Contemporary Asia in the World. New York: Columbia University Press, 2017. xxii, 272 pp. (Illustrations, maps.) US$90.00, cloth. ISBN 978-023-117260-8.
In his examination of recent developments in Japanese security thinking, Andrew Oros employs the metaphor of “renaissance,” harking back to the florescence of art, science, and philosophy which occurred between the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries in Europe. Drawing several parallels (3–7) between this transformative historical movement and the state of contemporary Japanese security discourse, he finds that “Japan’s security renaissance is evident in the broad discussions of contending approaches to security and in a new openness to acting upon different ideas about how Japan should best provide for its security” (2). Further, “[i]t represents an innovative melding of old and new ideas aimed at adapting Japan’s security practices to a changing domestic and international environment” (2). This metaphor thus serves as a loose overarching framework for the following exposition of the author’s thesis that a “security-identity” approach, anchored in the constructivist tradition of international relations, best captures the changes that are transpiring in Japanese policy.
The book is divided into five chapters and a conclusion. The first two chapters are by way of an extended introduction to the book’s argument for the primacy of a “security identity” approach in understanding how Japan’s security policies are debated and implemented. Chapter 1 outlines in detail the constituents of this security identity, in which, according to the author, three historical legacies play “an outsized role” in determining Japan’s security future (3). These include: “contested memories of the Pacific War and Japanese colonialism”; “postwar antimilitarist constraints on Japan’s defense establishment”; and “the security alliance with the United States” (24–32). Chapter 2 then tracks the evolution of Japanese security policy, from its postwar origins to its more recent attempts at moving toward a “normal” nation, in light of the three factors above. Chapter 3 provides a tour d’horizon of the current challenges faced by Japan’s strategic policy makers, amid the shifting geopolitical tectonics in Northeast Asia, including its own relative decline and that of its principal ally, the US, measured against the rise of China, simmering North Korean belligerency, and fractious relations with the ROK. Chapters 4 and 5 then chart how successive governments have sought to adapt to these changed circumstances, from the periods 2006 to 2012, and 2012 to 2016. The book finishes by examining the implications of, and next steps in, Japan’s security renaissance. His conclusion is that “like the European renaissance, the past continues to deeply inform Japan’s security future—and to limit Japan’s strategic options” (169).
The renaissance metaphor is apt and well justified, but quickly gives way to the core thesis of the book. Oros explains that Japan’s security renaissance must be seen as a response to changes in the international environment, filtered through security identity, and this is refracted through a distinct set of policies, institutions, and practices (figure 1.1, 17). This constructivist (or “ideational”) approach, which Oros initiated in his previous book, now appears to have come of age as a convincing alternative to heretofore dominant realist (or “materialist”) accounts. As such, his argument and those of other notable constructivist scholars working on Japan, such as Peter Katzenstein and Yasuo Takao, is juxtaposed with notions of “Reluctant Realism” (Michael Green) and “Resentful Realism” (Christopher Hughes), and with the short-lived liberalist approach put forward by Thomas Berger and Mike Mochizuki some years ago. In this it echoes a paradigmatic shift in the international relations discipline: moving away from the “traditionalist” approaches of realism and liberalism toward “reflectivist” approaches, primarily constructivism. And with Japan as a case study, Oros makes a compelling argument for its explanatory power. Nevertheless, I would still stress the continued importance of the realist and liberalist approaches to providing a truly composite picture (so-called “analytical eclecticism”). Though readers may not subscribe to the primacy accorded to the constructivist approach employed by the author, the actual content of his analysis is largely in accord with mainstream understandings of what is occurring in the realm of Japanese security policy making. Chapters 3 and 4, on domestic politics, are especially valuable to readers seeking to acquire a collated picture of the intricate and sometimes perplexing array of political shifts that have occurred over the last decade or so: the frenetic pace of security legislation, alongside the emergence of new parties and splinter groups. Consequently this reader found little to critique, except that while Oros does briefly mention Tokyo’s acquisition of a range of new security partners (92–94, bundling them in with multilateral security architecture), he does not pursue this topic further. This is regrettable since these more-limited security relationships—so-called “strategic partnerships”—remain in comparative infancy in relation to the crucial US-alliance; however, they do in fact represent a major departure in Tokyo’s security practice, and should command greater attention as an integral part of the security renaissance.
Overall, the book is well written and argued throughout, and comprehensive in its coverage of both the empirical data and theoretical literature. Like his earlier work, this book is well supplied with useful appendices and is clearly the product of extensive in-field research in Japan. The book thus serves as a useful compendium for those looking to aggregate and make sense of both the prolific policy activity that has emanated from recent Japanese governments, and the mass of academic literature that has accompanied it. For those teaching Japanese foreign/security policy, this book will be a valuable addition to recommended readings, as it provides a welcome update on the earlier, seminal works of Kenneth Pyle and Richard Samuels, which appeared around a decade ago.
Thomas Wilkins
University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
pp. 805-807