Singapore: NUS Press [distributed by The University of Chicago Press], 2019. x, 357 pp. (Tables, figures.) US$38.00, paper. ISBN 9789813250529.
While the presence of money and corruption in Philippine elections is considered commonplace, Money Politics, Patronage, and Clientelism edited by Allen Hicken, Edward Aspinall, and Meredith Weiss provides a unique contribution by delving into how patronage flows through networks at the local level. In differentiating between patronage as a material resource distributed for benefit and clientelism as a personalistic relationship of power, they demonstrate how local machines serve as “the foundation of contemporary Philippine politics” (3). Amidst the background of weak national parties are local political machines made up of “clientelist (including familial) ties and short-term instrumentalist arrangements” (10) that have upward-downward, reciprocal relationships to the national and lower-levels. The ever-present shadow of family politics and name recognition familiar to Philippine scholars still looms, but they, too, circle around the “critical role of machines and the centrality of patronage politics” (4).
The book focuses on a snapshot of local dynamics in the 2016 election, especially in regard to the disbursement of patronage. The bulk of the book consists of case studies covering one local race per chapter. They are grouped by region: chapters 3–10 on Luzon, 11–14 on Visayas, and 15–17 on Mindanao. Evidence presented in these chapters came from field research, interviews, and event reports conducted by about 50 researchers. The researchers also conducted survey experiments along with national and local surveys. One of the strengths of the book lies in the descriptive richness and depth of each case. Each chapter follows a standardized structure to present the fieldwork, leaving readers to infer the cross-case comparisons.
Local party machines center on the candidate with an inner circle directly below them. These central-level brokers are family members or people with enduring loyalty to the candidate. Under them are village or barangay-level brokers known as liders. These are usually barangay captains who are non-partisan, elected officials with a solid reputation in and knowledge of their community. Below the liders are multiple sub-barangay (purok) leaders who engage directly with voters.
The entire machine is maintained through expectations of reciprocity and loyalty. Everyone expects some form of financial or administrative assistance. Loyalty is also reinforced by a history of supporting the machine or the promise of money, employment, and future support. Such machines, however, are loyal to the candidates rather than the parties. While national party alignment may change, the ongoing clientelistic relationship between liders and candidates maintains the stability of a machine’s overall composition.
Local machines translate knowledge about constituencies that guide campaign decisions for targeting voters, networking maintenance, and image-making. Money and other patronage are often necessary for victory, but these factors alone do not guarantee it. The knowledge of local machines is crucial to effectively dole out patronage. Vote buying is pervasive among challengers and incumbents, even for reluctant ones (263). Grassroots brokers create voter lists, which guide how much to pay someone to vote or to stay home. Closer to election day, certain campaign efforts are banned. But this does not stop machines from discreetly disbursing money with sample ballots, operating on the “implicit understanding” that accepting the money means voting for a specific slate (103). Aside from open payment, voters may also be offered so-called loans that are forgiven if the candidate wins but incur high interest if they lose, or are paid as poll watchers who never are assigned duties on election day. Liders can also serve as gatekeepers by verifying the documentation of which supporters deserve money or programmes (245).
Money is not the only way to buy votes. Buying votes can involve providing direct services or goods ranging from pocket money, coffins, basketball shirts, a round of drinks, or space to hold an event. At campaign rallies, campaigns are often expected to provide entertainment and food to accompany celebrity endorsements. Local machines are critical for maintaining and expanding a candidate’s network, since they keep track of events and which actions resonate best with certain groups. In some areas, candidates are expected to make house visits and appearances at birthdays, baptisms, weddings, or drinking events. Failure to attend is seen as offensive. Lastly, local machines can ensure that candidates “maintain visibility” and a positive image (101). They work consistently to provide assistance to local leaders, sometimes making it clear to voters that access to certain social services is dependent on the politician (132). Incumbent candidates rely on machines to highlight their achievements while in office and even take credit for nationally funded projects as their own. While there is no systemic way to ensure voter compliance, machines play a role here, too. Liders employ house watches to ensure people stay home on election day. They may also offer collective incentives available to everyone only if a candidate wins.
Another key strength of the book is that the focus on machines and institutions does not sacrifice the importance of embedding them in Philippine social-political culture. Utang na loob (debts of gratitude), expanded kinship ties, and loyalty play a role in trusting voters. In addition, liders are aware of what forms of pakikisama (camaraderie) or pakulo (gimmicks) will be effective for specific groups.
Similar to existing research, this book reinforces how pervasive and extensive patronage is in Philippine elections. It differs by clearly demonstrating the flow of patronage through machines to local networks. Aside from leaving room for future researchers to build upon their rich descriptions with local comparisons, the book provides new ways to think about voter agency, even in a patronage democracy. Vote buying goes beyond exchanging cash, but voters who “trade their votes for temporary gain” still have perceptions of candidate competency and what they can do while in office. By directing patronage flows and targeting voters, machines help candidates strategize effectively and provide for voters in the process. While corruption can still occur, machines also provide a way to address voter needs, especially in a state that struggles to do so.
Mary Anne Mendoza
California State Polytechnic University, Pomona