Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017. xii, 224 pp. US$64.95, cloth. ISBN 978-1-62616-452-9.
There could not be a more timely and in-depth study of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, and it required a collective of scholars to analyze the issue from different angles for this collection, edited by Sung Chull Kim and Michael Cohen, who are also contributors to the volume. To outline a path toward the denuclearization of North Korea, we must understand the genesis and character of nuclearization. In chapter 1, Patrick Morgan argues that North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is meant to replace the extended deterrence previously provided by its allies, though this deterrence has engendered serious sanctions against the regime. At the same time, the opposition of the ROK, US, and the international community has not prevented North Korea from developing nuclear weapons (16, 21). Morgan concludes that North Korea’s nuclear problem and reunification are usually discussed separately, but “each is a central component of what is needed to resolve the other” (28). Thus, unification is the best solution to the nuclear problem, but we do not know when, where, or how unification will begin to emerge (26). I might add, or if unification will occur at all. In chapter 2, Sung Chull Kim writes about North Korea’s nuclear doctrine (the term was first used by Pyongyang in 2003) and revisionist strategy. Outlined by the Nuclear State Law of 2013, the nuclear doctrine presupposes assured retaliation instead of first use on non-nuclear states, something designed to drive a wedge between the US and its allies. The doctrine evolved in 2016, when North Korea expressed its will to use nuclear weapons preemptively (35–36). Kim argues that North Korea’s fear of American preemptive strike, formulated as “tailored deterrence” in 2006, was a contributing factor to Pyongyang’s nuclear program and doctrine, even though they do not guarantee the security or survival of the regime (43, 46, 49).
In chapter 3, Michael Cohen nоtes that North Korea has unsuccessfully used its nuclear and missile programs to compel the United States to conclude a peace treaty, grant diplomatic recognition, and end its isolation (58). The author uses historical examples to show that when revisionist leaders endeavor to challenge the status quo, and cause nuclear crisis as a result, they step back from nuclear compellence, believing they have control over whether nuclear war occurs. Hence, according to Cohen, Kim Jong-un will behave similarly (64). Interestingly, this prediction appears to be accurate in lieu of the events of 2018. In chapter 4, Tristan Volpe argues that North Korea’s coercive policy has failed to achieve its goals. He notes that Pyongyang had the optimal leverage for successful compellence in the early 1990s, when its plutonium production capabilities were coming on line (74). But the second nuclear crisis of 2002 revealed that there were diminishing returns in terms of bargaining leverage, despite the advancement of its operational nuclear capability (81). Volpe concludes that unless a “catalytic event” diverges the North Korean leadership from its current path, the nuclear program is too valuable for Pyongyang to constrain or roll back (84).
In chapter 5, Van Jackson addresses the question of how nuclearization impacts threat credibility, noting that nuclear weapons are neither necessary nor sufficient for making credible nonnuclear threats. Rather, follow-through on past actions is more important in terms of such credibility (93). Jackson concludes that nuclear capability does not provide North Korea with any political leverage beyond what can be had without them (105–106). In chapter 6, Chaesung Chun discusses the North Korean nuclear threat and South Korea’s deterrence strategy. Chun identifies three main motives behind North Korea’s nuclear program: deterrence of US nuclear attack, internal consolidation of power, and attracting economic assistance, although Kim Jong-un has never explicitly used nuclear power for economic benefits (115–116). For its part, South Korea has tried to strengthen extended deterrence through its alliance with the US and started to build its own mechanism of deterrence by retaliation (117). A combination of deterrence and engagement is critical, as North Korea is both a threat and a partner for reunification (126).
In chapter 7, Terence Roehrig elaborates on North Korea’s conventional and nuclear capabilities and the US response. While North Korea has not attempted to disrupt strategic stability on the peninsula since 1950, even with added nuclear weapons, it never stopped lower-risk provocations, hence the stability-instability paradox (135, 149). Roehrig notes that the American response of “extended nuclear deterrence is a double-edged sword and can be problematic nonproliferation policy in the long run” (147). In chapter 8, Fei-Ling Wang discusses China’s position on a nuclear North Korea, stating that fearful of North Korean regime survival, Beijing has pursued a policy of resisting and reducing the US presence and influence in the region, even at the expense of its own national interests, hence the “three-R” strategy of resisting, reducing, and replacing. A manifestation of this approach was China’s policy toward North Korea’s nuclear weapons (158, 160). Wang argues that, caught between the Chinese Communist Party’s interest of resisting the US-Japan alliance (the rock) and China’s national interest of opposing the North Korean nuclear program (the hard place), Beijing will continue to exploit the situation to its benefit in its rivalry with Washington and Tokyo (165).
In chapter 9, Yangmo Ku addresses the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), stating that North Korea became a de facto nuclear power in 2003 when it withdrew from this Treaty (185). The author argues that regime survival is the primary motive behind North Korea’s nuclear program, as Kim Il-sung began to pursue nuclear weapons as early as the Korean War in response to the US nuclear threat (182). Ku rightly concludes that the solution to the nuclear crisis is engagement (191). In their conclusion, Kim and Cohen state that deterrence against North Korea must take several forms—such as sanctions, diplomacy, military force, and dialogue—while the states most affected by North Korea’s nuclear advancement must “seek a path that will make deterrence unnecessary” (209). Kim and Cohen do not suggest what such a path might entail.
Japan too can be considered a state very much affected by the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs, which warrants a chapter on Japan’s role and policy toward a nuclear North Korea. Further, the book’s chapters discuss the nuclear issue largely from the perceptive of political science and international relations. In this regard, a chapter on the history of the nuclear crisis on the Korea Peninsula during the Cold War and beyond would have provided valuable context for the ongoing nuclear issue. Overall, the volume greatly contributes to our understanding of nuclear North Korea and how to cope with it.
Avram Agov
Langara College, Vancouver, Canada