London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2019. vii, 209 pp. US$32.00, paper; US$30.00, ebook. ISBN 978-1-5381-2958-6.
Author Jean-Pierre Cabestan is a professor in the Department of Government and International Studies at Hong Kong Baptist University. His recent book, translated from French, lays out in detail why he believes enlightened dictatorship (not his term) will continue to govern modern China. His main thesis is that the Chinese leadership has developed a number of institutions and techniques to listen and consult with stakeholders in the economy and society (but with no obligation of heeding or accountability), while dealing decisively with dissidents and malcontents. As Xi Jinping has assumed paramount leadership and diluted collective control of the Party, continued economic growth is needed to legitimize the system. Politics remains the theatre of action for the elite.
The book is a careful and structured look at an emerging super power, and especially the carefully constructed party-state as it emerges under Xi. Cabestan addresses the central question of whether China, undergoing massive changes at all levels, will move towards democracy. He examines the potential forces for change, and those striving to maintain the present stability. In the end he concludes that Beijing’s authoritarianism has sufficient will, instruments, and techniques to maintain itself. Political order and economic growth remain the common values uniting China’s rulers and most of the population.
Cabestan notes the various sources of the party-state, which can be characterized as paradigms, or explanatory models. Each has strengths and weaknesses, but may be necessary to draw a complete picture of the regime. Scholars have interpreted the PRC as a new Chinese empire, with echoes of Confucianism, Legalism, and a meritocratic bureaucracy. The Guomindang has also been a source of more liberal institutions, at least in the form of elections, law, and constitutional government. While the party of Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen proclaimed single-party dictatorship as a transition to democracy during a period of political tutelage, the CCP intends to be a permanent ruler of the Chinese state, with few restrictions on its power.
Another source of the party-state is addressed by a third paradigm: Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, although the rhetoric and force of this ideology has declined in recent years, with the term “revolution” drained of its sense of historical inevitability. Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has earlier precedents, and the Party’s discretionary power has few, if any, legal restrictions. “Rule of Law” strengthens the state, not democracy, and “freedom” has expanded in the economic, not political, realm. Pragmatism overshadows ideology, and China certainly enjoys greater openness than during the Maoist period. Lessons of the Soviet collapse and the spectre of chaos after Tiananmen have guided Chinese rulers to stress economic progress, stability, and central control. Some dissent is tolerated, sometimes as a bellwether of public opinion, but is repressed when it becomes a threat to order.
A fourth paradigm sees China becoming a “normal state,” with competing political parties, rule of law, and a market economy. This has been the hope of foreign policy makers, with an expectation that China might follow the path of Taiwan and South Korea. These two countries have been highly successful in economic development, provide recent models, are based on sinitic tradition, and advanced under dictatorships. The author considers this scenario unlikely, although reforms of the judiciary and economy have made trade and investment more predictable. According to Cabestan, concessions made to China upon entry into the WTO (2001) have given the country an unfair advantage: “China has been using WTO rules to its advantage, invoking the right to recourse in settlement matters that the institution offers while maintaining its own protectionism in all sectors where it wishes to support its ‘national champions’” (185).
Cabestan explores these interpretations, though not as paradigms, and examines how these past patterns of behaviour have contributed to the contemporary party-state. He concludes that while these past and present influences have had roles in the formation of modern China, they have not and will not determine its future. While not positing the Chinese state as sui generis, the author conveys a reluctant respect for the Party’s ability to consult and lead the masses. Public opinion is consulted, elections are controlled by the Party, and economic growth is maintained. Social media are given limited freedom, and dissidents are tolerated until their power becomes too broad. He urges the Euro-American democracies to remain skeptical of Chinese claims of democracy, and to recognize that “one would have to be blind not to notice that the CCP is at war against us, our values, and our ideals” (177).
He has implicitly defined a fifth paradigm of the Chinese party-state, a powerful human machine with growing strength to protect and expand its interests in Asia and elsewhere. The top leaders are autocrats without becoming aristocrats, although “princely” economic antics are not uncommon. Control of media, long-term plans to integrate Taiwan and Hong Kong, an appetite for economic growth fed by the need to satisfy expectations of the citizenry, oversight of religions, civil society, and social media, and continued modernization of military and public security organs are central components of the Chinese party-state. This unparalleled organization challenges the economic efficacy of liberalism and has brought life-affirming benefits to the largest population in history. Hopes for peaceful coexistence and mutually profitable trade should not delude Euro-Americans into expecting a democratic China to evolve. Rivalry, friction, and disputes will cloud external relations, and one hopes these will not spiral into military incidents. The book makes an important and unapologetic contribution to a more realistic appreciation of modern China.
Robert Bedeski
University of Victoria, Victoria
University of Washington, Seattle