Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. xxii, 255 pp. (Graphs, B&W photos.) US$29.95, cloth. ISBN 978-0-19-067208-9.
Carl Minzner’s ambitious book seeks “to explain what is taking place in China” (xvii) and “to explain the complex interplay between state and society that has developed in China during the reform era” (xviii). He argues that the era of post-Mao reform ended around the mid-2010s and that the nation’s touted “rise” faces a future troubled with four major challenges: sharp and increasing socioeconomic divides, weakening state governance, social unrest, and ideological polarization. To provide such broad coverage of China, the book is organized into six chapters in addition to an introduction and conclusion, with two main categories: chapters 2 to 4 deal with dimensional issues, each discussing, respectively, society and economy, politics, and religion and ideology, while chapters 1, 5, and 6 provide more general coverage, offering an overview, a comparative analysis, and hypothetical future scenarios. The book is written with the general public in mind, and its efforts in this regard, including its crisp writing, should be applauded.
The author positions his book against two trends, or, in his word, problems, of American academia in China studies: toward “ever-greater disciplinary specialization” (xx) and an inclination to engage in cheerful celebrations regarding the rise of China. In the latter regard, the book has successfully achieved its goal: it traces the historical development of China’s reform programs, showing how the initial momentum of “political institutionalization” (10)—which the book identifies as the backbone supporting the variety of achievements China has made since the late 1970s—has now been abandoned or reversed, thus bringing about those major challenges mentioned above. A series of Chinese dreams in the socioeconomic sense—ranging from the imperialist one in which education leads to an elitist career, to the communist one in which economic equality dominates social relations, and to the current Xi Jinping version—have all evaporated. With internal decay, the political system has not been capable of addressing country’s tremendous social unrest. By promoting an official ideology (the “red zone,” in the author’s words) while allowing some religions (the “grey zone”) but cracking down on others (the “black zone”), the state has kept Chinese people from enjoying diversity and freedom in their spiritual life. State interference in residents’ belief systems has caused sociopolitical tensions and pitfalls, which, the author argues, are “the inevitable result[s] of Beijing’s adamant refusal to contemplate substantive political reform” (10). “China’s frozen political façade” (15) cannot facilitate China’s rise. These observations challenge the “rose-colored glasses” (xix) American watchers of China have worn for decades and seem much closer to the reality of today’s China.
The author explicitly sets out to target the narrow-minded specialization seen in social-science research, and instead focuses on the big picture of the significant topic under study. However, Minzner does so at a cost. He investigates issues across society, politics, law, religion, and the economy, well beyond academic disciplinary boundaries. To take on such broad categories without compromises in depth of thought and academic sophistication is a significant challenge. In the case of this book, its weakness seems not to lie so much in its interdisciplinary design or longue-durée scope, but largely in its lack of clear focus, relatively weak intellectual engagement with the subject, and especially, the absence of a theoretical framework or, at least, an effort at conceptualization. The three chapters addressing comprehensive discussion are weak, and a simplified historical summary replaces a framework that is sorely needed for a book of such great scope. Comparative analyses are often random and historically mismatched (for example, India of the 1940s compared with China of the 2010s), and policy suggestions are surprisingly contradictory with the book’s central argument, leaving the reader to wonder how the United States can still engage with China without giving up its bottom line if China’s era of reform has already closed. But in the author’s own words, though not in entirely the same context: “Unfortunately, these doors are being shut” (xvi).
It is particularly interesting, albeit confusing, to read that “[l]aw is becoming less and less relevant to China’s future” (xvi) in a book written by a law professor who specializes on China. As a political scientist I could agree with this statement even more than the author does, by declaring that law has never been particularly relevant to the People’s Republic of China. But that declaration may not be enough, as a scholar’s mission must be to explore the why and the how of such a situation. In a similar vein, when the book upholds that “[s]ince 1989, Beijing has firmly adhered to one core principle: uphold the rule of the Chinese Communist Party at all costs” (18), the reader would expect to hear an answer to why China has been able to achieve this goal thus far, while facilitating the rise of China, but shall not be able to in the future? It would certainly be unfair to say the book offers no answer to this question, but the answer often turns tautological: the author tells readers that the Chinese Communist Party previously engaged in reform and now it refuses reform, especially political reform. But what explains this change? The book emphasizes consequences, much more than the deep underlying causes.
This book is an important contribution to China studies in the sense that it opens readers’ eyes to China’s reality. The book is largely descriptive, reading often like a prolonged public-opinion piece with an attempt at a systematic discussion of prominent issues in China, but with little analytical depth. It might serve as a good introduction to an undergraduate course on contemporary China.
Guoguang Wu
University of Victoria, Victoria