Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019. xv, 376 pp. (Maps, figures.) US$35.00, cloth. ISBN 978-0-691-15213-4.
As promised in the subtitle, M. Taylor Fravel examines the military strategies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) assumed power in 1949. Basing his analysis mainly on a meticulous examination of Chinese sources, Fravel finds that there have been nine strategies, also known as “strategic guidelines” (zhanlue fangzhen), of which three, (those adopted in 1956, 1980, and 1993) were efforts to enable the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to wage war in new kinds of ways.
The first major change, in 1956, was prompted by the leadership’s fear of an American invasion, and emphasized positional warfare and fixed defenses to stop or blunt this threat. This was a marked departure from the dominance of mobile warfare that prevailed during much of the civil war with the Chinese Nationalists and the actions of Chinese troops during the Korean War. In 1980, after reasonably amicable Sino-US relations had been established, concern with the Soviet Union became the major issue. The PLA again emphasized positional warfare to counter an invasion from the north, representing a major strategic departure from 1964 throughout the Cultural Revolution, which had emphasized ceding land to an invader, mobile warfare, and decentralized operations. A decade later, with the now-dissolved Soviet Union no longer a threat, the third major challenge was how to prevail in local wars on the PRC’s periphery, reflecting concern with territorial and sovereignty disputes.
Fravel argues that China has pursued major changes in its military strategy not only in response to changes in the international system but, most crucially, only when the party leadership is united. In socialist states with party armies, as opposed to national armies, the party is likely to grant substantial autonomy for the management of military affairs to senior military officers who will adjust strategy in response to changes in the state’s security environment. Because senior military officers are simultaneously party members, the party can delegate responsibility for military affairs without fear of a coup or concerns that the military will pursue a strategy inconsistent with the party’s political goals. However, such delegation is possible only when the political leadership is united on the party’s basic policies and the structure of authority within the party.
In Fravel’s analysis, the 1956 strategy was adopted during a period of unprecedented unity within the CCP. Senior military figures initiated the changes in response to the lessons of World War II, the Korean War, and the advent of the nuclear age. The 1980 strategy was adopted after the rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping consolidated his position as China’s paramount leader and re-established party unity following the leadership splits and general upheaval of the Cultural Revolution. Senior PLA officers led the change in response to their assessment of the Soviet threat based on the tank and air operations of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The 1993 strategy was adopted after Deng restored unity following the suppression of the 1989 demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. At this time, senior PLA officers were heavily influenced by the advanced techniques that the US military employed in the Gulf War (1990–1991).
Only one change in China’s military strategy, that of 1964, cannot be explained by the argument over when Mao Zedong intervened in military affairs to change strategy. He did so not to enhance China’s security but to attack the revisionists within the party leadership that would lead to the launch of the Cultural Revolution two years later; otherwise, senior military officers would have initiated all other changes in China’s military strategy. The PRC’s nuclear strategy, however, remained constant over the same time period, with Fravel’s explanation being that the top party leaders have never delegated responsibility for nuclear strategy to senior military officers.
Considering the future, Fravel opines, whether China will pursue major or minor changes in its military strategy will depend on the continued unity of the CCP’s leadership over basic policies and the structure of authority. This is an interesting argument and is likely to guide analysts of Chinese strategy for many years to come. Yet questions linger. As Fravel states, top military leaders are also party members, hence removing the threat of a military coup d’état. Indeed, for many years before and after the founding of the PRC, the military and the party were virtually fused, with Deng Xiaoping as the last top leader with unequivocal credentials in both. Deng’s initial 1982 plan to clearly separate the hierarchies of party, state, and army was considered to have failed by the events at Tiananmen Square in 1989. While we know that the PLA received guidance from above, some commanders nonetheless resisted implementing the order to enforce martial law. What we do not know is whether the recalcitrant commanders identified themselves with specific members of the leadership, indicating that they were reacting to a split in the leadership; their public statements stated only that they did not think that the people’s army should be used against the people. Going forward, should a split in leadership occur, are military officers not likely to mirror this split, with some of them supporting one group of leaders or another? A hypothetical might involve whether to press forward with the PRC’s territorial claims in the East and South China Seas in the face of pushback from other powers, entailing a major shift in strategy, or a biding of time. How would top military commanders, party members all, react to an order at least some of them would not agree with? Or would such an order, or shift in strategy, not be announced until consensus had been achieved through prior discussions, which would not be the same as allowing senior officers considerable autonomy to adjust strategy.
Since Tiananmen, the enforcement of retirement ages for military commanders and the routinization of frequent transfers of commanders among military regions have enhanced the ability of the top party leader to ensure loyalty among the military leadership. Presumably, military leaders can be allowed considerable autonomy since they already know and agree with the party leader’s thinking. How durable this situation is remains an open question. One can only speculate whether a drastic change in China’s international security environment might yet cause a leadership split, thus testing Fravel’s analysis of whether a change in the PRC’s military strategy would or would not be forthcoming. In the end, a leader’s individual personal power—Mao’s in 1964, Deng’s in 1980, and, most recently, in Xi Jinping’s 2015 massive reorganization of the PLA—and the degree of trust he has with his commanders may be more important than institutional affiliations.
June Teufel Dreyer
University of Miami, Coral Gables