New York: Columbia University Press, 2021. xvi, 368 pp. (Tables, figures.) US$35.00, paper. ISBN 9780231199797.
For years, if not decades, scholars, pundits, critics, and casual observers of Japan have been predicting a coming remilitarization. Some have claimed that Japan would break free from the shackles of its postwar pacifist constitution and “normalize,” while others have pointed to resurgent nationalism and historical revisionism as ideological groundwork to make militarism more palatable to the public. However, as yet, no such remilitarization has occurred. This book begins by asking, “Why not?” and, in exploring the reasons why Japanese militarism has failed to make the expected headway, concludes that such a change is not possible. At the core of this argument is what author Tom Phuong Le describes as an “antimilitarism ecosystem,” a collection of material constraints and ideational restraints that together place hard limits on the Japanese government’s use of force. Le posits that security is an ecosystem in which “the interactions among living organisms and between those organisms and the physical environment” (60)—meaning factors like culture, history, ideology, demographics, and infrastructure—create the rules that govern which policies can and cannot be made. This stands in stark contrast to realist approaches to security studies that dismiss the roles of such factors in favour of rational choice calculations based on the military capabilities of neighbours and rivals.
The introduction elaborates on the book’s title, developing ageing as an anchoring concept that can mean weakening or becoming out-of-date, but also evolving or maturing. Chapter 2 then explains the progression of modern Japan through multiple militarisms, demonstrating that militarism as a concept is neither singular nor static. This historical chapter sets the foundation for Le’s argument that present-day Japan’s antimilitarism “is another type of militarism that emphasizes diplomacy over the use of force, yet finds the use of force legitimate in some circumstances” (62; emphasis in original). The book then proceeds to map out the material constraints and ideational restraints that shape and limit the antimilitarism ecosystem: chapter 3 describes the impact of Japan’s low birth rate and hyper-aged society on the ability to recruit adequate numbers for the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). Chapter 4 then discusses the “technical-infrastructural constraints such as an outdated base infrastructure, lack of combat experience, defense-oriented arms procurement and production, and underdeveloped defense sector” (106) that provide further concrete barriers to any significant expansion of Japan’s war capabilities. Chapter 5 moves to ideational restraints with an in-depth look at Japanese antimilitarism, its distinctness from pacifism, and how it molds the way Japanese citizens and policymakers conceptualize security and imagine the country’s roles and duties toward its wartime enemies and former colonies in the region. Chapter 6 then elucidates the peace cultures and varying strains of peace activism that inculcate social norms that curtail major changes to Japanese security policy. Those changes that have been pushed through, such as increased JSDF involvement in UN peace-keeping operations and disaster relief and the adoption of collective self-defense, are covered in chapter 7, which argues that such developments should not be viewed as remilitarization since they are still bound by the limitations of the antimilitarism ecosystem and do not represent any substantial change in Japan’s power-projection capabilities. Chapter 8 concludes the volume with two parts: first, it delves into the security agenda of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzō (2006–2007; 2012–2020), arguing that, though his position was seen by many as hawkish and nationalistic, Abe was unable to move outside the bounds of the antimilitarism ecosystem. Le then takes the field of international relations to task for privileging America-centric, realist discussions of nuclear deterrence and great power rivalries over “topics such as demographics, the environment, immigration, class, race, and gender” (272) and offers his work as proof that human considerations have far-reaching political ramifications.
Le’s book portrays Abe and his fellow revisionists as paper tigers who are ultimately at the mercy of the antimilitarism ecosystem, stating “change [to security policy] will occur, but the antimilitarism ecosystem ensures that it will be at the margins” (33). However, mirroring Le’s own approach, pro-remilitarization policymakers have incorporated education, human rights, gender, demographics, and Japan’s colonial history into their vision of security as well. Abe and many other revisionist politicians are closely affiliated with Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference), the country’s largest right-wing organization, which has linked its vision of national security to sweeping constitutional reforms. Nippon Kaigi aims not only to normalize the military, but also to introduce mandatory patriotic education, give heads of household more power over their families, remove all mention of gender equality, and emphasize citizens’ duties to the nation while undercutting individuals’ rights (see for example David McNeill, “Nippon Kaigi and the Radical Conservative Project to Take Back Japan,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 13, issue 50, no. 4 [December 2015]). In zeroing in on policies and political rhetoric specifically focussed on rearmament, Le misses the larger-scale efforts to reshape the antimilitarism ecosystem in its entirety.
That being said, the book as a whole represents a bold step away from realist security studies by showing conclusively that any meaningful examination of a country’s security policy must acknowledge the cultural, historical, and demographic factors that inform it. Le also puts his money where his mouth is, engaging with anthropological and sociological scholarship and including ethnography and discourse analysis among his methods. This multifaceted approach makes the book ideal for class use as an introduction to Japanese security studies because it offers clear, thoughtful discussion of Japan’s wartime history and its consequences for present-day international relations and domestic peace movements, as well as showcases cultural, demographic, and ideational issues that are relevant beyond the field of political science. For more advanced students, the book is a convincing challenge to the hegemony of realism that would complement and complicate any course on security studies.
Carl Gabrielson
University of California, Santa Barbara