Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022. xix, 388 pp. US$130.00, cloth; US$99.00, ebook. ISBN 9783030971588.
Bangladesh—a South Asian postcolonial, over-populated and Muslim-majority country—achieved its independence through a bloody, nine-month-long war in 1971. Bangladesh is inclined towards authoritarianism under the present prime minister Sheikh Hasina, who has ruled for nearly 15 years. Fifty Years of Bangladesh, 1971–2021, by Taj Hashmi, is a wonderful contribution for several reasons. First, the book is a myth-buster that sheds new light on many known and unknown facts about the history, politics, society, and culture of the country. Second, it is the only historical-sociological work with a particular focus on culture, development, governance, and identity issues ranging from 1971 to 2021. The study convincingly argues that Bangladeshis suffer from an acute identity crisis and their political commitment reflects more of a deep-rooted patron-client relationship, a common feature of pre-industrial peasant societies. Hashmi has painstakingly collected both primary and secondary sources to frame the arguments of his book.
This book is organized into ten chapters. Chapter 1 provides background and sets the larger context for the rest of the study. The following chapter, “Why Bangladesh? A Prehistory up to the Rise of Mujib, 1757–1963,” traces the roots of Bangladesh. The author points out the collective ignorance of history among most of the people of Bangladesh. It is known that the British colonial takeover occurred in the then British India for Nawab Sirajuddaula’s commander-in-chief Mir Jafar’s treachery during the Battle of Plassey in 1757. Hashmi shatters the myth of the “Mir Jafar factor,” noting that “Clive has around 3000 troops and ten small cannons against the Nawab’s 62,000 troops and fifty large cannons. Mir Jafar and two other generals, Rai Durlabh and Yar Litfar Khan, with 30,000 infantry and 20,000 calvary troops, abstained from fighting after a few hours when Clive’s victory was imminent and inevitable” (31). He thus argues that Robert Clive’s and his officers’ military genius, advanced training, and discipline, along with the British East India Company’s (BEIC) military organization, strategies, and tactics, decided the ultimate decline of the Nawab. The BEIC initiated the Bengal Government Opium Monopoly in 1763 and the land under poppy cultivation reached 303,500 hectares in 1767. The BEIC plundered massive resources from Bengal, resulting in food scarcity, poverty, hunger, malnutrition, and famines. For instance, a total of 10 million people died in the Bengal Famine of 1770. The Permanent Settlement of 1793 further introduced a quasi-feudal relationship between landlords and tenants. In this regard, I would like to argue that the Permanent Settlement, known as the Zamindari system, was a manifestation of the British divide and rule policy regarding Hindus and Muslims. The system widened the class and communal feuds between the landed aristocratic oligarchy and the landless or underprivileged peasants.
In the subsequent two chapters, Hashmi provides politico-historical and sociological appraisals of the rise and fall of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib) as a leader between 1963 and 1975 and reveals a few sensitive pieces of information that are likely to challenge existing narratives and popular discourses on the nationalist and bifurcated political history of Bangladesh. First, Mujib romanticized the idea of secession between East and West Pakistan with Indian assistance. Second, Mujib traveled to Agartala, the capital of India’s northeastern state of Tripura, and stayed there for 15 days. The then-Pakistani military dictator President General Ayub Khan called Mujib a “secessionist.” Accordingly, Ayub Khan launched the Agartala Conspiracy Case against Mujib and his associates, accusing them of plotting the secession of East Pakistan. In the meantime, Mujib’s 1966 Six-Point demands became exceedingly popular in East Pakistan, giving new momentum to the anti-autocracy movement there, especially under the leadership of Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani. Mujib framed his Six-Point demands as the Magna Carta of Bengali freedom. Hashmi also explores how P. N. Ojha, first secretary of the Indian High Commission, stationed in Dhaka, gave pro-secessionist forces money and the assurance of India’s support, including arms and ammunition for the separation of East Pakistan. Third, Mujib agreed to become the prime minister of a united Pakistan, especially after the overwhelming victory of his party in the 1970 elections. Hashmi addresses an interesting issue of negotiated understanding between the military leader Yahya Khan and Mujib, that included a list of possible officeholders, with Mujib listed as the prime minister and Yahya Khan as president under a proposed Awami League government (88). Sadly, less than a year after Bangladesh’s 1971 independence, Mujib lost his appeal, a dilemma facing many charismatic leaders in developing countries.
Chapter 5 evaluates the policies and programs initiated by the successive regimes of Zia and Ershad from 1975 to 1990. Hashmi examines the civilianization programs of both the Zia and Ershad regimes from a comparative and historical perspective. In this chapter, Zia is depicted as a relatively honest and patriotic ruler, whereas Hashmi portrays Ershad as corrupt, opportunistic, and dishonest. The next chapter investigates the factors behind the dynastic politics and failure of parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh, especially under the rules of two rival women leaders: Begum Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina. Hashmi discusses the pro- and anti-Indian postures pursued by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) leader Begum Khaleda Zia and Bangladesh Awami League (AL) leader Sheikh Hasina. Moreover, it is alleged that Indian insurgents originating from that country’s seven northeastern states often take shelter in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), composed of the three tribal districts: Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban. The CHT is affected by violent ethnic insurgency movements supported and financed by external forces. As the author observes, “India and its intelligence agency RAW have been allegedly inciting, arming, training, and harbouring leaders and guerrilla fighters of the Shanti Banhini in India” (195). Of late, a new separatist group, namely, the Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF), has surfaced in the CHT and the hill districts of India, Myanmar, and the disputed territories between China and its neighbours. This new armed insurgency has upset the balance of power between the secessionist outfits in the CHT since the Peace Accord was signed in 1997. Chapter 7 provides an amazing case study of the Bihari Muslim minority community in Bangladesh. It explores the reasons the Biharis, who migrated to East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in the wake of the Great Partition of 1947, have not assimilated into the mainstream. As a result, the Bihari Muslims, living with second-class status in Bangladeshi society, have been persecuted and marginalized. Chapter 8 addresses the issues of identity crisis in relation to the global Islamic movements, terrorism, and cultural security paradigms.
The book has some organizational flaws. Several sentences are repeated in the preface and acknowledgements (vii). Endnotes are provided in each chapter, but the author could have inserted a well-crafted bibliography to make the work more reader-friendly and standardized. I am quite certain that some readers will have different perspectives on the arguments made and facts presented in this book. Overall, however, this book will be an eye-opener for students of Asian history, politics, and security, as it asks the reader to confront and question the stereotypical ideas and thinking prevalent in many postcolonial Third World states like Bangladesh.
Saleh Shahriar
North South University, Dhaka