of information and disinformation to their Australian counterparts during regular briefings; and discusses how, during such consultations, Indonesian officials worked to influence Australian acquiescence by highlighting the risks to the bilateral relationship, a point of sensitivity for the Australian government. Moreover, Job provides a more comprehensive account of the Fraser government’s policy toward Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor than has previously been available. Job offers significant insight into the efforts of Australian diplomats who supported Indonesia at the United Nations, and the Fraser government’s advocacy on behalf of Indonesia during and after the famine in East Timor.

Second, and through this analysis, the author makes clear the deep contradictions between the evidence of the situation inside East Timor that was available to the Fraser government, including information provided by Australia’s own agencies, and the official narrative created for the domestic and international audience. Chapter 5, for example, analyzes how the Fraser government attempted to neutralize the impact of the Dunn Report on East Timor (1977), which contained credible evidence of the humanitarian and military situation inside the territory based on interviews that James Dunn (formerly an Australian military intelligence officer and a diplomat) conducted with East Timorese refugees in Portugal, by refuting such allegations as “hearsay” (180). Through such public statements, the Fraser government contradicted its internal legal advice that the testimony contained within the Dunn Report met international standards for evidence. The political consequences of Australia’s narrative are also consistently highlighted. Job reveals how the Fraser government was regarded as an authority figure, was consulted as such after the Dunn Report  was released, and how its lobbying on behalf of Indonesia was influential on the policies of countries such as the Netherlands and contributed to marginalizing the East Timor issue at the international level.

Job’s analysis of the historical record is balanced, which contributes to the argument’s persuasiveness. For example, Job traces how Australia supported Indonesia to obstruct a United Nations investigation in East Timor undertaken by Vittorio Winspeare-Guicciardi, special representative of the secretary-general, in January 1976. Yet, Job equally recognizes that Winspeare-Guicciardi’s own behaviour and attitudes, such as his refusal to meet East Timorese refugees in Darwin, were also influential to the investigation’s limited outcomes. Moreover, whilst Job argues that the official narrative had significant political consequences, Australia’s policy is ultimately evaluated to have failed. One reason is because the government’s narrative was persistently challenged by a solidarity movement within Australia that exposed the reality of the situation inside East Timor and contradicted the official account. Here, perhaps, was an opportunity to discuss in greater detail the views of officials at the Australian Department of Defence, who had warned the Whitlam government prior to the Indonesian invasion that the Indonesian military would be likely to meet strong resistance, and that any attempt by Australia to conceal the conflict inside East Timor from public view would be bound to fail.

Job’s contribution is essential reading for anyone seeking a rigorous understanding of the policy options available to the Australian government during the period 1974 to 1983; how Australia’s policy was ultimately established under the Whitlam government and actively maintained under the Fraser government; how and why an official Australian narrative of denial was projected at the domestic and international level; and the political consequences for Australia, Indonesia, and the East Timorese.

Miranda Booth

Charles Darwin University, Darwin