Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015. xii, 319 pp. US$60.00, cloth. ISBN 978-0-8047-8966-0.
This is the fourth of five edited volumes sponsored by Harvard University. Thirteen essays examine Nationalist China’s wartime diplomacy with France, Britain, Tibet, Canada, India, Russia, and the United States, the Communist International (Comintern), the Nationalist declaration of war, the postwar recovery of the Northeast, plus negotiations ending the war with Japan, relations with Vietnam, and the postwar peace treaties. Notably, the Wang Jingwei government’s pro-Japanese diplomacy is excluded.
The introduction and conclusion, written by Diana Lary and Stephen R. MacKinnon respectively, describe how China grew from a minor international player in the early 1930s to one of the “Big Four” by the end of the war. Major themes include: 1) how Japan’s invasion forced the Nationalist regime to open diplomatic relations with the rest of the world; 2) Chiang Kai-shek’s failed attempts to balance relations with various Allies, in particular the USSR and the United States; and 3) China’s relatively lenient postwar attitude toward Japan in return for recognition as one of the victors of World War II. Many wartime problems remain unresolved, including Taiwan’s legal status, Japanese responsibility for beginning the war, plus the sticky issue of war reparations.
In part 1, Marianne Bastid-Bruguiere argues that Japan was determined to halt arms shipments to Chiang Kai-shek, and the Vichy regime was forced to agree after the fall of Paris on June 14, 1940, thus turning Vietnam into a virtual Japanese puppet state. Rana Mitter discusses how London was worried that Moscow might dominate China, but Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was reassured by T.V. Soong during fall 1945 that China was satisfied with its negotiations with Stalin; meanwhile, the British ambassador to Chongqing, Sir Horace Seymour, presciently warned that while the USSR had “agreed not to provide assistance to any government other than the Nationalists,” Moscow’s desire to expand into Xinjiang and Mongolia “might lead them to an alliance with Yan’an” (50). Chang Jui-te discusses Tibet’s attempts to retain its independence from China, but when Lhasa sent a delegation to the Nationalist Representative Conference during spring 1946, Nanjing refused to recognize Tibetan autonomy. Yang Kuisong shows how Mao Zedong was secretly pleased when the Comintern was dissolved in May 1943, without necessarily realizing that Soviet promises might no longer be honoured; among these was a Comintern promise to turn Outer Mongolia back to a Communist government. Diana Lary summarizes Sino-Canadian relations during World War II, when many Canadians—most important among them Dr. Norman Bethune—were lionized by the Chinese Communists as models of self-sacrifice.
In part 2, Tsuchida Akio explains why the Nationalists did not declare war against Japan until December 8, 1941, fearing US aid would be cut due to the Neutrality Act. Yang Tianshi recounts how Jawaharlal Nehru supported the Nationalists in their fight against Japan, but when Chiang urged India to join the war effort Nehru refused, instead denouncing British imperialism. Li Yuzhen discusses how, after the Second United Front’s formation in 1937, Chiang tried, and failed, on three different occasions to convince Joseph Stalin to declare war on Japan; Stalin was more than happy to let China absorb Japanese troops, even while signing the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 1941, and authorizing Soviet troops to invade Manchuria only in the last days of the war. Xiaoyuan Liu recounts how the US State Department hoped to sponsor postwar international discussions on the autonomy of Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, Tannu Tuva, Tibet, and Xinjiang, but restoring the Chinese empire turned out to be a core interest of both the Nationalists and Communists, and so US efforts were largely ignored. Nishimura Shigeo discusses Chiang’s determination to recover the northeast, and when it was suggested that Manchuria be ceded to the USSR after the war, he protested that recovering Chinese sovereignty in the northeast was a primary war aim.
In part 3, Wu Sufeng details the Nationalist postwar claims to all private and public Japanese lands in China, minus much of the industry in Manchuria that the USSR removed as war reparations. Yang Weizhen shows that Chiang initially supported an independent Vietnam, but fearful of a pro-Communist government under Ho Chi Minh, Chiang allowed France to return to Vietnam in exchange for abolishing French special rights and privileges in China plus territorial concessions along the Sino-Vietnamese border. Hans van de Ven recounts how Russia refused to attend, and neither the PRC nor the ROC were invited to the signing of the 1951 San Francisco Treaty. American insistence that Japan not pay reparations angered many participants, but John Foster Dulles—who had attended the Versailles peace talks as a young man—refused to back down. This treaty, plus the subsequent 1952 peace treaty between Japan and the ROC, helped guarantee the postwar peace.
While presenting much new information on the Nationalist wartime diplomacy, this book repeats outdated myths. One author argues Roosevelt and Churchill “accepted Stalin’s price tag” at Yalta and “endorsed the geopolitical reality on the Mongolian Plateau” (170). Another blames FDR for signing “secret Yalta agreements,” forcing China to agree to Outer Mongolia’s independence (155). It has long been known that W. Averell Harriman, who was the US ambassador to the USSR, testified in 1951 that once Sino-Soviet negotiations began in July 1945, “Stalin, at the outset, made demands that went substantially beyond the Yalta understanding.” Harriman also said of T.V. Soong: “At no time did Soong give me any indication that he felt the Yalta understanding was a handicap in his negotiations. I repeatedly urged him not to give in to Stalin’s demands” (W. Averell Harriman Papers, Manuscript Division, US Library of Congress, Washington, DC). Recently, S.C.M. Paine has demonstrated that Roosevelt did not betray China, but that “Chiang Kai-shek traded Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia for the return of Manchuria” (The Wars for Asia, 1911–1949, Cambridge University Press, 242).
Bruce A. Elleman
U.S. Naval War College, Newport, USA
pp. 419-421