Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2020. x, 320 pp. (Tables, figures.) US$80.00, cloth; US$65.00, ebook. ISBN 9780472131761.
Embarking on a critical re-assessment of Graham Allison’s “Thucydides’s Trap,” the articles compiled in this edited volume undertake a critical theory-guided and empirically grounded investigation of the impact of China’s global rise on the changing global order.
The golden thread connecting the chapters is the assumption that the 2008 global financial crisis marks a turning point in world affairs with China resorting to a more “assertive” positioning in regional and global politics. In their introduction, the editors—Huiyun Feng and Kai He—develop a nine-dimensional framework to conceptualize international order and trace its recent transformations (not including power shifts in the post-Trump era). This typology of international order is composed of three issue areas—security, politics, and economy—and three layers that represent three types of order transition: Feng and He propose a differentiation between order transitions via alterations of international norms, via the reshuffling of power distributions, or via modifications of rules (and institutions). Their typology merges multiple streams of international relations theory and seeks to incorporate both material/structural and ideational dimensions of change in international order.
Part I opens with Steve Chan’s discussion of the flaws and conceptual misfits of Allison’s “Thucydides’s Trap” (and his related prediction of an inevitable war between the United States and China), pointing specifically at the sample bias and the lack of universal applicability of Allison’s case-related findings and extrapolations. Chan concludes with a warning that the omnipresent Thucydides’s Trap-induced threat perceptions might finally become a self-fulfilling prophecy (46). David A. Welch complements these critical remarks on the Thucydides’s Trap with an empirical comparison of the power capacities of the United States and China as well as the related international power distributions. Turning to the regional power constellations in the Indo-Pacific, T. V. Paul adds that most states would oppose Beijing’s prospective hegemonic power ambitions. As leadership always requires followership, the regional order in Asia would thus not be expected to undergo any major transition (as long, at least, as there are not any unexpected changes in the material or normative capacities of the US and its regional allies). This is further supported by Mingjiang Li and Xue Gong’s analysis of Southeast Asian states’ responses to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). They conclude that there is no unison acceptance of Beijing’s regional infrastructure and investment initiatives. Part II provides the reader with a historical-comparative evaluation of international order and change in East Asia, with Yuan-kang Wang underlining that the Ming-Qing transition did not result in a general transformation of rules and institutions, whereas the Opium Wars triggered a transformation of China (from tianxia to guojia) caused by the abolition of the tributary system of East Asia’s regional order. In addition, part II elaborates on the cultural and philosophical underpinnings of China’s foreign behaviour and Chinese visions on regional and global order. Part III shifts the focus to the global level. Cameron Thies’ national role theory-based approach fits nicely into the editors’ research framework as it illustrates the multiplicity of Chinese role-identities and their flexible adaptation over time. Xiao Ren’s chapter introduces an important footnote to the question on China’s impact on the international order by distinguishing between “being shaped” and “shaping,” hence stressing the dynamic construction of roles and identities via interactions and socialization processes. Xiaoyu Pu’s overview of leading Chinese scholars’ studies on China’s role in global governance and their general consensus that Beijing would be rather reluctant to replace the U.S. as the sole global power centre resonates with Xiao’s prediction of China striving for “co-leadership” in global governance.
In sum, the essays compiled in this volume present a snapshot of theory-guided research on China’s rise in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Several chapters underline that China used the vacuum created by the U.S.’s withdrawal from multilateral agreements under President Trump to position itself as a responsible global power, especially in the fields of global finance and world economy. The G20 meeting in Hangzhou as well as Chinese signature speeches at the World Economic Forum in Davos are quoted to illustrate that, contrary to scenarios of China as an overt challenger to the existing liberal system, the PRC tries to maintain and stabilize the existing global capitalist order and the principle of free trade while addressing the need for modest reforms (an idea widely shared by most states located in the so-called Global South).
The authors, however, could not foresee the multiple shocks to and turbulences of the global system with the outbreak and spread of COVID-19, followed by (sub-)national and regional lockdowns, and the re-emergence of the autocracy-democracy-divide in world order narratives. From today’s perspective, some parts of this volume thus appear as historical accounts of scholarly perceptions and views on China’s global role prior to the year 2020, and depict a post-Cold War order that by now seems to have been lost. While the Thucydides’s Trap paradigm is still alive, novel threat perceptions of an emerging strategic alliance between Russia and China and scenarios of their joint promotion of autocracy and coordinated acts of aggression are currently dominating the international debates on China’s regional and global role. A follow-up volume to cover these recent perceptions and future-oriented projections of world order transformations (and the role of China) would be highly desirable.
Nele Noesselt
University Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg