Modern South Asia. New York: Oxford University Press, 2022. ix, 315 pp. (Tables, graphs.) US$30.00, paper. ISBN 9780197638415.
This book is a welcome addition to scholarship on war and peace in South Asia. Its academic and policy contributions stem from sensitivity to variation in the enduring conflict between India and Pakistan (over its entire duration) and focus on peace-building efforts. Where others see solely conflict, the book’s author Christopher Clary shows noteworthy “islands of agreement” and progress towards peace. Case studies of “the difficult politics of peace” between India and Pakistan include the ups and downs of the Kashmir dispute starting in 1947, the conciliatory initiatives from 1958 and 1960 that culminated in the Indus Water Treaty, the politics surrounding the Tashkent Declaration, East Pakistan crisis and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s post-1971 peacebuilding efforts, and improved relations during the military dictatorship of Pervez Musharraf.
In tackling the longest-running rivalry in Asia, Clary challenges the dominant explanations of war and peace in South Asia, including those which focus on Pakistan’s revisionist intentions and powerful military, as well as contributing to the broader scholarship on international security by offering a productive alternative to the dominant neorealist view of states as unitary actors. The ambitious temporal scope of the study also makes it a good candidate for an introductory text to those studying South Asian security.
According to the book’s leader primacy theory, states’ openness to peace varies depending on the presence or absence of a coherent foreign policy authority. Clary’s main argument is that peace-making occurs when leaders are able to sustain conciliatory initiatives, which requires that they have consolidated authority over foreign policy within the government. The Difficult Politics of Peace thus turns the spotlight on domestic politics.
Strategic incentives matter as well. Clary argues that they favour rapprochement when there are fewer resources available or threats increase. Leaders feel resource constraints when the economy is stagnating, budgetary demands exceed readily available revenue, and/or foreign exchange demands exceed available reserves. Threats emerge when a rival is rising economically or militarily and/or a new nonrival threat emerges or grows. Clary does not distinguish between internal security threats (e.g., insurgencies) and foreign interstate threats, consistent with the “omnibalancing” approach.
Several questions emerge. First, does the same logic apply to war-making? Clary suggests that conflict is the default state for some dyads (32–35), such as India and Pakistan. The author does a good job explaining the concept of islands of peace in what is otherwise a contentious relationship, but he does not attempt to explain why some but not other states are locked in an enduring rivalry vs. stable peace. This leads to another question: the distinction between peace initiation and maintenance. Does the proposed framework equally explain both? How much concentrated foreign policy authority would it take to generate a stable peace in South Asia?
It is true that authoritarian leaders do not always enjoy full control over foreign policy. However, often they do. The proposed framework may thus imply that authoritarian leaders are more likely to be peacemakers than their democratic counterparts. Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power in 2022–2023, including over foreign policy, would then be good news for those concerned about China’s regional ambitions, including vis-à-vis Taiwan. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine in 2022, as well as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s reluctance to engage in peace negotiations with Russia, suggest another important factor when it comes to peace: leadership.
The emphasis on leaders’ choices is a welcome and original contribution of the book. Yet, the story told is not one of agency, as in free-will-based decision-making, but of structural constraints on agency, be they international or domestic. The leaders in the book are presumed to act only as they are incentivized and able. What about what they want? Does leadership matter, if by leadership we mean transcending the existing incentives and constraints to do what one genuinely believes is in the country’s best interest? The book adds to our understanding of how inter-state conflict can serve as a useful domestic structural constraint on leaders, but leaves more work to be done on the question of leadership. The exercise of leadership involves actors not just doing what they can but also, if they so choose, making it possible to do what they want.
In the richly detailed empirical chapters we encounter actors making consequential choices, be it Liaquat Ali Khan overseeing Pakistan’s aid to the invading force in Kashmir in 1947, Indira Gandhi deciding when and how to get involved in the East Pakistan conflict in 1971, and Musharraf boldly asserting power in Pakistan in 1999. These chapters could dwell more on leaders’ preferences and choices. Take Bhutto and his choice not to accept the victory of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League in the 1970 general election. It may be argued that it was Bhutto’s decision not to accept the electoral outcome that led to the 1971 civil war (which the book suggests was inevitable for structural reasons) and the subsequent inter-state war between India and Pakistan. A different choice by Bhutto may have meant peace, even if it also meant greater autonomy for the country’s eastern wing.
The book’s expert approach to South Asia through the lens of peace is a unique and valuable addition to an ever-growing and increasingly saturated literature on the origins and dynamics of the India-Pakistan rivalry. The clarity and elegance of the writing and structure make it a strong candidate for course assignment at advanced undergraduate and graduate levels. It also offers compelling ideas and evidence for more seasoned readers.
Yelena Biberman
Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs