Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series. London and New York: Routledge, 2022. xiii, 199 pp. (Tables, figures.) US$160.00, cloth; free ebook. ISBN 9780367699581.
The authors of this book present their hypothesis as a daring one, in which they seek to challenge conventional views of irregular forces in Southeast Asia and to influence methodologies in the field of post-conflict peacebuilding more broadly. The intended audience is in large part practitioners and donors supporting security-sector reform and governance (SSRG) in post-conflict nations undergoing peacebuilding processes. The authors’ main intention with this book is to argue that rather than ruling these groups out of their planning, for better outcomes they need to recognize their potential for change and bring them in to the process.
The book is upfront about the slightly truncated “Southeast Asia” covered in this study, explaining that its hypothesis only stands for those countries in the region that are democratizing in some fashion. As such they argue that whilst a transition is underway, the “state” cannot be and is not the only agent for that change. Irregular forces—rather than always acting as spoilers—offer alternatives to a monopoly of violence within such a state. Under different political contexts depending on the nature of their composition, motives, and ideological and territorial claims, irregular forces can also evolve.
The book includes case studies from Indonesia (democratic deepening), Thailand (democratic reversal with ongoing conflict, especially in the case of the Deep South), Timor Leste (democratization through post-independence state-building) and the Philippines (democratic transition through post-conflict peacebuilding, specifically in the case of Mindanao).
Chapters 1 and 2 provide an excellent introduction for understanding and categorizing irregular forces, their nature and the variation in their motives, objectives, composition, and methods of engagement. The emphasis is on disrupting the common perception of such groups as using violence indiscriminately against civilians in the process of conflict with opposing forces. These chapters argue that a more detailed understanding of the particularities of these groups—why they exist, why members enlist, what keeps them together as a unit and their relations within the territories and communities in which they operate—will dispel this view and open a discourse for how these groups can participate and assist with peacebuilding processes.
In chapter 2, Rosalie Arcala Hall provides a rich and comprehensive overview of the common pathways for irregular forces post-conflict and a review of existing literature on irregular forces. Drawing on this literature, including much of it on Southeast Asian countries, Hall highlights the book’s key messages for the peacebuilding process: do not ignore irregular forces, recognize their positive contributions, create pathways that make violence less appealing and accept that concessions and trade-offs will be made. In Indonesia and Timor Leste, the transformation of the irregular forces—Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) in Aceh and Falantil in Timor-Leste—did not lead to their dissolution. Rather, their hierarchies and clientelist structures were absorbed into the patronage and clientelist practices of the state itself. For Hall, and the other authors of the book, where public security and making violence less appealing is the ultimate goal, such a trade-off is worth it.
For postcolonial states born from revolutionary and bloody struggles, it is perhaps unsurprising that they will find ways to accommodate and co-opt irregular forces in their midst. The heroic image of the revolutionary veteran and a spirit of rebellion is a cornerstone of nationalist myth-making and state-building in the countries under study. As Masaaki Okamoto details, in Indonesia non-state forces have a crucial and lauded role in the formation of the nation-state, and in cases such as the Pemuda Pancasila, their ongoing coexistence or “mutual accommodation” with state forces continues until today.
Jennifer Santiago Oreta’s study of the Philippines outlines how an extremely complex threat landscape makes public security a rare and sought-after commodity. Irregular forces there, as elsewhere, step in to offer missing services and protection to citizens. As Hall explains, “the decentralized power structure in the Philippines makes a fertile environment for irregular armed formation. With a weak state bureaucratic structure, alternative security providers step in to fill the gap” (129).
Paul Chambers and Srisompob Jitpiromsri’s study of the use of paramilitaries and auxiliary forces in Thailand’s Deep South makes especially clear—as do all case studies present in the book—the need for professional law enforcement to replace the need for or imposition of, irregular forces (state-sanctioned or not) as providers of public security. Whilst they are each at different stages on their “democratizing” journey, this is something each country has in common and continues to find very difficult to achieve.
The case studies in this book reveal the complex and multifaceted nature of “irregular forces,” highlighting in particular the ways in which they have been transformed and repositioned within their own transitioning political contexts. These studies allow for “grey areas” to emerge where previous studies may have cast only darkness over such groups, thereby limiting the insights and practical uses they bring to peacebuilding after conflict. For each of the Southeast Asian countries under study, security governance continues to be supported by non-state actors. Whilst better and more professional law enforcement and governance may be the goal, it is far from a reality. The editors have tangible and practical ambitions for their analysis, including hopes for the regular inclusion of these groups in the security-sector reform process: “The more experience irregular forces gain in collaborating with government agencies, the more incentive they may have to be more accountable and transparent.” They rightly argue that the unique situations and histories of Southeast Asian countries must be taken into account, including recognition that “the states’ lack a complete monopoly over the use of legitimate force” (167).
The cases recounted in this book and from elsewhere indicate that change is certainly possible and where an end to violence is the ultimate practical goal, even realistic. Those looking for deepening democratization, however, will not find it in these solutions. In the short term bringing an end to violence is the goal-at-all-costs, but with the benefit of hindsight, it also begs the question “wither democracy?” As Okamoto puts it, the best outcome to hope for might be described as bringing about “a certain democratic consolidation in a distorted way” (67).
Jemma Purdey
Monash University, Melbourne