Routledge Studies in Modern History of Asia, 72. London; New York: Routledge, 2012. xix, 203 pp. (Map.) US$155.00, cloth. ISBN 978-0-415-59899-6.
This monograph by the distinguished scholar and veteran-specialist in the field of international relations, Peter Berton, is the outcome of his lengthy studies that had already begun in the early 1950s. The book is the recently revised version of his well-known dissertation thesis The Secret Russo-Japanese Alliance of 1916 (Columbia University, 1956).
First of all, it should be noted that the title of the monograph seems to be somewhat inadequate, because only seven pages of the monograph are devoted to bilateral relations in the pre-war period, and the military, economic and cultural contacts between the countries are mostly omitted from the study. As a result, this monograph should be treated generally as a scrupulous and elaborate examination of the history of Russo-Japanese diplomatic relations during the First World War. In the book the author analyzes in detail the Russo-Japanese diplomatic negotiations concerning new political alignments during the First World War, and examines the reaction of the powers—Britain and France, the United States and China—to the Russo-Japanese alliance treaty.
The historical setting of Berton’s initial research seems to influence its character and approach. The 1950s were the decade when the Cold War in the Far East was in high gear and the US re-evaluated its relations with Japan greatly. Naturally, the study of the history of Russo-Japanese relations, especially in the political and military fields, appeared to be crucial to the US at that time. It is not curious that Berton has been using as an antithesis for his study the assertion, circulated for decades both in the Bolshevik press and in the US State Department, that the Russo-Japanese alliance of 1916 had been directed against the American presence in East Asia (presumably Manchuria) and the Pacific. Berton believes that he had managed to demonstrate that that assertion was false, and his examination “proves the case of Germany, not the United States, as the target of the secret treaty”(i). In actuality, from the “juridico-historical” approach that Berton has taken, this conclusion looks quite persuasive; however it seems to be only one side of the coin, because the character and essence of Russo-Japanese rapprochement during these years (1905–1917) cannot be reduced to the formal meaning of this treaty.
In the present reviewer’s opinion, the key question is not whether the alliance treaty was directed against the US, but whether the Russo-Japanese rapprochement posed a potential threat to American interests. From this perspective, it is necessary to state that Russo-Japanese alignment greatly strengthened Japan’s position not only in the Far East but also in world affairs, and endangered the interests of the US and Britain in East Asia. The author himself also seems to recognize the fact that Japan strove to become a predominant power in China and was prepared to confront any American efforts in the promotion of the “Open Door” policies. Certainly, at that time the Japanese elite had no intentions of initiating military conflict with the US, but was ready to defend Japan’s special rights in China by any means, for example, through reliance on Russia (because Britain would not help Japan in any potential conflict with the US). Similarly, the Russo-Japanese agreement did not include any conspiracy against the US, but it had to show to all other world powers that Japan would not allow any country to weaken its position in East Asia. In fact, Japan’s game was a kind of bluff, with Tokyo attempting to demonstrate—by the use of some semi-official channels and newspapers as means of disinformation—the visibility of Russo-Japanese unity in Far Eastern affairs. In this sense, the rumours concerning the Russo-Japanese secret agreement, leaked intentionally by Japan’s political elite to the press, were much more important than the agreement itself.
Berton reasonably argues that, from the Russian point of view, rapprochement with Japan was nothing more than an attempt to include Japan and China in an anti-German military block. It was also an attempt to weaken Japan’s pressure in Far Eastern affairs. Russian diplomats did not wish to strengthen Russia’s dependence on Japan’s expansionist policy, and managed to make the alliance treaty’s conditions toothless. However, Berton tends to overestimate Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov’s role in the preparation and conclusion of the Russo-Japanese alliance, because historical archival sources and recent studies on this subject unambiguously show that this policy trajectory toward the alliance was orchestrated by Japanese elder statesmen, headed by Prince Yamagata. Eventually, Japan managed to exploit Russia’s need for weapons and other strategic products, and thus paved the way to bilateral negotiations for the conclusion of a new political agreement. It should also be noted here that Berton’s monograph is based mostly on Japanese archival sources, while the Russian political strategy, unfortunately, is traced only in general terms. Similarly, although France as Russia’s nearest ally played a critical role in inducing Japan’s cooperation with the Triple Entente, its diplomatic stategy is not well analysed.
Berton’s monograph takes little account of new studies on this problem that have appeared in Russia and Japan, as well as in the United Kingdom and the United States, in the last decades. In this sense, the monograph lacks novelty for researchers of Russo-Japanese relations. However, despite the above-mentioned shortcomings and questionable arguments, the monograph gives us a skilful analysis of international diplomacy during the First World War and even now should be recognized as the best research on Russo-Japanese alliance in English historiography.
Eduard Baryshev
University of Shimane, Hamada, Japan
pp. 159-161