Albany: SUNY Press, 2023. ix, 243 pp. US95.00, cloth. ISBN 9781438492940.
In this edited volume, experts offer various historical and theoretical perspectives as they analyze international actors’ efforts in denuclearization negotiations with North Korea. The book investigates two fundamental research questions. First, to what extent did the distinct characteristics of the Six-Party negotiations impact the chance of successfully accomplishing the goal of denuclearizing North Korea? Second, did a viable opportunity exist to address the denuclearization of North Korea while the negotiations were in progress? Several experts investigate how the goals, motives, and strategies as well as the cohesion and alienation tactics of the parties affected the negotiation process and its outcomes.
Chapter 1 provides an overarching research framework of analysis centred on various factors related to negotiation including participants, motives, use of power and leverage, criteria to benchmark, success and/or failure, and various other issues. In the section on domestic politics as a factor influencing negotiations, the authors focus on the example of a democratic country, providing a thorough explanation (23) that should be further developed toward different regimes. Chapter 2 presents a broad historical overview of four decades of denuclearization negotiation deals with North Korea. Beginning with Kim Il Sung’s nuclear concern germinated by the United States’ threat of nuclear weapons use during the Korean War, the author goes on to address Moscow’s role in offering an experimental nuclear reactor and pressure on Pyongyang to join the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, and the prelude of North Korea’s nuclear crisis in 1992–1994. The author also explores various breakthrough attempts, including the Agreed Framework in 1994, the Six-Party Talks (2003–2007), the Leap Day Agreement in 2012, and the recent summit diplomacy between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un (2018 and 2019). All of these help us understand and analyze the contending positions and interests of the negotiation parties. Chapter 3 investigates inexplicable North Korean beliefs, goals, and strategies related to their pursuit of nuclear weapons development and their approach to negotiating denuclearization with the United States. To identify North Korean insight and behaviour in the negotiation process, the author analyzes three transition periods and four stages of negotiation. Although the United States has tried numerous efforts to persuade North Korea to engage in denuclearization through sanctions and incentives, the author attributes the lack of progress mainly to Pyongyang’s unwavering commitment to its goals of ensuring security and becoming a nuclear-armed state. Chapter 4 analyzes the dilemma faced by South Korea in the context of changing governments from liberal to conservative. Several liberal South Korean presidents pursued an engagement policy based on the belief that building socio-economic cooperation and cultural exchange between the two Koreas would ease tension while achieving lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. Meanwhile, conservative presidents have criticized the engagement approach due to a lack of apparent fruitful results, instead favouring a more pressurized approach to dismantle the North Korean nuclear program before offering any economic compensation or incentives. North Korea’s preference for direct negotiation with the United States has limited South Korea’s ability to play a leading role in denuclearization negotiations. Chapter 5 presents a comparative analysis of different US administrations’ efforts in managing the nuclear issue with North Korea in the context of domestic and international constraints. The author focuses on investigating to what extent major factors such as presidential characters (leadership), political partnership, public opinion, election results, and foreign national interests have affected the outcome of denuclearization negotiations with North Korea. As for new policy implications, the author recommends that the Biden Administration pursue a change in political relations with North Korea and initiate a new negotiation on arms control separate from the denuclearization deal. Chapter 6 analyzes China’s complicated attitude, which projects North Korea’s nuclear armament as a means to expand its influence and check the United States, despite its role as North Korea’s comrade, which should technically oppose such nuclear armament. In order to urge China to play a more active role in denuclearization negotiations with North Korea, China should be considered as an obstacle to the negotiations. The author posits that the United States leverages discord between China and North Korea, and may consider tolerating South Korea’s or Japan’s nuclear armaments as a desperate measure. Chapter 7 describes the diplomatic difficulties that arose in the midst of Japan’s efforts in the Six-Party Talks to also resolve the issue of the North Korean abduction of Japanese citizens. For the more constructive role of Japan, the author proposes that the abduction issue should not be prioritized by Japan in future denuclearization negotiations. Chapter 8 examines Russia’s sympathetic approach to North Korea’s security concerns in pursuing a nuclear weapons program against the US-ROK alliance and Russia’s symbiotic diplomatic postures with China in the process of negotiations. Though Russia wished to encourage North Korea’s voluntary denuclearization through multilateral security guarantees, arms control, confidence-building measures, or the “three-stage roadmap” of denuclearization, these were not realized due to the objection of the other three parties. As a conclusion, chapter 9 provides an overall evaluation of the negotiation process in terms of party cohesion, goals, motives, and strategies of the negotiating parties. The authors conclude that a lack of party cohesion and promoting ripeness were the major causes of failure in the process of negotiating North Korea’s denuclearization. They propose an alternative framework for negotiation which considers various incentives or pressure measures for negotiating parties, a broadening of the agenda from denuclearization to disarmament issues, and the invitation of a fair mediator into the negotiations to help resolve the North Korean issue.
This volume is very helpful in considering how to bring North Korea back to the negotiation table, and what stances the major negotiating parties should maintain in denuclearization negotiations with North Korea.
Edward Kwon
Northern Kentucky University, Highland Heights