Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2021. 264 pp. US$120.00, cloth. ISBN 978-94-6372-514-9.
China’s rise as a global power has generated many debates in international relations. Is China challenging the existing global order? How do various countries respond to China? In China’s Political Worldview and Chinese Exceptionalism, Benjamin Tze Ern Ho provides a fresh and innovative analysis. Challenging conventional theoretical approaches, Ho emphasizes Chinese exceptionalism as a crucial analytical framework for understanding Chinese international relations. Empirically, the book examines multiple dimensions of China’s international relations, including China’s political worldview, national identity, national image, the Belt and Road Initiative, and perceptions of China from regional states in Southeast Asia. Ho collected empirical evidence through in-depth interviews and discourse analysis.
Chapter 1 explains the primary analytical framework. Ho argues that China perceives itself as being exceptional, and such a perception has influenced China’s approach to the practice of international politics. Chapters 2 and 3 analyze two ideational dimensions of Chinese international relations. Focusing on four leading Chinese scholars (Yan Xuetong, Qin Yaqing, Zhao Tingyang, and Zhang Feng), chapter 2 discusses how Chinese exceptionalism shapes the theoretical discourse of Chinese international relations. According to Ho’s analysis, all four scholars use indigenous Chinese ideas to challenge Western paradigms in international relations. Chapter 3 discusses how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses Chinese exceptionalism to provide a “unified identity” and legitimate its domestic governance. Chapters 4 and 5 shift the focus from the domestic context to the theatre of international politics, analyzing China’s image promotion and the Belt and Road Initiative, respectively. Chapters 6 and 7 examine how China is perceived by policy elites in three Southeast Asian countries, namely Vietnam, Indonesia, and Singapore. With various concerns about China’s behaviours and policies, regional states tend to see China as a country not any different from other powerful nations. Chapter 8 summarizes the findings and implications. Ho concludes that Chinese exceptionalism provides a powerful framework for understanding China’s international relations. Ho also suggests that China’s claims of exceptionalism lack universal appeal and are fundamentally self-serving. In addition, chapter 9 offers a preliminary analysis of China’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic.
With this book, Ho contributes to the subject literature in several ways. First, his analysis enriches and broadens our understanding of the motivations of Chinese foreign policy. Ho challenges the conventional focus and puts exceptionalism at the centre of the book’s analysis of China’s international relations. Second, by focusing on ideas and identity in China, Ho provides rich empirical evidence of China’s ideational and political motivations. Finally, Ho identifies the potential gap between China’s self-narrative and other countries’ perceptions of China.
While the book helps deepen our understanding of Chinese international relations, some questions need further discussion. First of all, is the Chinese worldview largely coherent, or is it contested even in the Xi Jinping era? For instance, Ho assumes Chinese international relations scholars have a relatively coherent worldview. But the reality seems to be more complicated. Among the four leading Chinese scholars Ho cites, Yan Xuetong openly opposes the so-called “Chinese school” of international relations while strongly advocating a scientific and universal approach to international relations theorizing. For Yan, the ancient Chinese thoughts are examples scholars could use to advance theoretical thinking. Yan does not intend to emphasize the uniqueness of Chinese materials (Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers, Princeton University Press, 2019). Meanwhile, Qin Yaqing seems to advocate a uniquely Chinese approach to international relations. Second, is Chinese exceptionalism a constant factor, or might it vary significantly across different periods? In the 1990s, China’s dominant discourse emphasized socialization and integration with many Western-led international institutions, and during that period, Chinese exceptionalism was hardly a prevailing political view. However, the nationalistic worldview has become more prominent in the Xi Jinping era. In this sense, the actual influence of the narrative of exceptionalism has changed over the years. Finally, is Chinese exceptionalism unique? Ho admits that different countries consider themselves exceptional for various reasons. However, from a social science perspective, there is also a general tendency that is universally valid. For instance, based on social psychological research, all human beings and social groups tend to see themselves as good and different (Marilynn B. Brewer, “The psychology of prejudice: ingroup love and outgroup hate?” Journal of Social Issues 55, no. 3 [1999]: 429–444). Not surprisingly, all great powers try to justify their leading role through some ideational framework in international relations. In this sense, Chinese exceptionalism is not that unique.
Above all, China’s Political Worldview and Chinese Exceptionalism provides a refreshing analysis of Chinese foreign policy. The book sheds new light and opens new space for debates on China and international relations.
Xiaoyu Pu
University of Nevada, Reno