Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2023. vii, 186 pp. US$95.00, cloth. ISBN 9781955055918.
As its title, Countering China: US Responses to the Belt & Road Initiative, suggests, Edward Ashbee’s volume deals with US foreign policy reactions toward Beijing’s grand BRI project initiated more than a decade ago. In light of the abundance of titles on the BRI that have accumulated since its inception—spanning discussions on geopolitics, political economy and the initiative’s influence on specific regions—Ashbee’s volume is a refreshing addition to the existent literature, in the sense that coherent studies concerning the US perception of the BRI and its policy responses remain paltry. In Countering China, the author seeks to propose a framework for understanding US foreign policy that weaves together concerns for great power competition, domestic debates regarding China, and the formation of particular projects precisely aimed at pushing back against China.
In less than two hundred pages, Ashbee elaborates on the competition between the US and China (chapters 1–3), the adoption of the Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development (BUILD) Act (chapter 4) and the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative (chapter 8), the Blue Dot Network (chapter 5) and cooperation with Europe in countering China (chapter 7). A major contribution of the title is the revelations on domestic developments in the US such as the BUILD Act, B3W initiative and Blue Dot Network, which continues to be under-researched, especially in relation with the BRI. In addition, utilizing the concept of historical institutionalism, the author makes an effort to embed the discussion in theory, which not only adds to the academic value of the title but also sets it apart from many works concerning the BRI that are excessively descriptive in nature. The short summary at the end of each chapter nicely captures the main points in the preceding discussion while guiding readers through the proposed framework.
In Countering China, Ashbee argues that under the Trump and Biden administrations, the US has introduced new initiatives aimed at balancing China’s expansion. The initiatives complement existing policies that are reactions to the increased competition between the US and China. While such an argument may not be novel, it puts partnerships, including the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), the Australia-United Kingdom-United States Security Pact (AUKUS) and transatlantic cooperation, into focus, and suggests a comprehensive picture of alliances and networks centered on the Indo-Pacific region. In the sense that the BRI, as proposed by China, is an intercontinental initiative that seeks to realize market and institutional integration in Eurasia and beyond, Ashbee’s argument is interesting. The US, since 2016, has adopted a partnership strategy aimed at counterbalancing China. The strategy involves new and renewed security and economic institutions that pose a greater challenge to China than simple bilateral competitions.
While Countering China addresses US-China competition in terms of the BRI and the Trump and Biden administration’s institutional responses, an important question that Ashbee does not address is Washington’s seeming preference of countering China in the Indo-Pacific as opposed to other regions. This is not an unimportant point, as China has made great efforts in developing its western front more than twenty years ago, a move that fits well with the BRI’s emphasis on Eurasia. In other words, between initiatives centered on the Indo-Pacific and initiatives that focus on other regions, the US seems to devote more resources and enjoy more success in the former. Hence in terms of countering China, the mainstay of US strategy may lie in the Indo-Pacific rather than elsewhere. Meanwhile, in terms of the BRI, China’s strategic emphasis is not necessarily in the Indo-Pacific. Juxtaposing the strategies of the great powers, one may begin to question whether US strategy targeted at the BRI is truly on the mark, or more of a global strategy that aims to rally support from partners in other regions, such as Europe, and push back against Chinese expansion from two fronts. Despite touching on the respective responses of European countries towards the BRI, Ashbee does not elaborate too much on whether there were larger US strategic considerations involved, particularly in the Biden administration.
On another note, Ashbee seems to adopt the assumption that the BRI is a geopolitics and foreign policy centered strategy that China has employed to further its interests, which in turn calls for a strategic response from the US. While Washington’s dominant position may be such, the fact that the BRI may be more than just a geopolitical or foreign policy initiative and Beijing’s strategy may be more complex is neglected. An example is China’s charm offensive through the establishment of Confucius Institutes in countries along the BRI. These Chinese education institutions present a challenge that is generally overlooked by policy makers, as the US continues to invest greater effort on hard balancing. Noting the wide ambition of the BRI, it is obviously impossible to tackle all the proposed aims under the initiative. However, the central argument of Countering China could have been reinforced had the author considered the limited US resources to counter the BRI, and the necessity of concentrating its efforts on the Indo-Pacific.
Overall, Countering China provides readers with a comprehensive look at the US’ strategic response towards the BRI, one that puts into perspective the US rivalry with China, search for cooperation with Europe, and establishment of institutions that seek to realize national interests both at home and abroad. Ashbee’s work provides important insights for readers interested in understanding the competition between the US and China and US foreign policy in general, and paves the way for further studies on the BRI. The author’s proposed framework may be beneficial and offer an important reference for future research that takes on a specific state’s response to the BRI.
Tony Tai-Ting Liu
National Chung Hsing University, Taichung