Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2024. US$30.00, paper. ISBN 9781517915094.
In 1970, why did the United States send troops into Cambodia? Was Cambodia, a geographical periphery, central or peripheral to America’s geopolitical strategy during the Cold War? This well-researched and written study addresses these questions. The author, James Tyner, is a professor of geography at Kent State University specializing in the political economy of violence. This is his tenth book relating to Cambodia.
The book’s introduction argues that World War II buttressed America’s linkage between geography and politics, culminating in a US-centric “postwar spatial order” (13). US diplomat and Cold War architect George Kennan advised Washington about America’s policy in East Asia, stating that it should be “primarily military and economic” rather than considering “human rights” and “democratization (22).” Though Kennan never mentioned Cambodia, his proposals regarding Asia directly touched upon that country years later. Cambodia, a peripheral country, became central to Washington’s war in Indochina and America’s Cold War efforts.
Chapter 1 documents America’s early involvement in Indochina. Though Kennan had advocated political, economic, psychological, and military tactics to thwart the Soviet Union’s expansion, NSC-68, a top-secret US National Security Council policy paper drafted in 1950, concentrated on military means. American concerns about Asia had increased following the 1949 communist revolution in China, communists’ domination over northern Vietnam after World War II, and communists’ invasion of South Korea in 1950. US policymakers thus urgently sought to contain communism in peripheries such as Southeast Asia so that Soviet influence could be kept from expanding there.
Chapter 2 elaborates on chapter 1 to look at Cambodia. US President Dwight Eisenhower’s administration had mostly paid for French counterinsurgency in Indochina but the latter’s defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu transformed Indochina from being peripheral to US Cold War efforts to playing a much more central role. Washington “created” the state of South Vietnam as an anti-communist hub in Southeast Asia, with America relying on nuclear retaliation. John F. Kennedy’s ascension to the presidency marked a US move toward a greater reliance on flexible responses, though no US troops were formally stationed in South Vietnam. In fact, Laos became the centre of US efforts. It was President Lyndon B. Johnson who, in 1965, approved the deployment of US troops to South Vietnam alongside a deeper American commitment to the war in Indochina.
Chapter 3 scrutinizes the unfolding conflict in Cambodia, a country that became independent in 1953–1954, though it initially remained dominated by King (later Prince) Norodom Sihanouk. Distrust of Sihanouk by Cambodia’s anticommunist neighbours and the US led to coup attempts against him (in which Washington was complicit) (120).Thereupon Sihanouk became distrustful of Washington, and he severed relations with the US in 1965—despite commencing a policy of neutrality. President Kennedy had wanted to build bridges with Sihanouk but was assassinated. President Johnson for his part focused on Vietnam instead of Cambodia.
Chapter 4 investigates US policy toward Cambodia during the Johnson administration. Johnson administration officials sought to halt North Vietnamese operations in Cambodia though they were split on how to stop them. Johnson did not want US forces to enter Cambodia. The president was pressured by General Westmoreland, head of US war efforts in Vietnam, for permission to deploy US forces or simply conduct airstrikes in Cambodia. By 1967–1968, Johnson did authorize covert operations across the Cambodian border but refused to expand the war further geographically.
Chapter 5 examines the widening Vietnam War under the Nixon administration. The author argues that unlike previous administrations, Cambodia became central to Nixon’s efforts. Under Nixon, though the US participated in negotiations with North Vietnam and practiced “Vietnamization,” in 1969, Nixon also approved massive secret bombing in Cambodia and Laos to disrupt North Vietnamese infiltration routes. In March 1970 right-wing Cambodian allies of the US seized power from Norodom Sihanouk. Washington supported coup-born Cambodian leader Lon Nol. Then, on April 28, 1970, Nixon approved the sending of US and South Vietnamese forces into Cambodia.
Chapter 6 details the ignominious finale to US military efforts in Cambodia. First, Washington deployed less soldiers in that country than was expected. Second, loud demonstrations in the US and global anger pressured Nixon to withdraw most soldiers from Cambodia by July 1970. Third, though the Nixon administration incrementally lost its trust in Lon Nol, Lon Nol blindly trusted Washington. Meanwhile, the US continued the bombing campaign in Cambodia until 1973. By then, Congress had turned against the war and cut off funding for it, and the administration itself was in increasing disarray. Cambodia finally fell to the Khmer Rouge in 1975.
The epilogue looks at the US “grand strategy” in the post-Vietnam, post-1975 era. It argues that in the Cold War (especially in Indochina), the tug-of-war between Washington’s central interests and what were peripheral interests was never clearcut. Such was the case with Cambodia. Indeed, for the US, the “spatial dilemma of Cambodia’s strategic importance remained unresolved” (259). But because the country was a hub for US Cold War activities, Cambodia became an unfortunate pawn.
The strengths of this book are first that it offers a nuanced approach to the study of Cambodian history during the Cold War, linking politics to geography. Second, it offers an intriguing look at US intervention in Cambodia across the five decades (1954–1973) of the Vietnam War.
demonstrated America’s efforts to construct a hegemonic spatial world order, but how in fact Washington’s failures to consider practicalities on the ground led to considerable consequences in terms of enormous numbers of killings across the country. Perhaps this book could have discussed in greater detail how US policy contributed to the rise of the brutal Khmer Rouge in 1975. Also, the book might have more thoroughly scrutinized the role of US officials in Cambodia’s 1970 coup, previously discussed elsewhere (Seymour Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House, Summit Books, 1983). Regardless, the work stands as an unparalleled study of US involvement in Cambodia’s history and is an excellent read for academics and laypeople alike.
Paul Chambers
Naresuan University, Phitsanulok