Asian Security Series. London; New York: Routledge [an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business], 2018. xvi, 220 pp. US$49.95, paper. ISBN 978-0-367-66666-8.
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and Political Islam is an insightful book that helps us better understand how ideas on the caliphate fluctuate across the transnational Islamic movement, Hizbut Tahrir (HT). This volume also encapsulates how Hizbut Tahrir has reached out to Muslims around the globe to unite under one identity as ummah. As a national chapter of Hizbut Tahrir, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) is committed to uniting Indonesian Muslims in pursuit of a caliphate. This book focuses on the rise and fall of HTI, from its first official emergence in the 2000s until its dissolution by the Indonesian government in 2017.
Although the caliphate is a long way from being realized, Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman tells the story of the collective identity of hizbiyyin (the supporters of a caliphate) that is used to attract outsiders and to retain existing members within HTI. Interestingly, former HTI members still adhere to hizbiyyin, though no longer in the form of HTI. While former members of HTI and current members of HT outside Indonesia feel dialogue to be the best method of convincing other Muslims to believe in the notion of a caliphate, former members instead resort to violent actions to establish a caliphate. Accounts of this comprise one focus of this book. Hizbiyyin is certainly involved in ongoing debates with Islamic sects in and outside of Indonesia regarding the adequacy of those sects’ Islamic ideologies relative to HTI. This sense of superiority eventually served to isolate HTI, making it a solitary fighter with certain Islamic values not shared by others. Most importantly, HTI’s persistence in promoting the caliphate, albeit in the face of constrained responses from other Islamic organizations, is another point of this book.
This book seeks to challenge the findings of what it sees as previous imbalanced studies of Islamic political movements. Some previous studies have employed macro theoretical frameworks, such as a political opportunity structure or resource mobilization theory, to analyze how political movements emerge. This approach focuses on the possibility of a group taking collective action as a result of social and political changes and networking. Neither theory pays much heed to individual motivation for joining a movement. By contrast, other studies have used micro theoretical frameworks, like identity and ideology, to analyze the reasons individuals become involved with movements. This can sometimes lead to a lack of attention to the larger social context. The author attempts to bridge the current scholarly debates by using framing theory. According to him, framing is “an insight into how movements act to change the cognitive structure of targets, and the conditions which lead to the success of movements in doing so” (7). This theory leads the author to use caliphate and hizbiyyin as the essential framing concepts. The caliphate ideology opposes the existing framework of democracy and capitalism, the secular values of which HT and HTI strongly repudiate. Meanwhile, hizbiyyin provides a cultural enclave in which feeling proud about being a true Muslim is nurtured in line with HT’s interpretations of Al-Qur’an and the Hadiths of the Prophet Muhammad.
Chapters 2 to 4 trace the historical background of HT and its connection to HTI. Initially, they stood for the original idea of Palestinian freedom. Faced with the unwelcome reactions of many middle-eastern governments that worried about a coup by HT, HT subsequently grew into a global Islamic party that reached out to other Muslims. Promoting the idea of a caliphate and Islamic law globally will serve not just Palestinians but all Muslims because these two ideas are compulsory, according to Al-Qur’an. Although this shift ultimately supports the establishment of caliphate; it still favours the Arab-centric view that any caliphate should be located in the Middle East. This close-minded approach has certainly put HT in a difficult position due to the failure of the Amir (the supreme leader of HT) to understand the local political contexts of each country. However, the rapid growth of HTI surprised the Amir, who never expected HT would grow outside of Arabian soil. Though now defunct, HTI became a major expansion of HT’s global reach.
Chapters 5 to 8 emphasize the meaning of political Islam for HTI. It has been established within existing literature that political Islam is the instrumentalization of Islam by individuals and groups to achieve certain political objectives. The most common aim is the formation of a state and society in accordance with Islamic principles. In reality, the way many Islamic sects’ organizations define political Islam is subject to further discussion—there are ongoing heated disputes among Islamic organizations about this. This has eventually created rivalries among Muslims, a situation that has affected the operationalization of HTI to promote a caliphate in Indonesia. Although HTI was an Islamic newcomer organization in the 2000s, it attracted many Indonesian Muslims. The end of authoritarianism arrived coincidentally with the global resurgence of Islam and provided the underlying conditions for HTI to grow. Another primary factor in the growth of HTI is the rational interpretation of Islamic principles that attracted like-minded Muslims from other Islamic organizations to join its ranks. HTI took a rational approach to understanding Islam by citing verses from Al-Qur’an or the Hadiths, rather than a doctrinal approach as other Islamic organizations were doing. The more members of other Islamic organizations that could be convinced to join HTI, the more superior HTI felt towards those other organizations. This increased the rivalry between Islamic organizations, which in turn led HTI to slightly alter its agenda, from focusing on the caliphate to instead being a cultural enclave and home base for a hizbiyyin identity. This new identity compelled many of its members into social networking using the party’s ideology. In sum, the HTI version of political Islam was to build its own hizbiyyin society and prepare for the welcoming of a caliphate once the movement debunked the claims made by proponents of democracy and capitalism that freedom of individual expression could guarantee equality.
The author succeeds in achieving his stated goal of analyzing the persistence of hizbiyyin as a collective identity. The hizbiyyin identity is still likely to inspire adherents despite the organization’s break up by the government of Indonesia. These findings contribute to existing social movement studies that focus on how movements organize and achieve their goals through taking advantage of larger contexts, such as social inequalities. The fact that the dreamed goal of a caliphate is a far-off one might serve to discourage adherents. But the author shows that a collective identity is the salient factor that keeps former members of this organization on board despite the many challenges. This book is highly recommended for readers interested in Islamic studies and Indonesian politics.
Wasisto Raharjo Jati
National Agency for Research and Innovation, Jakarta