Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. xxiv, 351 pp. (Tables, graphs, figures.) US$39.99, paper. ISBN 978-3-319-76474-0.
The Japan Decides series has produced swift, authoritative, and moderately priced studies after each general election to Japan’s House of Representatives (the lower and more powerful chamber of the Diet, or national legislature) beginning with 2012 and extending now to 2014 and 2017. Japan Decides 2017 provides a trove of information on parties and campaigns in Japan, based largely on surveys of citizens and candidates, the ordering and wording of items in each party’s electoral manifesto, and election results.
Individual chapters by an array of prominent scholars are succinct and clearly written. The early chapters provide informative overviews. Chapter 3, by Ethan Scheiner, Daniel Smith, and Michael Thies, for example, examines the changing party system. The authors argue that Yuriko Koike’s decision to break with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), run for governor of Tokyo, and create her own Party of Hope led to a short-lived boom, but ultimately left voters with a mere conservative echo of the LDP that soon petered out. In contrast, the split of the centre-left Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), led to the emergence of the liberal Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP), a smaller but more coherent opposition party that provided a genuine alternative for voters. Still, the LDP performed strongly in both cities and countryside and “[i]n the short term, the 2017 general election changed almost nothing” (47).
Later chapters are more technical or specialized. Kuniaki Nemoto’s careful study of the interaction or contamination effects across electoral tiers shows that running even weak candidates in single-member districts can help boost the party’s share of votes in the proportional representation tier, but contributes to partisan fragmentation. Matthew M. Carlson and Steven R. Reed examine the evolution of political scandals in postwar Japan, noting that Prime Minister Abe did best when he avoided stacking his cabinet with friends and cronies, and when he quickly cut ties with ministers who became embroiled in scandal. They also identify a new form of scandal, the sontaku or “anticipated reaction” scandal, in which ministers or bureaucrats engage in dubious or illegal activity because they anticipate that it would please the increasingly powerful prime minister and cabinet. Mari Miura recounts the small increase in Japan’s famously low level of female representation, and notes more optimistically the passage after the election of a non-binding but nonetheless significant gender parity law, a measure inspired in part by Miura’s own research. Similarly, Michael Strausz argues that immigration is not a significant or controversial electoral issue in Japan and provides some preliminary evidence that with proper administrative support, a vigorous pro-immigration coalition could emerge.
Greater controversy attends the possibility of constitutional revision. Indeed, it is the key line of partisan cleavage in a society marked by limited diversity in ethnicity, language, and religion. Kenneth Mori McElwain explains that revision is unlikely even though the LDP and its coalition partner Komeito captured the necessary three-quarters of the seats in the House of Representatives: both the public and elites are open in principle to revision, but neither—even within individual parties—can agree on how they might revise it. For now, at least, the infamous Article 9 of Japan’s pacifist constitution looks to be safe. Finally, Hiroyasu Izumikawa and Sheila A. Smith, respectively, agree that Abe cleverly played up the threat from North Korean missiles to deflect attention from scandals and highlight a foreign policy issue in which Abe and the LDP enjoyed an enormous advantage in expertise, credibility, and connections with the United States.
One striking omission is a concluding chapter. A conclusion would have been a good place to address two of the questions of greatest interest to most foreign readers: why does the LDP almost always win, and how has the LDP-led government dealt with the economic and social pressures stemming from Japan’s aging and shrinking population, and its near-zero levels of economic growth and inflation, conditions that are already threatening Europe, Asia, and even North America? In part, this may reflect the fact that 2017 provided a virtual “rerun” of the 2014 election (30), and that the editors wrote a memorable conclusion to that installment, characterizing 2014 as a “bait and switch” election: Abe ran on uncontroversial policies, then claimed an electoral mandate for hotly contested issues that he had actively downplayed during the election, such as constitutional revision and the restart of nuclear power stations.
Despite the lack of a formal conclusion in the 2017 volume, crucial clues to the succession of electoral victories by Abe and the LDP appear in chapter 8, Yukio Maeda’s fascinating discussion of public opinion and the Abe cabinet. When Abe needs to boost his approval ratings, Maeda points out, he emphasizes consensual “valence” issues centering on policy performance, since the LDP enjoys a far superior reputation for competence. When faced with scandals or other bad news, he strives to manipulate the schedules of the Diet or elections to cut off the flow of news and information to and from the opposition. Then when he has achieved sufficient support, he pushes his controversial policy positions.
Thus, during his first two years as prime minister (2012–2014), Abe appealed to “Abenomics.” When lack of a widespread recovery rendered that strategy less plausible, he pushed other valence issues, twice delaying scheduled but unpopular increases to the consumption tax and promoting local revitalization measures that the opposition could hardly oppose. After electoral victory in 2014 reinforced his support ratings, he resumed promoting his unpopular policy agenda: security-related bills in the spring of 2015, anti-terrorism laws in spring 2017, and constitutional revision since the 2017 election.
How well is Japan is dealing with demographic aging and pressure to revise its economic model? Here, a degree of disagreement is visible. David Chiavacci tells a familiar story of lagging median incomes and surging demand for pensions and health care, suggesting that the opposition might flourish by taking a more resolutely pro-welfare stance. Saori N. Katada and Gabrielle Cheung agree that Abenomics has lost its appeal, but emphasize that voters still trust the LDP more than the opposition on economic issues. Finally, Kenji Kushida provides a surprisingly optimistic account of both macroeconomic performance and the progress of micro-economic reforms (“the third arrow of Abenomics”) since Abe and the LDP returned to power in 2012.
The series is a boon for research and teaching, but should also prove useful for foreign policy professionals and political risk consultants. Indeed, anyone with an interest in Japanese politics would benefit from reading the invaluable Japan Decides 2017 and its companion volumes.
Gregory W. Noble
University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan