Politics, Economics, and Inclusive Development. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. xii, 245 pp. (Tables, Figures.) US$100.00. ISBN 978-1-137-40298-1.
The public perception of civilians in civil wars is, commonly, that they are passive victims. The proportion of civilian as opposed to combatant casualties tends to confirm this general understanding. Yet as Shane Barter points out in Civilian Strategy in Civil War, civilians are not always or even often passive in the face of civil war, but have active responses to the environment that confronts them.
Barter seeks to explore civilian responses to civil wars by examining three case studies: Indonesia’s Aceh province, Pattani/Patani in southern Thailand and Mindanao in the Philippines. Within the context of these case studies, he puts forth a categorization for civilian responses to civil war that can be broadly grouped into three, sometimes overlapping, categories. They are that civilians may flee civil war, they may speak out about it, or they may support one or other of the combatants.
Although not stated explicitly, each of these categories can be understood to exist on a sliding scale, from little activity to high activity. One category not addressed by the author, however, is that point at which “civilian support” actually morphs into, and back from, active participation in aspects of the conflict.
A case study of Timor-Leste shows that the underground resistance appeared, for all intents and purposes, to be comprised of civilians, but who in fact were actually members of the “Clandestine Front,” as part of the formal FALINTIL command structure. So too in Aceh, where the number of formal Free Aceh Movement combatants was stated in the Helsinki peace talks as only those in formed, mobile units but who, after the peace agreement was signed, were identified as including “civilians,” expanding GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka)forces by perhaps 300 percent.
In one sense, the set of categories identified is fairly obvious, as anyone who has experienced such conflict will have experienced one or more of the identified responses. Yet because most people, at least among the audience this book is aimed at, have not experienced such war first hand, they might not be aware of these almost instinctive responses.
From the beginning of the book the author has experience in the three research sites, each located in Southeast Asia and within Muslim communities. This is a useful case study, but would need to be recalibrated if the lessons drawn here are to be applied elsewhere.
It is also worth noting that, while this is a fairly comprehensive account of civilian responses to conflict, it is structured and reads like a PhD thesis, from which it appears to be drawn. Like some PhD theses, it over-reaches a little in the introduction, saying that its approach “promises to lead to new understandings.” Perhaps “contribute” to new understandings might have been more appropriate.
The author acknowledges that his main experience is in Aceh, Indonesia, which, since 2005, has not been the site of civil war. As the author notes, Patani and Mindanao are more difficult sites for research, because of the continuing conflict. He also notes this as being a reason why so little work has been done on the subject, including limitations upon his own research.
The potted histories of each of the conflicts provide some of the most interesting and readable parts of the book. They are succinct and largely accurate accounts. However, like all histories that involve conflict, aspects of the accounts presented are contested. Barter relies heavily on Aspinall’s understanding of the Aceh conflict which, while academically respected, is not agreed on by many Acehnese. Similarly, he suggests that there was a lack of continuity in Aceh’s separatist movement, a view that has been rejected by former GAM members themselves.
Barter also argues that the proportion of the Indonesian army that were ethnic Acehnese was higher than for other regions in Indonesia. This reflects a lack of understanding of the territorial organization of the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) and the establishment of the regional Acehnese command (Kodam), Iskandar Muda, named after the former Acehnese sultan and, in theory, being entirely comprised of Acehnese (it was not). So, too, the TNI used such a tactic in Timor-Leste, where they recruited Battalions 744 and 745 from the local community, as well as for proxy militias.
In relation to “ethnic cleansing” (52), Barter appears not to acknowledge that, as noted above, “civilians” can segue into combatants and that ethnic minorities in Aceh were regularly recruited into TNI proxy militias.
One other surprising observation of the author, taken from a secondary source, was that “secessionism is not part of the MILF vocabulary” (165). This is factually incorrect, given that the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) was formed in 1977 with the explicit intention of forming a separate Islamic state.
While no such study can be entirely comprehensive, it is also odd that there is no mention of the communist insurgency in Mindanao. Focusing on civil wars involving Islamic groups is topical and coherent, but seems geographically inconsistent.
In all, however, this is an interesting book and a useful resource for those wishing to understand why civilians in conflict zones do not always, or often, conform to stereotypical patterns of behaviour. Civilians always exercise some degree of agency, if sometimes within constrained parameters, and their responses reveal much about the nature of the conflicts in which they are engaged.
Damien Kingsbury
Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia
pp. 485-486