The Oxford International Relations in South Asia Series. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015. xv, 411 pp. (Figures, tables.) US$35.00, cloth. ISBN 978-0-19-945062-6.
India’s evolving relations with Israel provide a fascinating window to the hopes and aspirations, constraints and limitations, and diplomatic capacities and resilience to deal with unexpected and persisting challenges facing India’s foreign policy makers. The greatest mystery of this relationship has been the long gap between the recognition of Israel as a sovereign, independent nation by India in 1950 and the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1992. This book is a serious scholarly attempt by the author, Nicolas Blarel, to unravel this mystery of 42 years, and the subsequent developments in India-Israeli relations.
The author divides his subject into five time segments starting from 1922 and ending in 2012. In the first segment (1922–1947), the conflicting roots of Indian and Israeli nationalism are traced for their impact on one country’s approach toward the other. Gandhi and Nehru, who shaped India’s destiny during the initial years of India’s independence, were reluctant to accept the notion of a religious state. They supported the Khilafat movement as a protest movement but insisted on a secular identity for a state. The next two segments of 1948 to 1956, and 1956 to 1974 present detailed and meticulously researched accounts of many occasions when India could establish diplomatic relations with Israel but did not due to a variety of factors and forces, including the role of individuals. The analytical or thematic division between these two segments is a bit blurred and somewhat fragile. Then the author looks closely at a period of eight years, from 1984 to 1992, which is described as “From Estrangement to Engagement” of India with Israel. Finally, the book very systematically analyzes the “Consolidation of India’s New Israel Policy” during the two decades from 1992 to 2012, when establishment of diplomatic relations eventually led to the firming up of a “strategic partnership.” This segment is most informative and well organized and gives relevant and valuable details of emerging economic, defence, and political relations between the two countries. It even presents accounts of the visits of various chief ministers of Indian states to Israel (331–333). The author also compiles a list of India’s arms procurements from Israel, though the authenticity of this information may be debatable at many places in the compilation.
The role played by the “institutional” and “ideational” obstacles deterred the pragmatic approaches of many Indian rulers towards establishing diplomatic relations with Israel until 1992. Obstacles identified by the author include the religious identity of the Israeli state and India’s aversion to this identity, India’s support and sympathy for the Arab countries and the Palestinian people, the consideration of the political preferences and religious sentiments of the sizable Muslim minority within India, and the role of the Cold War and Israel’s aggressive posture towards the Arabs and Palestinians. The change in India’s approach towards Israel occurred as part of a significant shift in India’s foreign policy as a whole at the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the 1990s. Since Narasimha Rao’s coming to power in 1991, India liberalized its economy, opened up to Southeast Asia under its Look-East policy and became increasingly sensitive to international and Jihadi terrorism. Political turbulence, ideological confusion, and a breakdown of solidarity within the Arab world also played a significant role in shaping the change in India’s policy towards Israel. The shift in US attitude towards India, the consequent change in Indo-US relations by the end of the 1990s, and subsequent growth dynamism in the Indian economy certainly gave impetus to India’s cooperation with Israel.
Major policy changes in a country like India do not occur through knee-jerk reactions. The author rightly questions Jeffrey W. Legro’s theory that change occurs only when one “orthodoxy” collapses and another gets consolidated in the realm of policy. In this questioning, the author of this study claims that he was breaking new theoretical ground by demonstrating that within a “sub-system” of policy, like India’s approach towards Israel, change can be both “gradual” and “dynamic” (360). This, however, is not a great theoretical formulation. Most of the changes take place gradually and incrementally, particularly in large, diverse, and complex societies like India. In the course of his discussion, the author also highlights the role of policy “shocks” in inducing the change, but fails to show as to why many such “shocks,” like the Arab failure to support India’s position in the 1962, 1965, and 1971 wars (151), could not deliver the expected change? What in fact the author describes as policy “shocks” were hardly considered to be major “shocks” within the Indian policy portals.
The value of this study lies not in any major theoretical contribution, but in presenting the evolution of Indo-Israeli relations in a historical perspective. It gives us a narrative that is meticulously chronicled and copiously researched. It makes the reader aware of the conflicting claims often made on Indian policy makers on sensitive and critical issues. Its value would have been enhanced if the author had detailed the parallel debate within the Israeli establishments about India. The book gives us a very comprehensive bibliography and an impressive database on the subject. The author’s efforts deserve commendation, as this study can be of immense value to serious scholars, analysts, and commentators, as well as policy makers dealing with India’s foreign policy.
Sukh Deo Muni
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India
pp. 703-705