Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. xvi, 244 pp. (Tables, figures.) US$34.99, paper. ISBN 978-1-108-72536-1.
The Art of Political Control in China by Daniel C. Mattingly argues that Chinese political control is made possible not simply through coercive institutions such as the secret police or the military but also “uses local civil society groups as hidden but effective tools of informal control to suppress dissent and implement far-reaching policies” (i). Through case studies based on his fieldwork in four provinces, a face-to-face survey conducted by research team members, and national surveys the author often quotes from secondary sources, “the book challenges the conventional wisdom that a robust civil society strengthens political responsiveness. Surprisingly, it is communities that lack strong civil society groups that find it easiest to act collectively to spontaneously resist the state” (page after the book cover). Spanning seven chapters, the book is well organized and the additional figures and tables, survey designs, and qualitative research design attached are admirably detailed, leaving readers an impressive picture of how the author conducted his research, drew up his findings, and reached his conclusions. Although he focuses on selected villages in China, Mattingly extends several pertinent observations to other countries where possible.
His book is commendable in that he seems to have added another dimension to the understanding of a political paradigm most people regard as totalitarian, authoritarian, or as he calls it, autocratic. The work can be recommended for students interested in the dynamics of sociopolitical aspects of China in the past decade. However, its research is not without limitations in several areas.
First, given the rapidity of change affecting Chinese society, the time frame within which the research was carried out is significant and should be clearly established early on, preferably in the introduction. Although scholars of Chinese politics and society can believe that this study largely examines the 2010s, it is not until appendix C, Qualitative Research Design (218), that Mattingly fully reveals his fieldwork in China took place between mid-2012 and early 2018. Since late 2012 coincides with the beginning of Xi Jinping’s position as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, this means that this study of Chinese governance falls primarily within the Xi era up to 2018, the year Xi managed to remove the term limits for his presidency. Thus timeline counts here, and issues of political control during 2012 to 2018 could benefit from analysis in the context of Xi’s leadership.
Second, the scope of this study should be more explicitly indicated at the beginning so readers know what Mattingly means by “political control in China,” the words he uses in his title. Again, it is also in appendix C (219–220) that we learn his research coverage is based on 14 villages in 4 provinces, even though China had almost 700,000 villages by the end of 2017 according to the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the PRC. National Bureau of Statistics of China and World Bank sources indicate China’s sweeping urbanization rate had already exceeded 50 percent in 2011 and was nearly 60 percent in 2018. As for governance at the village level, it can be described through an old Chinese saying, translatable literally as “Heaven is high and the emperor is far away,” meaning that at the lowest government level in faraway places, state control is much looser compared with that at higher administrative levels. One shouldn’t forget that the art of political control becomes a more complex art in a vast country. The current book title seems overly general and carries a whiff of sensationalism. It would perhaps be more appropriate to add a narrowed-down subtitle to research findings such as these.
Third, the messages conveyed in this book seem rather vague and lack an informed sense of Chinese history. The author provides no convincing explanation—or good examples—of the difference between “a robust civil society” outside China and “communities that lack strong civil society groups” within China. Likewise, he often cites cases of autocracy elsewhere, yet acknowledges that “social groups such as temple organizations, lineage associations, and social clubs” (3) in rural China are alive and well. In his concluding chapter he points out that imperial China used local communal groups “in much the same way as local officials today exploit the communal ties and use networks of local informants” (184). Despite that acknowledgment, there is little solid analysis of the fact that the role of civil society groups is unique in China today. China’s social structure, which stretches from feudal times to the present, does not simply consist of the ruler and the ruled but of many levels of governments, semi-governments, and non-governmental organizations in between. Other than the baojia system for a community-based law enforcement and civil control of ordinary households, one can mention the xiangshen (landed gentry) system in effect for the upper class in small towns as well as in the type of rural areas Mattingly’s book is focused on. The gentry possessed a virtual monopoly on office holding via the imperial examinations (keju), such that scholar-officials usually hailed from the unofficial elite of the wealthy. Both the baojia and gentry systems were “effective tools of informal control” that predate what Mattingly observed in his research. During the Republic of China on the mainland (1912–1949) there were, and in the present People’s Republic of China (1949- ) there continue to be, “people’s organizations” (renmin tuanti) in cities and “mass organizations” (qunzhong zuzhi) such as academic, professional, or trade associations in both urban and rural areas, not to mention all sorts of active social groups. Religious organizations, of which the authorities claim there are well over 5,000, clan associations, and other groups all play some role in governing the country.
One may conclude that despite the rise and fall of dynasties and changes of government there has been continuity in the political control of China: it has always been governed top down and through the intermediate stratum regardless of whether this stratum represents civil society groups from today’s perspective.
Helen Xiaoyan Wu
University of Toronto, Toronto