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Book Reviews, Northeast Asia
Volume 90 – No. 2

THE EVOLUTION OF THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCE: The Eagle and the Chrysanthemum | By Matteo Dian

Chandos Asian Studies Series. . Oxford: Chandos Publishing, 2014. xxviii, 247 pp. (Tables, figures.) US$141.00, cloth. ISBN 978-1-84334-766-8.


At the core of Matteo Dian’s The Evolution of the US-Japan Alliance is a question central to the study of alliance management. How do alliances evolve over time, especially those where there is an asymmetry of power? Dian’s work traces the evolution of the US-Japan alliance, breaking the partnership into four stages. These might be described as a creation phase lasting from 1960 until 1969 (27–67), a détente phase from 1969 until 1978 (69–106), a renewal phase from 1997 until 2008 (107–149), and a pivot phase from 2009 until 2013 (151–197). The book is located within alliance management theory and focuses especially on which factors shape the “internal cohesion” (7) of alliances as they develop. By making use of such concepts as balance-of-threat, security dilemma, and second-image constructivism, the book draws out several key factors to explain different possible alliance outcomes: their origin, evolution, and “possible demise” (1). These factors include the level of external threat, shared threat perceptions, interests and commitments, and security identity limits.

The main chapters of The Evolution of the US-Japan Alliance, which cover these four stages of the US-Japan relationship, offer readers a broad study of the alliance’s progress from the 1960 revision of the original security treaty through to the current period of American “pivot” and Japanese security “normalization.” The book covers some of the key historical developments in the alliance’s management, such as Japan’s shifting approach to the alliance during the Vietnam War (51–54) and Japan’s strategic reorientation following the Nixon shocks and the subsequent deepening of the alliance during the late 1970s (80–89). More contemporaneously, it provides a detailed examination of vital current issues reshaping the alliance, including ballistic missile defense cooperation (133–137) and Japan’s attempts to normalize its security role since 2009 (171–183).

If the book’s aim was to fully trace the alliance’s evolution from its origin to today as a study of internal cohesion, some of the choices over which periods of evolution to exclude might seem contentious. Beginning the alliance story in 1960, rather than 1951, is justified on the basis that the “previous treaty did not represent an actual alliance treaty” (22), that the treaty was uneven, and that it did not oblige the US to defend Japan. Yet, in international relations theory, the concept of alliance is more contested, and arguably broader, than this approach would suggest. Similarly, excluding this period because the relationship was uneven appears at odds with the book’s focus on asymmetry. Further, the US-Japan alliance was not alone in terms of the ambiguities of the “obligation” involved: this was also characteristic of America’s alliance with Australia and New Zealand, signed at the same time.

Similar exclusions later in the book are also puzzling. By not covering the 1980s, the book misses some crucial alliance developments and important shifts in external threats, threat perceptions, and interests. Examples include the 1981 agreement for Japan to play a greater role in protecting sea lanes, as well as the two sides’ subsequent close diplomatic cooperation over the Soviet Union’s ballistic missile threat. Likewise, the choice of 1997 as the beginning of the fourth chapter would appear to exclude some major external changes to the alliance prior to this date, such as the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait crises, although these are in fact discussed. Important intra-alliance controversies from the mid-1990s relating to the alliance’s changing commitments, interests, and identities, such as over America’s military presence in the Japanese prefecture of Okinawa, also receive little attention.

The use of a single case study to make an argument on the evolution and internal cohesion of alliances generally is ambitious. Identifying factors that could contribute to the demise of alliances, for instance, is impossible here, given that the US-Japan partnership is still strong after sixty-five years. The book also sets itself a difficult task of establishing causal relationships between multiple (perhaps too many) independent and dependent variables or “multi-dimensional intra-allied interactions” (208). Disentangling these becomes an almost overwhelming task for the conclusion. Norms “cannot be excluded” (201), while similar preferences produce different “behaviours” in different situations. Shared threat perceptions cannot explain the evolution of alliances—the book is highly critical of Stephen Walt’s balance-of-threat theory. Commitment plays a crucial role by creating in the junior ally a “freedom of irresponsibility” (204), but this seems less applicable to the post-Cold War period.

The book’s central conclusion focuses on a mixture of these variables under the heading of the “sharing/control dilemma and the paradox of self-reliance” (208). Put simply, the alliance has evolved as the US has pressured Japan to take up a greater burden, creating a dilemma for the US as it struggles to accept ceding influence. For Japan, this greater role has made it more susceptible to US demands but also more able to resist US pressure. If these pressures are in fact crucial, internal cohesion in the US-Japan partnership may become more difficult in the future as the alliance becomes less asymmetrical. Alternatively, both sides may simply adapt as the alliance becomes more equitable.

Overall, The Evolution of the US-Japan Alliance provides an in-depth examination of some of the most significant issues of the US-Japan alliance since the two nations revised their Mutual Security Treaty more than fifty years ago. The final text would have benefitted from greater copyediting scrutiny from the publisher, as occasional misspellings (e.g., “Yunichiro” Koizumi, xxviii) and inconsistencies can be distracting. Nonetheless, the book should be of interest to students and scholars working both on the important US-Japan alliance and on alliances in general.


H.D.P. Envall
The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia

pp. 358-360

Pacific Affairs

An International Review of Asia and the Pacific

School of Public Policy and Global Affairs

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