New York: Routledge, 2023. 166 pp. (Illustrations.) US$45.00, paper; US$160.00, cloth. ISBN 9780367250713.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, a distinguished foreign policy strategist, published a well-known book in 1997, titled The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. In the book, Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor under President Jimmy Carter from 1977 to 1981, outlined America’s strategic challenges to maintain its global supremacy in the twenty-first century. The task facing the United States, he argued, was to manage the conflicts and relationships in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East so that no rival superpower would arise to threaten American interests or well-being. Therefore, developments in Eurasia are of the highest stakes for US national interests.
Events in recent years on the Eurasian landmass—especially the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, dubbed a proxy war between Russia and NATO/US, and a potential war in the Taiwan Strait between the US and China—have proved Brzezinski prescient.
International relations scholar Gregory O. Hall’s new book Examining US-China-Russia Foreign Relations elaborates on the Brzezinskian thesis by highlighting the geo-strategic challenges in Eurasia in the mid-2020s and exploring the key to maintaining a peaceful world today, i.e., how to manage US-China-Russia triangular relations.
No matter how one measures power and influence today, the United States, China, and Russia remain three of the most consequential countries in the world. These three great powers (Big3) continue to dominate geopolitics and geoeconomics today. Therefore, smoothly managing their bilateral and trilateral relations is vital to maintaining international security and promoting global development.
Hall’s study is informed by neoclassical realism, the English School, and foreign policy analysis, with focus on the interactions of external environments and key domestic factors facing the Big3 in their foreign policy making. Hall developed a refined strategic triangle model which contains four variables: independent variable 1, “International System” and independent variable 2, “Events and Trends,” intervening variable “Domestic Context,” and dependent variable “Foreign Policy Outcomes” (13). He suggests that this model makes an important contribution to the study of a major aspect of the current international order.
Hall notes that three elements are important to understand the strategic dynamics in US-China-Russia relations: power shift, multilateralism, and agency (xvi). He discusses three major findings in the book: the international system remains in transition as the United States attempts to stay at the top while Russia has declined, while China is gaining ground; the strategic triangle itself is adjusting to this global power shift, with the tenor and tone of US-China (Axis-1) and US-Russia (Axis-2) relations progressively worsening and China and Russia (Axis-3) drawing closer to each other; and finally, key domestic dynamics, notably the emergence of authoritarian leaders, are having a greater influence on the politics of the strategic triangle in the early twenty-first century (4–5).
The world today is unstable and divisive largely due to growing tensions between Russia and the US-led West and between the United States and China. The close Russia-China “no ceilings” relationship has also contributed to the Cold War-style division between the East and the West.
Ironically, the more the United States and its allies try to counter China’s rise and reduce Russia’s power, the closer China-Russia relations will become. This explains the dilemma Beijing faces in the Russia-Ukraine war. A strong advocate of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, Beijing should have sided with Ukraine when Russia invaded its neighbour. However, it cannot and will not, given the hostile relationship between Beijing and Washington. Perhaps the best one can hope for is Beijing’s proclaimed “neutral” stance in the Russia-Ukraine war. It will not publicly condemn Russia nor will it provide military assistance.
Hall asks: “Can the Big3 Coexist?” (27). Recent developments suggest that this is going to be very difficult. The ultimate goal of US foreign policy is to maintain US global dominance into the future. Meanwhile, some sort of a multipolar system is forming, with both China and Russia being major forces or “poles” in this new global structure, which also includes other emerging powers such as India, Brazil, and South Africa.
As Hall points out, global power is becoming more diffuse, spreading eastward and southward (30). Russia remains a key military power though its overall strength has drastically decreased from the days of the former Soviet Union. China’s reemergence as a great power is stunning, probably even to the Chinese themselves. The United States still sits comfortably at the top, both militarily and economically, but China is quickly narrowing the gap. Are the Big3 and the rest of the world ready to face the new power dynamics? Can they adjust their mentality and policies to match the new reality?
Hall analyzes how Donald Trump handled or mishandled US foreign policy. According to Hall, Trump scuttled Obama’s broad multilateralist approach and replaced it with transactionalism and partial retreat from multilateralism (43). Domestically, Trump exhibited authoritarian inclinations and resorted to populism to win supporters. Externally, he ditched international cooperation and withdrew from many international organizations and agreements. Notably, he launched the so-called trade war with China, triggering an all-out competition and even confrontation with China, a trend that his successor Joe Biden has continued.
Lacking mutual trust, the Big3 are clearly stuck in the classic security dilemma, as demonstrated in NATO expansion and the Russia-Ukraine war as well as military buildup in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. Hall calls on the Big3 to bridle their competition and conflicts, avoid confrontations wherever possible, and practice non-interference in others’ domestic affairs (132). This is a tall order since the Big3 are not showing any signs that they can or are willing to do so.
This book is a timely, insightful, and thought-provoking study of contemporary international politics dominated by the relationships between and among the Big3. It is a solid and fascinating study situated at the intersection of international relations and foreign policy analysis. Theoretically rich and analytically rigorous, the book has significant policy implications today. It is highly recommended to students and scholars of international politics or anyone who is interested in understanding why our world today remains so problematic.
Zhiqun Zhu
Bucknell University, Lewisburg