London; New York: Routledge, 2014. ix, 162 pp. (Tables.) US$140.00, cloth. ISBN 978-0-415-75039-4.
North Korea remains somewhat of an enigma in international relations, and observers of its foreign policy often try to make sense of its decision-making process. Some view North Korea’s foreign policy making as a mystery, in which Pyongyang’s motivations are inscrutable and its behaviour unpredictable. Others argue that North Korea’s foreign policy is in fact guided by rationality and its actions are geared towards achieving specific objectives that the regime deems important for its survival. While these two perspectives are not mutually exclusive, North Korea-US Relations under Kim Jong Il could arguably fall within the category of the latter group. Using organizational learning theory, author Ramon Pacheco Pardo provides a fresh perspective and a comprehensive account of North Korea’s considerations in its bargaining with the United States under the leadership of Kim Jong Il. This time period spans the US administrations of presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and the first term of Barack Obama.
Pardo establishes the context for his study succinctly in the first chapter. Despite being a nuclear state and possessing one of the largest armies in the world, North Korea is justifiably a weak power—in both military and economic terms—when compared to its Northeast Asian neighbours and the United States. Given North Korea’s status as a weak state, Pardo identifies three tactics it could use in bargaining with stronger powers: alignment, brinkmanship, and participation in international regimes. North Korea selects its tactics based on its learning, which Pardo (7–8) defines as “an active process whereby an actor analyzes its experiences and reconceptualizes its understanding of the world accordingly.” He addresses two types of learning in the book: simple and complex. The former reflects no change in the state’s goals, but an adjustment of the tactics used to achieve the goals. The latter, on the other hand, indicates changes in both the goals and tactics of the state.
North Korea’s fundamental objective in its relations with the United States is to normalize bilateral ties. Pardo highlights that this goal has generally remained constant under the Kim regime, with North Korea adjusting its bargaining tactics based on its understanding of international developments, its past experiences, as well as the actions of other states. Pyongyang’s simple learning is reflected in its decisions on whether or not to align with its Northeast Asian neighbours; whether or not to carry out brinkmanship; and whether or not to participate in international regimes such as the Agreed Framework, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and the Six-Party Talks. Following its nuclear test in October 2006, however, North Korea turned its attention to interim goals such as peaceful coexistence with the United States and, subsequently, the conclusion of a peace treaty and the possession of a nuclear deterrent against the United States. The emergence of such interim goals and the consequent change in tactics, Pardo contends, are proof of Pyongyang’s complex learning.
The book’s structure helps to reinforce the clarity of Pardo’s argument. The discussion is organized according to consecutive time periods, in which the start/end point of each time period is marked by a significant event in North Korea-US relations. Within each section, Pardo assesses Pyongyang’s objective(s) and examines in relative detail its employment of the three tactics mentioned above. Overall, Pardo has presented a convincing argument. It is indeed conceivable that North Korea’s bargaining with the United States is affected by what it has learnt from past experiences, and Pardo presents credible evidence for his case.
Two clarifications might help to enhance the book’s strengths. First, in discussing North Korea’s brinkmanship during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations, Pardo on occasion mentions different types of brinkmanship, such as verbal, diplomatic, or nuclear. At least one account of verbal brinkmanship was considered by the author “routine” (115) and thus of little importance in the study of North Korea’s foreign policy. It would be good if these different types of brinkmanship and their significance had been briefly explained at the beginning of the book. This would help readers to understand what Pardo considers brinkmanship by North Korea, as well as which types he views as significant for North Korea-US relations. Second, Pardo identifies two instances where North Korea failed to learn from experience—from January 2001 to March 2003, and from January to May 2009—resulting in its employment of unsuitable tactics. In both cases, North Korea’s learning was said to be limited by the leadership’s “cognitive structures” and “competency traps” (122). However, it could also be argued that in these two instances North Korea was acting in a way that reflected learning from past experience—for example, its brinkmanship in late 2002/early 2003 could be due to the fact that past brinkmanship had eventually led to engagement with the United States. Perhaps, then, one could consider the distinction between the intentions and outcomes of the bargaining tactics.
Nevertheless, the book undoubtedly makes an important contribution to the literature on North Korea-US relations. Pardo’s utilization of organizational learning theory offers a unique analytical lens through which to understand Pyongyang’s foreign policy making with regard to the United States. Significantly, the book has helped to shed light on the considerations of North Korea in its bargaining with the United States. The book’s rich content and the insights it provides into the North Korean and American decision-making processes makes it valuable to anyone seeking to understand the drivers in North Korea-US relations during Kim Jong Il’s leadership. Pardo’s approach could also suggest useful implications for North Korea’s policy towards the United States following Kim’s passing. Ultimately, North Korea wants to normalize bilateral diplomatic relations. It remains to be seen if Kim’s successor, Kim Jong Un, will be able to achieve this goal.
Sarah Teo
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore