Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series, 45. London; New York: Routledge, 2012. xviii, 204 pp. (Figures, tables.) US$145.00, cloth. ISBN 978-0-415-50963-3.
In Hussin’s words, the Singapore Republic “is not yet a ‘nation’, let alone a successful model of a multicultural nation” (3). Among other things, he blames this condition on the “perennial and persistent plight of Singapore’s ethnic Malay minority,” reinforced by the policies and politics of the governing elites, composed mainly of “ethnic Chinese and Indian ministers” (4). Malays form 13.4 percent of the total population of 3.77 million in Singapore. They are significant not just because they make up a sizeable minority but also due to history and their “indigenous” claim within the Malay World of archipelagic Southeast Asia.
There are four parts to the book. The first section serves as an introduction and justification to the study. The second part contains the author’s diagnosis of the problem or what he calls the “examination” of the “Malay plight.” The third part delves into the sources of the plight and the final part, on “what is to be done.”
Although this book is rich with details, chronicling some of the issues that have understandably made Singapore Malays overly conscious of their identity as a besieged minority, the author is less clear in his theoretical and policy-making direction. The crux of the matter is that, relative to the other ethnic groups within the island nation, Malays underperform in every field that is statistically measurable. In the field of education (from primary to tertiary level) they are under-achievers. In marriage they record the highest rate of divorce. Malays also suffer the highest rates of medical afflictions, from heart disease to diabetes. Among all youths, more Malays are known to be drug addicts and delinquents. Furthermore, in terms of jobs, professions and household incomes, Malays occupy the lowest measures among all ethnic groups. A very distressing characterization of a seemingly homogenous group—that is, if one continues to make a correlation between these statistical indicators with the idea of “race.” Unfortunately, but definitely inadvertently, Hussin has succeeded in reinforcing the perception that race is indeed destiny.
From the above premise Hussin then stresses that the Malays are unhappy with their minority syndrome. On the socio-economic front they occupy a secondary status and role compared to other fellow Singaporeans, namely ethnic Chinese who make up the majority and the more advanced other minority group, the Indians. The second gripe is political, in that the government is said to have imposed its own choice of Malay political leaders upon the community. Hussin contends that as a result of this they lack legitimacy and clout among the Malays. Thirdly, Malays are also said to be unhappy culturally and religiously. This is attributed to government intrusion into their religious affairs, while at the same time doing little to accommodate their ethno-religious interests.
Nevertheless, the author is ambivalent about the state, which seems to be the source of contention, if not blame in his analysis of the problem. On the one hand, Hussin admits that “there is neither overt discrimination by the present government nor collective suffering of the Malay minority as a whole in Singapore,” but on the other hand points out that the problem still lies in the fact that Malays are “lagging behind fellow ethnic Singaporeans” (4). The author vacillates in finding a solution to all these; that while putting the blame on government for not doing enough, especially in not anointing the right Malay leaders to represent the community, he also blames the community for also not working hard enough for itself.
The key to the perspective in this book is that Hussin takes it as a given that competition (an inter-ethnic one, at that) is the unquestioning mission and telos of the Singapore nation. It is as though everyone’s destiny will and can only be shaped by competition. As long as this framework is being used, there are inevitable winners and losers in the system. One either loses (or wins) as an individual or loses (or wins) in solidarity (forced or otherwise) with others in one’s group-designate.
The other assumption of this line of thinking, as suggested by the author, is that members of a group have the obligation to help one another out, or that individual achievement is also translatable into group pride. On this, we may ask, is that so? To what extent do individual members actually seek their sense of belonging to a racial group? Furthermore, is group “solidarity” a function of top-down state policy or a bottom-up, organic sense of togetherness?
Disappointingly, his answer to the problems he has outlined is rather non-committal, if not restrained. Hussin foresees a more optimistic scenario for Singapore Malays when they can commit themselves to “pursuing their expectations and interests within the Islamic paradigm … continue to work hard and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices” (149).
He even admits that the problem is rather insurmountable and Malays will still continue to fall behind other ethnic groups. He hopes for the emergence of a “small reservoir of talented and courageous Malay professionals” and that this “small but significant segment – in line with the emphasis of the Islamic faith on quality rather than quantity – could be the future models or torchbearers of Malay progress” (151).
He gives an assurance that Malays would continue to give support to a “government that is effective and equitable to all citizens” but seeks for more rights among Malays “to choose their own leaders who can better represent their aspirations and concerns” (153). All this seems to be a rather moderate policy recommendation to all that passionate and meticulous detailing of the malaise of the Malays.
Maznah Mohamad
National University of Singapore, Singapore
pp. 385-387