Routledge Politics in Asia Series. London; New York: Routledge, 2012. xiv, 209 pp. (Figures.) US$145.00, cloth. ISBN 978-0-415-69749-1.
Japan and Germany have been an object of comparative studies in terms of not only their economic power and regional status, but also their historical trajectories in the twentieth century. Yet, there have been few systematic studies comparing these two countries in the area of post-Cold War security and foreign policy, although plenty of works abound focusing on either one of them. This book helps fill the void. In tracing and evaluating the foreign policies of Japan and Germany—using the notion of “national role conceptions”—the book refutes the view that post-Cold War Germany and Japan have followed divergent paths.
In chapter 1, Sakaki explains the theoretical and methodological frameworks, as well as discusses such German and Japanese national role conceptions as “exporter of security,” “promoter and defender of universal values,” “non-militarist country,” “reliable partner,” “regional stabilizer,” “contributor to regional cooperation,” and “respected, trusted country” (this applies only for Japan). In chapter 2, Sakaki isolates national role conceptions through the content analysis of foreign policy speeches made by political elites in Japan and Germany. She then applies the national role conceptions to the analysis of the foreign policy behavior of Japan and Germany in two cases: missile defense policies (chapter 3) and textbook talks with neighboring countries (chapter 4).
Sakaki focuses on the issue of change and continuity in German and Japanese foreign policies in the post-Cold War era, which has attracted much attention but has not been compared in a systematic manner. Her attempt to address this lacuna presents a persuasive explanation of missile defense policies, but less of the respective textbook disputes. Political elites in Germany were reluctant to consider the strategic need for US-led missile defense system while remaining remarkably receptive to Russia’s criticism of the US plans. Sakaki posits that Berlin’s policy was based on an emphasis on multilateralism and negotiation as a way to ensure the overall strategic stability of Europe. In terms of national role conceptions, so the argument goes, this German behavior was associated with the “regional stabilizer” role conception, which in its turn contradicted with a competing role conception, i.e., “reliable partner” of the United States and other NATO allies. In contrast, Japanese policy-makers tended to evaluate the US-led missile defense system rather positively. The Tokyo government argued that the missile defense system in question was conducive to the stability of Asia. Sakaki claims that the Japanese attitude was based on a group of the national role conceptions that were not necessarily mutually consistent: “reliable partner” (i.e., demonstrating the loyalty to the United States), “regional stabilizer” (i.e., seeking deterrence and balance of power as a key policy measure for regional stability in a traditional manner), and “non-militarist country” (i.e., stressing missile defense as a non-offensive measure that corresponds to Japan’s defensive, non-militarist strategy). She uses this missile defense case to counter the assertion often made by political realists that post-Cold War Japan has been undergoing drastic changes in its foreign and security policies. Sakaki thus successfully delineates the specific and complex features of the policies of Germany and Japan, and thereby offers insightful comparisons.
On the other hand, Sakaki seems to be less successful in applying the same analytical approach to the case of textbook disputes. She argues that whereas a successful German policy is owed to Berlin’s strong and consistent political leadership in solving the textbook disputes, Tokyo’s lawmakers have been more hesitant or even opposed to addressing the problem head-on. This lack of political leadership in Japan stems from the fact that no strong consensus exists, according to Sakaki, among Japanese political elites on contrition and self-critical reflection on the past. Consequently, the Japanese decision-makers have been reluctant to pursue reconciliation efforts, fearful of domestic backlashes which in turn might elicit suspicions among neighbouring countries (Sakaki focuses on South Korea).
Sakaki then points out that while Germany’s proactive stance can be explained by such role conceptions as “contributor to regional cooperation” and “regional stabilizer,” Japan’s passive attitude and rightist-nationalists’ opposition to textbook reconciliation seem at odds with the role conceptions of “contributor to regional cooperation” and “reliable partner.” According to these role conceptions, Japan would have played a more positive and supportive role in the textbook issue, especially in the context of recent security tension in East Asia. Sakaki attempts to solve this seeming puzzle by adding one more role conception: “respected, trusted country.” That is to say, she suggests that the nationalist tendencies among Japanese political elites are a reflection of this role conception. But this analytical strategy seems problematic: the more precisely Sakaki tries to explain the Japanese case, the more factors she has to examine in an ad hoc manner.
A part of the problem, in the view of this reviewer, is that the textbook disputes are inherently bilateral in nature: their solution involves South Korea and the Tokyo government’s policy on them inevitably is influenced by the attitude and behavior of South Korea, as well as of Japanese political elites. As such, analyzing Japan’s role conception alone is not sufficient; such an analysis would remain incomplete at best. In this regard, the reviewer wonders why Sakaki disregards nationalistic tendencies in South Korea. More generally, we have to take into account the different policy environment between Europe and Asia when considering the textbook question. The lack of consideration of the regional differences between Europe and Asia on the question of nationalism makes Sakaki’s explanation less persuasive as far as the case of textbook disputes is concerned.
Which general tendency better characterizes post-Cold War German and Japanese foreign policies, change or continuity? Sakaki’s answer to this key question is that “modified continuity” characterizes these foreign policies in spite of some gradual adjustments. Despite her well-balanced and elaborate analysis of Japanese foreign policy, however, Sakaki tends to describe Germany’s regional foreign policy in a too static manner, perhaps because of her efforts to counter political realists as noted above.
Despite such shortcomings, this book should be strongly recommended as a solid comparative study of post-Cold War Germany and Japan foreign policies, not only for the students and experts of the two countries but also for the broader audiences interested in international relations and comparative politics.
Aya Kuzuya
Meiji Gakuin University, Tokyo, Japan
pp. 339-341