Constitutionalism in Asia Series. Oxford, London, New York, New Delhi, and Sydney: Hart Publishing, 2022. xi, 326 pp. US$118.00, cloth. ISBN 9781509927692.
To what extent is Thailand a constitutional monarchy? How much of the monarch’s power is legal-constitutional rather than informal? This study addresses these questions. The author is an academic specializing in law at the University of Paris (Sorbonne) who has concentrated on Thailand and human rights. Her dissertation investigated Thai constitutionalism and kingship. Her focus on monarchical authority is highly relevant in Thailand—a country where perceived insults to its kings can produce long prison terms.
Chapter 1, the introduction, establishes the study’s purposes and arguments regarding monarchy’s legal authority. The purposes of the book are to examine 1) the near-absence of analyses of constitutionalism and monarchy in Thailand; 2) the local relevance of the importation of legal concepts into the country and how “modernization” equates with “secularism” in Thailand; and 3) how Thai law, politics, and religion have been interwoven to construct constitutional “bricolage” (9). The author argues for rethinking the concept of constitutional monarchy in Thailand—that the acculturation of Thai constitutionalism depends upon an increasingly global constitutionalist discourse; and bricolage as a concept and method should be used to understand constitutional “transplants,” especially in the case of Thailand (10).
Chapter 2 points out that the Sakdina laws and 1805 Three Seals Code, which were derived from Hindu-Buddhism, placed monarchy at the pinnacle of power. Kings Rama V, VI, and VII opposed transcending toward representative democracy. However, a 1932 coup against absolute monarchy imposed a Soviet-type constitution, thereupon King Rama VIII backed a second constitution permitting limited monarchy (56). Chapter 3 stresses that in the decades prior to 1932, Siam’s leaders mixed conceptions of Buddhist kingship with Western legalism. The 1932 coup-makers invoked kingship (monarchy is enshrined in all of the country’s constitutions) to legitimize enactment of their preferred constitution(s).
Chapter 4 states that under King Rama IV, Siam embarked on the legal Westernization of law and kingship. His reforms, and those of Rama V and Rama VI, secularized law from being based upon religion to being based upon state-led modernity, which contributed to the consolidation of monarchical absolutism. The post-1932 constitution became a “substitute king” when Rama VII abdicated (101). Chapter 5 emphasizes that after the Cold War began in 1947, Thai constitutions became progressively more authoritarian (except for the more liberal 1974 charter). These constitutions generally provided for an appointed Senate, a palace-appointed Privy Council, and emergency provisions (129). In the process, the monarchy regained some “inviolability” (129).
Chapter 6 stresses that militaries could only become power-brokers in Thailand when their actions were legitimized by the monarchy. Coups could only occur when the king assented to them. Monarchy could trump the military because laws deemed the monarch supreme. Simultaneously, the king, who held crisis authority, was legally allowed to behave extra-constitutionally (151). Chapter 7 argues that the post-1947 routinization of the king’s approving of military coups (through decree) eventually made a palace imprimatur for any putsch necessary. Thus, the king progressively affirmed his supremacy in the constitutional hierarchy as well as the senior player in the monarchy-military alliance.
Chapter 8 contends that Thailand’s post-1991 “new constitutionalism” promoted representative “Democracy with the King as Head of State (DKHS)” (184). Under Rama IX, palace-led pluralism and anti-corruption efforts were pushed. Though the 1997, 2007, and 2017 constitutions were based upon Westminster parliamentarianism, the charters one-by-one became more authoritarian. This paralleled the growth of DKHS authoritarianism. Chapter 9 states that after 1997, the new Constitutional Court gradually gained the right to rule in the name of the king. Judicial activism was equated with obedience to royalty. The notion of dhammaraja was personified in Rama IX, who enjoyed extra-constitutional powers. The Constitutional Court could exert these supreme powers as a “substitute king” (201).
Chapter 10 argues that after 1996, There was a “judicialization at the [King Rama IX’s] request” followed by “juristocracy under royal command” (224). In 2006, pressure from the king led leading judges to void that year’s general election. The king endorsed coups and coup-makers’ constitutions in 2006 to 2007 and 2014 to 2017. King Rama X refused to sign the 2017 constitution until certain redrafts of it enhanced the Royal Prerogative. Both Rama IX and X promoted juristocracy, ensuring that courts remained under royal control. Chapter 11, the conclusion, stresses that Thailand’s post-1997 juristocracy brought down almost every elected Thai premier since 2001—in the interest of royalists (266). Also, as a country where judges and generals hobnob together, Thailand is a “textbook case of authoritarian constitutionalism” where constitutions are used to legitimize the actions of monarchy and military (267). Ultimately, the notion of DKHS is the “bricolage [importation and indigenization] of Thai constitutional identity.”
Regarding strengths, this book is unprecedented in examining how laws about monarchy, derived from Hindu-Buddhism, became enmeshed in Western conceptualizations, ultimately resulting in legal, hybridized bricolage. Another strength is the author’s rich use of Thai and non-Thai sources in writing this book. Finally, the author’s ability to show how Thailand’s constitutional court rose from a strong judicial body to become a substitute king is novel. The book would be a good read for students of comparative constitutionalism and/or Thai studies. Sometimes it seems a bit dense, with palace-backed constitutions appearing perhaps overly deterministic. Actually, only since 1981 have Thai military coups needed monarchical endorsement to be successful. But as a work that explains in depth the evolution of monarchical domination over Thailand’s various constitutions, it is unsurpassed.
Paul Chambers
Naresuan University, Phitsanulok