China: From Revolution to Reform. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2021. 319 pp. (Tables.) US$120.00, cloth. ISBN 978-94-6298-986-3.
This book by Konstantinos D. Tsimonis, published in 2021, is an important study of the organization, function, and operation of the Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL). The existing literature on the CYL can be divided into two categories: research on the promotion of league cadres, and analysis of the CYL’s united front work among youth and its political socialization role. Obviously, this book belongs to the second category.
Tsimonis begins by highlighting the unique characteristics of the CYL among China’s mass organizations (quntuan zuzhi), pointing to the importance of the CYL in youth education and mobilization. He employs a large volume of interview material to show that the CYL is still unable to respond to the needs of young people. In this respect, he finds that the CYL compares unfavourably with other Chinese mass organizations. The organizational setup of the CYL replicates that of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and like the CCP it has departments dealing with organization, propaganda, united front work, and international liaison. Some CCP insiders have even called it the “little CCP” (xiaozhonggong). This makes the CYL much more important than other Chinese mass organizations, and this is one reason why this book has considerable research value.
As Tsimonis points out, during the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao period, while the CYL served as a channel for cadre promotion, its youth work role declined (242). However, I suggest that here, the author should distinguish between the CYL’s central leadership as embodied in its Central Committee and leadership at the local level. The CYL’s central leaders hold “ministerial-level” (buji) positions, meaning that they are cadres managed by the CCP’s Central Organization Department (zhongguang anbu). In the past, it was indeed easy for these CYL officials to transfer to leading positions in the Party and the government, but today, although it is possible for local CYL leaders to transfer in this way, their promotion is not as significant. These previous transfers, including secretaries and deputy secretaries of the CYL Central Committee, formed what was known as the “CYL clique” (tuanpai).
Tsimonis concludes by pointing out how, under Xi Jinping, CYL leaders can no longer count on promotion to leading positions in the Party and government. This is an indication of the Party centre’s requirement that the CYL change its emphasis and return to concentrating on united front work. Xi Jinping has ordered CYL cadres to focus on united front work among youth rather than treating the CYL as a stepping stone to top Party and government positions. Xi has reinforced the functions of mass organizations in what is known as China’s “grand united front” (datongzhan). In addition to the CYL, he has called on the Women’s Federation, the Federation of Literary and Art Circles, and the Federation of Industry and Commerce to step up united front work in their respective areas. This new emphasis for all mass organizations dates from the central conference on mass organization work (zhongyang quntuan gongzuohuiyi) held in 2015.
This book also contains a very useful discussion on the thinking and training of CYL members during the Hu Jintao period. Tsimonis concludes that CYL members have grown dissatisfied with the organization and lack a sense of identification with the CYL. Perhaps the author will in the future expand his research into CYL membership under Xi Jinping. Previously, it was relatively easy for students to join the CYL, but the bar seems to have been raised under the current leadership, adding to the prestige.
Finally, the author seems to think that the CYL lacks independence and autonomy. For example, CYL personnel appointments are decided by the corresponding Party committee (238), and the higher-level CYL secretary can only “assist in managing” (xieguan) these. Under Hu Jintao, the relationship between the Party and the CYL may have been more complicated. In those days, party secretaries were well aware that CYL cadres had the potential to become the political stars of the future, so they tended to respect the preferences of CYL officials when it came to the recruitment of CYL cadres. This is no longer the case under Xi Jinping.
This book is an excellent source for understanding the operation of the CYL under Hu Jintao’s leadership. Most of the other works on this subject are in Chinese, and their authors tend not to use field interviews, but rather to base their research on secondary or official sources. It is to be hoped that Tsimonis will continue his research into the CYL under Xi Jinping and analyze the relationship between the Party and China’s young people from the perspective of the grand united front.
In an authoritarian, Leninist state like China, young people are seen as “new blood” for the regime, who must be cultivated by a mass organization. However, since the anti-government demonstrations that took place in many colleges and universities in December 2022, observers have begun to question whether the current CCP leadership has succeeded in reinforcing the political socialization of China’s youth. And if it has not, can this failure be blamed on the CYL? These issues merit close observation and further research.
Wen-Hsuan Tsai
Academia Sinica, Taipei