Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. US$34.00, paper. ISBN 9781009114202.
If, as Barrington Moore and Theda Skocpol have shown, the Communist Revolution was a watershed event in the making of China’s modernity, this project did not conclude in 1949. Instead, China’s modernity has been remade by subsequent revolutionary movements, notably the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and the 1989 Tiananmen Movement. Having completed an award-winning, widely acclaimed book on the Cultural Revolution (Collective Killings in Rural China during the Cultural Revolution, Cambridge University Press, 2011), Yang Su now provides a profound analysis of the 1989 Tiananmen movement and massacre, an event pivotal to the life experience of his generation.
In Deadly Decision in Beijing, Su focuses on the complex interactions between elite conflicts and popular protests. Rather than treating the state leadership as a cohesive body or as clear-cut ideological factions, Su examines the intricate relationships within the ruling elite, showing how their internal conflicts shaped policies that influenced the protests and China’s political trajectory afterward. Overall, Su offers a superb account with sociological insight, historical depth, and literary elegance, exemplifying the best of historical and political sociology. It deserves the status of an instant classic in China studies, joining the ranks of outstanding scholarly works on the Tiananmen movement.
Su’s central concern is why this peaceful movement ended in bloody suppression. To answer this, he considers three competing theoretical models to explain the decision-making process behind the violent crackdown: (1) the revolution suppression model, framing the event as a “society-versus-the-state” conflict, with repression as an authoritarian regime’s default response; (2) the two-way factionalism model, viewing reformists within the political elite as potential allies of the social movement and attributing the crackdown to the reformists’ defeat by hardliners; and (3) his own three-way succession model, which places Deng Xiaoping, the supreme leader, at the heart of elite politics. This model shows how the protest reshaped the political landscape and became a tool for elites vying for control, suggesting that Deng used the unrest to assert his military authority among his peers—both conservatives and reformists.
The book compares the three explanations through detailed analyses and historical narratives in four empirical sections. Part 1 examines Deng Xiaoping’s role as supreme leader, highlighting both the extent of his authority and its limitations. Su introduces the “Crown Prince Problem,” referring to the challenge faced by party elites concerning leadership succession. Despite Deng’s considerable power, he was caught between conservative elders and his reformist successors and hence forced into political maneuvering. Su argues that these succession-related tensions are crucial for understanding the internal power struggles within the party and its response to the 1989 protests.
In part 2, Su contends that party elites co-produced the Tiananmen movement from mid-April to mid-May. While General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and Premier Li Peng were divided on characterizing the protests, Su argues that Deng’s positioning ultimately became decisive. When elite tensions and student protests co-evolved to increase intensity, Deng, less focused on ending the protest than on leveraging it, undermined Zhao’s more conciliatory approach.
Part 3 examines the government-student interactions from the martial law decision on May 17 to the massacre on June 3–4. Su contends that the student protest did not justify extreme military measures and offers his explanation for why a forceful intervention occurred. He argues that Deng used this crisis to build a temporary alliance with his conservative rivals, removing Zhao Ziyang and securing a new leadership with minimal party disruption. Su further suggests that the military show of force was excessive and clearing Tiananmen Square could have been accomplished with far fewer troops, making the large-scale military intervention unnecessary.
In part 4, examining the post-Tiananmen period, Su argues that Deng was playing a strategic “long game” during the 1989 crisis. Immediately after Zhao’s removal, Deng selected Jiang Zemin as a compromise leader since Jiang had conservative backing. Despite this, Deng continued to push reform, strengthening his position through the famous Southern Tour of 1992, which enabled him to counter conservatives and consolidate support from Jiang. This post-Tiananmen victory demonstrated the significance of Deng’s decisions during the 1989 protests.
Su concludes that his succession model offers the most compelling interpretation of the historical events, surpassing the other two models. His analysis is grounded in extensive use of recently available primary sources, including diaries, memoirs, and government reports. Su’s work aligns with the latest historical approach to studying Tiananmen (Jeremy Brown, June Fourth: The Tiananmen Protests and Beijing Massacre of 1989, Cambridge University Press, 2021; Yang Zhang and Feng Shi, “The Micro-foundations of Elite Politics: Conversation Networks and Elite Conflict during China’s Reform Era,” Theory and Society 53, vol. 1, 2024), contrasting with earlier studies based mainly on ethnographic and interview data (Craig Calhoun, Neither Gods Nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for Democracy in China, University of California Press, 1994; Dingxin Zhao, The Power of Tiananmen: State-Society Relations and the 1989 Beijing Student Movement, University of Chicago Press, 2001).
My main disagreement is that Su attributes too much agency to Deng and too little to other leaders. At times, he portrays the Deng/Zhao split and the decisions from 1989’s suppression to 1992’s reform as Deng’s “long game,” as if Deng had a calculated, long-term strategy. My own research instead finds that the reformist bloc’s breakdown and military crackdown were products of situational conflicts amid an emergent, unpredictable crisis. However, I agree that more definitive evidence is needed to determine which explanation is more convincing.
For a long time, there has been a division between area studies and disciplinary knowledge in the China field. Su’s work demonstrates that this division is unnecessary and unproductive. Like his first book, Deadly Decision in Beijing represents a new wave of theory-informed China studies. It not only tells a nuanced story of a crucial episode in modern Chinese history but also contributes fresh insights to social science theories: elite politics, social movements, and historical sociology. Su’s scholarship sets a standard for all sociologists studying China.
Yang Zhang
American University, Washington DC