Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012. xiii, 257 pp. (Graphs, tables.) US$26.95, paper. ISBN 978-0-8014-7776-8.
In Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China, political scientist Andrew Wedeman explains the double paradox of how rapid economic growth and widespread corruption have coexisted in China since the beginning of the economic reform era (1978 to the present). Wedeman argues that petty corruption existed in pre-reform China, increased significantly after the beginning of economic reforms in the 1980s, and intensified in the 1990s when China deepened its transition from a command to market economy. With escalating corruption, however, the Communist Party and state initiated an anticorruption program that successfully prevented the increasing corruption from running out of control. Thus, rapid economic growth coexisted with rising corruption in post-Mao China.
Wedeman’s book includes seven chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the double paradox of rapid economic growth and rising corruption. Chapters 2 and 3 put the double paradox in comparative contexts by examining developmental corruption in South Korea and Taiwan, and the predatory corruption in developing countries, respectively. In these two chapters, Wedeman argues that China’s corruption is neither structural, as existed in developmental corruption, nor systematic plunder, as found in Equatorial Guinea and Zaire, although China’s corruption is by nature predatory. Thus, Wedeman claims that he solved the first paradox, the “worsening corruption and sustained rapid economic growth” (197), because corruption did coexist with rapid economic growth elsewhere, as in the case of developmental corruption. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 seek to solve the second paradox, a “worsening of predatory corruption and sustained rapid economic growth” (197).
Chapter 4 describes the origins and evolution of corruption in post-1949 China. By presenting quantitative data in graphs and tables, Wedeman argues that in the 1980s and early 1990s, newly increased corruption was limited and thus not a prior barrier to growth. In addition, he argues that corruption was concentrated at low levels. The purpose of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms was to secure the party’s political legitimacy and thus policies that would stimulate economic growth rather than serve private gains were designed and implemented at the higher levels. Furthermore, corruption only intensified after the acceleration of privatization of state assets, such as state enterprises and land, in the 1990s. This intensification of corruption has involved more and more high-level officials, who did not prevent growth but grasped the opportunities to feed on market reforms.
Chapter 5 argues that China’s corruption shifted from predatory (direct thefts of state assets) to transactive corruption (official-business exchanges) after the deepening of reforms in the 1990s. Contrary to the literature, Wedeman argues for the transitional nature of China’s corruption. He contends that corruption will decrease as the process of privatizing state assets gradually concludes. He, however, admits that this is subject to “three crucial caveats,” which I will discuss at the end of this essay. Otherwise, Wedeman warns that marketization will create crony capitalism.
Chapter 6 evaluates China’s ongoing war on corruption. Wedeman argues that China’s anticorruption effort is successful in the sense that it has prevented corruption from spiraling out of control. Wedeman first points out that the goal of an effective anticorruption effort is both to punish and convince people of the risk involved in corruption. Wedeman then argues that Chinese officials convicted of corruption either received criminal prosecution or administrative penalties that often devastated their careers. Then, he uses four officially published cases to argue that the risk is real, although it may be low, as these individual cases show the authorities’ willingness to attack high-level corruption. Chapter 7 concludes the book, partly by likening China’s corruption to American corruption during the Gilded Age. Wedeman argues that like historical American machine politics, China’s corruption is disorganized, fragmentary, and individual based, because the Chinese “regime as a whole, as an institution, has not, thus far, degenerated into an instrument of plunder” (190–191).
Wedeman does briefly point out the limitations of his major arguments. He mentions that the transitional nature of China’s corruption is conditioned on three caveats: markets should function in a competitive manner, property rights should be established, and political and economic powers should be separated (119). He also states that corruption may create extreme negative consequences on economic growth, as some of the scholars have argued (196). He continues to discuss three factors that have contributed to corruption: lack of property rights, problems in the regulatory and legal system, and China’s urban-rural divide. However, all the caveats and factors Wedeman names have long been discussed in both official and academic circles since the opening of China’s reform era.
A reader who is familiar with Chinese official statements on China’s corruption will easily see the parallels between his arguments and the official ones. I think this is perhaps due to Wedeman’s deep immersion in his sources, all published and mostly official, which may well have influenced his viewpoint and arguments. This is very understandable and not uncommon in scholarly work. Also, I was sometimes frustrated by the repetitiveness of some of his arguments. Finally, Wedeman’s comparison of China’s current corruption to American corruption in the Gilded Age ignores the fundamental differences between American and Chinese institutions. Overall, Wedeman provides an excellent description of the evolution and shape of China’s corruption but stops short of a deep analysis.
Aiqun Hu
Arkansas State University, Jonesboro, USA
pp. 134-135