Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021. xviii, 282 pp. (Tables, graphs, figures.) US$90.00, cloth. ISBN 9781108491280.
Just as democratic peace suggests that democracies do not make war with other democracies, democratic civil peace suggests that democracy reduces domestic violence by making repression more costly and providing alternative means for political struggle, even if transitions see spikes in violence. Jacques Bertrand’s new book, Democracy and Nationalism in Southeast Asia: From Secessionist Mobilization to Conflict Resolution, analyzes how democratic transitions condition secessionism in Southeast Asia. It shows how the turn to democracy reduces violence, managing although not resolving conflicts. Through a fine-grained examination of a handful of cases, Bertrand analyzes variation in timing and outcomes, providing readers with a rich, grounded understanding of how democracy manages minority nationalism.
Democracy and Nationalism in Southeast Asia features eight chapters, including a compelling conceptual chapter and dedicated chapters on five cases, bookended by an introduction and conclusion. Bertrand’s five cases are Aceh and Papua (Indonesia), Mindanao and the Cordillera region (Philippines), and southern Thailand. A point of departure is why Aceh enjoys meaningful territorial autonomy, with Mindanao doing so later, the Cordilleran struggle rebranding itself in terms of indigenous rights, while Papua continues to see violent resistance with limited autonomy, and southern Thailand was afforded no concessions. Democracy may help to reduce violence and manage conflicts, but this plays out differently across cases, some enjoying concessions while others face simmering violence and repression. To explain variation, Bertrand introduces conditioning factors, including the cohesion of armed groups and minority nationalist movements, states’ credible commitments, political institutions, and timing.
One of the book’s many important contributions relates to timing. Bertrand differentiates between democratic transitions and democratic stabilization, the latter preferred over “consolidation” given the unsettled nature of democracy in Southeast Asia. In place of the inverted U-shape suggested in other studies, with closed autocracy and stable democracy seeing less violence, but moments of transition enabling resistance, Bertrand makes a compelling case for more of a bell curve. Early on in transitions, we see brief moments of optimism, where civil society groups celebrate the end of dictatorship and armed groups wait and see. But we also see violent flare-ups later on, as democracy stabilizes, especially where national legislatures try to claw back concessions.
In terms of case selection, readers may be surprised to see the Cordillera region discussed alongside more traditional separatist conflicts. Although featuring violent resistance from distinctive ethnic minorities with territorial claims, the Cordillera region was initially linked to leftist insurgents, had fewer demands for separatism (and is less “separable”), and is framed as more of an indigenous movement. Myanmar may offer more comparable separatist conflicts, however it has not seen a clear transition to democracy. The inclusion of the Cordillera region makes for distinctive insights, showing how armed groups can shift to reframe their struggle. It also underlines the nativist flavour of all separatist conflicts, with the potential for indigenous rights framing especially relevant for Papua.
One quibble is that the book focuses not on secessionist conflicts, but instead on “nationalist conflicts.” This seems to be what most would understand as separatism: “[n]ationalists are mostly concentrated territorially and make strong demands for self-determination or independence” (238). The author’s hesitancy to frame these as secessionist conflicts makes sense, as demands may move from independence to autonomy or other concessions, shifts at the heart of this book. The book’s preface offers a thoughtful reflection on the meaning of “ethnic conflict,” a term that lumps together varied types of violence and may overpredict conflict. Nationalist conflict emphasizes that the groups in question typically identify not as ethnic minorities, but as nations—almost by definition, a named group with widespread mobilization for self-government may be seen as a nation. However, the term “nationalist conflict” seems imprecise, since some groups lack a clear national identity, be it fragmented plural indigenous nations in the Cordillera or Papua or ethnic divisions in Mindanao. The book speaks of “nationalist mobilization,” which can be confusing, since it is nationalists (at the country level) that separatist groups must often confront. For many readers, “nationalist violence” suggests actions from national majorities, not those struggling against them, or at least conflicts over national identity across a country. It could also refer to mobilization in communal violence, a blurring that the author criticizes in the term “ethnic conflict.” Minimally, the term “nationalist conflicts” needs the qualifier “minority” to make sense. It seems that separatism might be a clearer term, as it does not assume that the goal is secession, but instead a group governing itself separately.
Bertrand’s study cautions against the idea of such struggles being resolved through democracy, instead noting that democratic systems can better manage minority demands. This is an essential point, consistent with findings in the broader literature on majority-minority relations. Majority groups typically want final resolutions, for instance with indigenous claims, when instead we must see intergroup relations as ongoing negotiations as new challenges and generations emerge. For relations between majority and minority nations, we must speak of managing rather than resolving demands. As a consequence, it will be interesting to see how a decline in democracy will impact these cases. The book is focused on shifts toward democracy, especially in the 2000s. As Southeast Asia sees democratic collapse and erosion, it will be important to analyze how this might reduce the space to manage these cases through peaceful means.
Democracy and Nationalism in Southeast Asia provides a seminal account of how democracy conditions the struggles of minority nations. Democracy enables new forms of mobilization and makes violence more costly for all sides, allowing for minority demands to play out more peacefully. How this plays out varies, and Bertrand’s considerable expertise helps to guide the reader through varied pathways. The book will be essential reading for those familiar with Asian politics seeking to understand conflicts, as well as experts on conflict seeking to understand these cases.
Shane Joshua Barter
Soka University of America, Aliso Viejo