Harvard East Asian Monograph Series 442. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2021. xiv, 245 pp. (Maps, B&W photos, coloured photos, illustrations.) US$28.00, paper. ISBN 9780674260146.
Grace Huang’s book is a welcome addition to the literature on Chiang Kai-shek and the history of Nationalist China. As a political scientist, Huang focuses on Chiang’s leadership style, highlighting his consistent references to the Confucian concept of chi, which translates as “humiliation” or “shame.” Huang argues that this emphasis on chi played a central role in Chiang’s understanding of leadership as he employed humiliation and shame as “potent cultural tools to inspire his country, persuade posterity of the rightness of his actions, and ultimately shape China’s modern national identity in ways that continue to have repercussions today” (5).
The book is divided into two parts of four and two chapters, respectively. The first four chapters examine Chiang’s understanding of chi and the manner in which he employed it to confront Japanese imperialism. The final two chapters compare Chiang’s use of humiliation and shame to other leaders, both within China and without. Huang’s analysis is grounded in a thorough reading of Jiang Zhongzheng zongtong dang’an shiluë gaoben, the multi-volume collection of Chiang Kai-shek’s diary entries, speeches, and correspondence, published in 2003.
Author Huang is at her best in her analysis of Chiang’s use of humiliation in two specific cases: the 1928 Jinan Incident and the 1931 Mukden Incident. Operating from a position of weakness, Chiang rejected a military response in each case, instead urging patience in order to first achieve national unity before confronting the Japanese military. In his private diary entries and in public remarks, he frequently referenced the story of King Goujian of the Spring and Autumn Period, who stoically endured humiliation at the hands of a rival while preparing for later revenge. Through the Goujian story, familiar to most Chinese at the time, Chiang created a narrative to explain his unpopular decision not to respond to Japanese aggression with military force. At the same time, this narrative emphasized Chiang’s strength as a leader—one who had the discipline to endure humiliation and suffering in order to gain time to unify and strengthen the state. In the aftermath of both incidents, Chiang eschewed spontaneous reactions such as protests, boycotts, and violence, of which he saw little value. Instead, he sought to project calm and disciplined leadership, expecting the Chinese people to unite behind him. While many at the time decried Chiang’s failure to confront the Japanese as weak or ineffective, Huang asserts that Chiang believed he was demonstrating his legitimacy as a leader by displaying the strength required to withstand humiliation for the sake of achieving the larger goals of completing the Northern Expedition and unifying the country.
Beyond dealing with Japanese aggression, Huang also analyzes Chiang’s use of shame in pursuit of his domestic goals. Pointing out that chi was one of the Confucian Four Virtues that guided the 1934 New Life Movement (NLM), the author shows how Chiang leveraged this cultural term to shame the Chinese people—from his major military and political rivals to average citizens—to take responsibility for the nation’s weaknesses. This sense of shame, Chiang hoped, would lead to changes in behaviour and direct people toward his vision of a modern state and society. Far from a mundane list of social niceties, Huang sees the NLM as an example of the centrality of the concepts of humiliation and shame in Chiang’s leadership.
In examining the cases of Yuan Shikai and Mao Zedong, Huang points out that Chiang was by no means the only Chinese leader to invoke a humiliation narrative, but that the political environment strongly influenced the success or failure of these leaders in doing so. Yuan Shikai referred to national humiliation in attempts to win support for his policies, but Huang argues that the lack of a mass political consciousness prior to 1919 hindered Yuan’s efforts. Chiang, on the other hand, benefitted from the post-1919 political environment which proved far more conducive to mass mobilization. Yet the outbreak of full-scale war with Japan in 1937 undermined Chiang’s talk of patiently enduring humiliation and placed him in a politically vulnerable position. At the same time, it provided Mao with an opportunity to present an alternate humiliation narrative—one which blamed Chiang for China’s woes. Thus, Huang concludes that the political context had much to do with the success or failure of the humiliation narrative.
One of the more interesting chapters compares Chiang to Mahatma Gandhi, the Indian nationalist leader who harnessed the power of humiliation and shame to mobilize a mass movement in opposition to British imperialism. Gandhi’s Satyagraha, which emphasized self-control and willingness to endure suffering in order to effect political change, bore some similarity to Chiang’s approach. While some might see this as an odd pairing, Huang notes that both leaders employed culture-specific moral constructs to show how “building internal strength before confronting a stronger power can be an effective strategy for leaders of vulnerable states” (155).
Huang concludes that Chiang’s humiliation narrative left an enduring legacy in which “the lingering power of past humiliations has become tightly intertwined with China’s national identity” in recent years (158). Indeed, several contemporary Chinese leaders have cited China’s “century of humiliation” or referenced its Confucian traditions for political purposes. Yet Chiang Kai-shek’s Politics of Shame is most worthy of praise because it offers a nuanced picture of Chiang Kai-shek as a leader, which serves as a powerful alternative to traditional interpretations. Where others saw weakness in his leadership, Chiang drew on cultural sources to project strength and legitimacy. As such, Grace Huang has made an important contribution to a growing body of revisionist scholarship on Nationalist China which advances our understanding of this important period of China’s modern history.
Peter Worthing
Texas Christian University, Fort Worth