Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. xi, 272 pp. (Figures, maps, illus.) US$96.95, cloth. ISBN 978-0- 521-86460-2.
Unlike much academic writing, Tessa Morris-Suzuki’s work is almost always clearly written and jargon-free, impeccably researched and, above all, original. From the idea that area studies is an obstacle to international understanding (“Anti-Area Studies,” Communal/Plural, 2000) to untying the post-structuralist Gordian knot that sees all representations of the past as untrue (The Past Within Us, London and New York: Verso, 2005); from coining the term “cosmetic multiculturalism” to describe Japanese-style multiculturalism (“Immigration and Citizenship in Contemporary Japan,” in Japan—Continuity and Change, edited by Javed Maswood et al., London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002) to rethinking the contours of Japan itself (Re-Inventing Japan, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), Morris-Suzuki’s writing is consistently innovative and thought-provoking. Her new work, Borderline Japan, is no exception.
One topic which has captured Morris-Suzuki’s attention in recent years is the history of Japanese border controls, particularly in relation to undocumented Korean migrants in early postwar Japan. The present volume is perhaps best seen as the culmination of many years of research in this area. As she takes pains to repeatedly point out, this is a largely neglected and under-researched field: for most scholars postwar migration in Japan began in the late 1970s with the arrival of the Indochinese refugees and other visibly different “newcomers.”
The introductory chapter opens with the story of an individual, “Mr Koh,” a Japanese resident of Korean descent who in 1949 briefly returned to his birthplace to visit his sick mother. This giving of voice to individual actors—through the diaries of Korean migrants, the letters of Japanese officials, and the correspondence of American occupiers—is a key feature of the book as a whole. Another is the framing of such “micro” vignettes in a broad international “macro” context.
Chapter 2 paints a broad historical picture of migration to and from Japan from colonial times through to the Cold War. Chapter 3 focuses more narrowly on repatriation operations during the early years of the Allied Occupation of Japan, outward voyages carrying mostly Koreans and incoming boats bringing Japanese troops back home. One unexpected phenomenon, however, was the increasing number of boats smuggling Koreans back into Japan, partly a result of the strict regulations regarding how much those departing were allowed to take out of Japan. These unauthorized re-arrivals were the catalyst for the new border control system, including the introduction of alien registration certificates, detailed in chapter 4.
Chapter 5 focuses on another group of undocumented and “forgotten” foreign migrants, Allied military forces, especially US troops. Here, Morris- Suzuki contrasts the mobility of the military, able to enter and leave Japan at will, with ordinary people whose movements are tightly regulated. Those who violated these regulations—regulations which changed as Japan’s relations with neighbouring countries evolved—often found themselves in the newly established Ōmura detention centre, which is the subject of chapter 6. The one key that could save such people from captivity and deportation was “special permission to stay.” Morris-Suzuki highlights the discretionary special permission system as playing “a surprisingly central role in Japan’s postwar policy towards foreigners” (167) and writes about this in detail in chapter 7.
Chapter 8, the penultimate chapter, is also one of the strongest. While briefly discussing Cold War repatriations to China, the main focus is the mass repatriation of Koreans from Japan to North Korea: between 1959 and 1984 93,340 people left to start new lives. What stands out most sharply here is the eagerness of the Japanese government to be rid of as many Korean residents as possible, regardless of the destination or consequences for these individuals. This is evidenced by the creation of various disincentives to stay, beginning with the exclusion of Koreans and other foreigners from the new Japanese welfare system put into place in 1959.
The main failing of the book is that it is not long enough. Although Morris- Suzuki frequently stresses the importance of history in the understanding of contemporary migration issues, the emphasis is firmly on the former. Put simply, the author falls short in her promise to show how the history of the “borderline” sheds light on the nature of policies and controls in the present day. Only on the last page or two of the final chapter does she present her proposals for the future of Japan’s migration policy. As the author points out (245), the current migration control and nationality system is essentially unchanged since the Cold War—and arguably even earlier—and “resistance to change remains profound” (9). Why is this the case? For a system that has been shown to be so clearly shaped by global forces, why is Japan, as Erin Chung (Immigration and Citizenship in Japan, Cambridge: CUP, 2010) has noted, the only advanced industrial democracy with a fourth generation immigrant problem? These are the kinds of questions that remain unanswered and leave the reader wishing for an extra chapter or two.
With the issue of voting rights for foreign residents having dropped off the political radar and the rise of right-wing groups such as Zaitokukai (an abbreviation of “Zainichi Tokken o Yurusanai Shimin no Kai,” literally “Group of Citizens Who Do Not Forgive Special Rights of Foreign Residents”), there is a real worry that the history of foreign residents in Japan—and Korean residents in particular—is being forgotten. “Without understanding this history,” the author (3) warns, “it is impossible to understand the issues of migration in modern Japan.” In this regard, Morris-Suzuki’s book should not only be considered required reading for Japanese Studies scholars and students, but for all Japanese who are unaware of the circumstances and sufferings of non-Japanese, the vast majority of whom wanted and continue to want nothing more than to peacefully work and live in—and travel in and out of—a country they have come to call home.
Chris Burgess
Tsuda College, Tokyo, Japan
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