London: Palgrave Macmillan [an imprint of Springer Nature], 2016. xvii, 168 pp. (Illustrations.) US$54.99, cloth. ISBN 978-1-137-59800-4.
How shall neighbouring countries deal with a collapsed North Korea? Tara O, Adjunct Fellow at the Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies—and a retired US Air Force officer—tackles this question in The Collapse of North Korea. The result is a well-researched, lucid and, for the most part, objective analysis of the steps necessary to prevent a collapsed North Korea from wreaking havoc in Northeast Asia and beyond.
According to O, and in common with the view of most Korea experts, the end of North Korea would mean the reunification of Korea. Thus, following a succinct introduction about North Korea’s class system and the disconnect that it has created between a small elite and ordinary North Koreans in chapter 1, O examines three different unification scenarios in chapter 2. She presents three possible situations: gradual and peaceful unification, unification through war and collapse and absorption. The author considers the first two scenarios unlikely due to Pyongyang’s unwillingness to reform and the strength of the US-South Korea alliance, respectively. Thus, O argues, the collapse of North Korea is the most likely pre-reunification scenario.
Will North Korea collapse though? Keen North Korea watchers know well that the collapse of the country has been predicted several times since the collapse of communism almost everywhere else in the early 1990s. Yet, Kim Jong-un is the third member of a Kim dynasty that has ruled North Korea since its inception in 1948. In chapter 3, however, O presents a careful analysis of the indicators and triggers that could lead to the collapse of the country. The indicators are well known to North Korea specialists. They include a crumbling economic system unable to satisfy the basic needs of ordinary North Koreans, the reliance on external assistance, the disintegrating information control mechanism, the on-going processes of leadership succession between Kim Jong-un and his father Kim Jong-il and power consolidation by the former, the possible queasiness of Pyongyang elites, and the growing number of defectors.
Building on a wealth of sources, O concentrates on three possible regime collapse triggers. She starts with an examination of elite disaffection and factionalism, powerfully arguing that Kim’s frequent purges and brutality show that he does not command the respect enjoyed by both his father and his grandfather Kim Il-sung, the founder of North Korea. Rule by force could therefore lead to elite-driven instability and systemic collapse. The author then focuses on famine and mass migration, followed by mass opposition. These two potential triggers can be conflated, since they focus on processes driven by ordinary North Koreans and the regime cannot contain mass disaffection. The parallels with the still-recent triggers behind the Arab Spring are clear.
Once North Korea collapses, what comes next? In chapters 4 and 5, O focuses on regional geopolitics and preparations and responses to a possible collapse. In the first of the two chapters, she first examines a regional geopolitical landscape in which tensions about a host of issues create enmity, but in which —crucially—deepening economic regionalism is likely to lead to cooperation. Thus, O analyses the national interests of the five remaining countries with an important say in affairs on the Korean Peninsula—the United States, China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea—as well as South Korea’s bilateral relations with the first three from the prism of a geopolitical landscape in which tensions are overridden by a need for cooperation to preserve economic links. Therefore, she argues, there is scope for regional cooperation in the areas of pre-collapse planning, North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, and stability and economic development. This is very welcomed, since many journalistic and—some would say—lazy analyses of contemporary Northeast Asia focus on the disagreements between the regional powers rather than the many areas with potential for cooperation.
In chapter 5, O discusses twelve different areas of preparation for and response to a North Korean collapse. They range from the obvious and already well-planned—such as ensuring quick control over Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal—to the not-so-often discussed but equally important—including dealing with the unemployment of under-skilled North Koreans, the reforestation and flood mitigation of large swathes of underinvested North Korean land, and the development of the DMZ. O comes with a to-do list that to some might seem overwhelming. For example, she rightly points out that the education of a North Korean population that has lived under decades of Jucheideology will be far from an easy task. Yet, this list is a timely reminder that reunification is much more than bringing together two countries that most think should be together. The not-too-distant cases of Germany, Vietnam, or Yemen show that reunification processes take time.
In the concluding chapter, O provides a useful summary of the main points raised in the book. Arguably, this chapter also shows the only weakness that can be found with this book. The author’s analysis is very systematic, with one issue presented after another. It would have been interesting to know, for example, whether O thinks that South Korea’s bilateral relations with the United States, China, and Japan influence each other. Or whether migration from North Korea towards the south in a reunified Korea has any implications for unemployment or social integration. This is a minor issue in an otherwise very interesting read.
O’s The Collapse of North Korea will be of interest to Korea and East Asia specialists, whether from academia or from policy-making. It is recommended for those who want a broad and comprehensive overview of the challenges that Korean reunification would—or will, following the author’s train of thought—entail.
Ramon Pacheco Pardo
King’s College London, London, United Kingdom
pp. 607-609