Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies/Routledge Series, 45. London; New York: Routledge, 2012. xiv, 212 pp. US$135.00, cloth. ISBN 978-0-415-46336-2.
Japanese security policy has been a subject of heated debates between constructivists and realists. Constructivists, on the one hand, argue that Japan has not developed full-fledged military capabilities despite its economic and technological potentials because it has been constrained by so-called antimilitarism, the political culture shaped by Japan’s disastrous experiences before and during World War II (WWII). Realists claim, on the other hand, that Japanese security policy is well within the explanatory scope of realism and offers different types of realist explanations. Bhubhindar Singh joins this ongoing debate from the constructivist side, but offers a view uniquely different from others in this camp.
Singh puts forward two main arguments, the combination of which makes this book unique from others. First, he differs from other constructivists, who tend to detect continuity in Japanese security policy, by claiming that the changes in Japan’s security policy are real (22-32). Second, he argues that this policy shift has resulted not from changes in Japan’s external security environments, as realists claim, but from the change in Japan’s security identity. In his view, Japan’s security identity has transformed from a peace state to an international state (2-5, 41-74).
Singh defines security identity as the collective image of Japan held or proposed by the security-policy-making elite in the area of security policy (42). He defends this elitist definition by arguing that the identity construction process is largely controlled by the security policy elite (43). He then elaborates on Japan’s identify shift. While his concept of a peace-state identity is heavily derived from the previous constructivist works that emphasize the historical legacy of WWII, the Japanese Constitution, and the so-called Yoshida Doctrine, his concept of international-state identity may require some explanations. According to him, the origin of the international-state identity dates back to the late 1970s, when Japan’s role in the world became increasingly contested due to its increased economic power, and its consolidation process has accelerated in the post-Cold War period (58-61). This international-state identity centres upon Japan’s role as a responsible stakeholder that participates militarily as well as non-militarily in international peacekeeping and disaster relief operations but that does not use force in conventional warfare. This identity transformation is reflected in the three aspects of Japan’s security policy: Japan’s conception of national security, the degree of its involvement in regional and global security, and Japan’s security policymaking regime (69-72). The empirical chapters (chapters 4 to 6) elaborate on the changes in these areas respectively.
While making a unique argument, the book suffers from several shortcomings. First, the elitist conception of security identity seems inadequate to capture what constructivists and other international relations theorists usually regard as a collective identity. Identity formation is not a one-way process from the elite down to the mass. Singh’s definition does not capture the other important pathway through which ordinary citizens exert pressure over the elite due to their shared image of Japan’s identity. Second, Singh’s conception of security identity is too inclusive to be useful. This inclusiveness allows him to refer to North Korea’s first nuclear crisis in 1994 and its 1998 Taepodong missile launch as the turning point of Japan’s conception of national security (85-86, 93-95). The author is right to point out that both material and non-material factors contribute to identity formation (42). If the aforementioned factors are significant contributing factors to Japan’s identity change, however, the margin that is left to explain by cultural and normative factors seems rather thin. Third, Singh’s empirical analyses seem more of subjective narratives rather than systemic hypotheses testing or causal (or constitutive) explanations. For instance, Singh elaborates on how Japan’s security policy institutions have changed, but does not pay sufficient attention to why such changes have occurred in the post-Cold War period but not earlier. This may be explained by the change in the normative context in Japan, as the author implies, but it may also be linked to the changes in external security environments.
But the most controversial aspect of this book, and the reason why I believe that this book may be criticized more severely by constructivists than by realists, is the author’s claim of Japan’s identity shift. This claim reminds readers of a fundamental and largely unanswered question for constructivism. That is, how and when can one know a state’s collective identity has changed, independent of its behaviour? After all, other constructivists find continuity where this author finds change, and readers are left unsure of which claim is more valid.
This book’s greatest contribution is the uniqueness of its claim for Japan’s identity change, but this is its most vulnerable point as well.
Yasuhiro Izumikawa
Chuo University, Tokyo, Japan
pp. 337-338