SUNY series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2023. US$32.00, paper. ISBN 9781438491660.
Albert Welter’s The Future of China’s Past: Reflections on the Meaning of China’s Rise provides a comprehensive and accessible, though not entirely original, account of the relationship between China’s past, present, and future. Rather than repeating the typical policy-oriented debates in the US—such as the threats China poses to the liberal international order or the economic, diplomatic, military, and ideological competition between China and the US—Welter focuses on the cultural aspect of China’s rise. He explores the indigenous resources the Chinese authoritarian regime draws upon to sustain its rule, and how China’s rise can be understood through the lens of its own traditions.
As a scholar of Chinese religion and thought, Welter offers an insider’s view on China’s rise, one that takes China’s self-image seriously. While his book acknowledges concerns about China’s growing authoritarianism under Xi Jinping—particularly for those who value human rights and democracy—he persuasively argues that understanding China’s traditions is essential for anyone who cherishes these values.
Welter emphasizes that traditions like Confucianism, Legalism, Daoism, and Buddhism are central to grasping China’s rise. While most discussions of Chinese politics tend to focus on Confucianism and Legalism—arguably the two pillars of China’s political system during imperial times—Welter broadens readers’ perspectives by extensively discussing the history and contemporary relevance of Daoism and Buddhism. He demonstrates that while the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) calls for a revival of China’s “traditional culture,” it treats these four traditions differently. Confucianism and Legalism, replacing the waning influence of Marxism, provide intellectual resources to strengthen the CCP’s authoritarian control. In contrast, Daoism and Buddhism, due to their status as organized religions, are treated with a certain degree of suspicion by the government. The chapter on Buddhism, along with the final chapter on the future of Chinese traditions, is particularly valuable, as Welter suggests that lessons can be drawn from Confucianism’s response to Buddhism in premodern China to understand how China may meet challenges from the West today.
Despite these merits, however, the chapter on Daoism is less satisfactory. Although Welter concisely and accessibly explains Daoist ideas as expressed in the Daodejing, he does not present a comprehensive or convincing narrative of Daoism’s relevance to contemporary China. The only example he provides is Daoism’s contribution to environmental movements in China, as its philosophy advocates harmonizing with nature. Somewhat oddly, Welter also discusses popular protests in this chapter, citing Daoism’s historical role in rebellions against imperial dynasties. However, he does not mention any cases where Daoism is invoked in popular protests in present-day China.
The limited discussion of Daoism’s contemporary relevance stems from Welter’s assertion that “of China’s traditions, Daoism has had the most difficulty adapting to modern circumstances. Long associated with individual (even libertarian) freedom, Daoism inspires spontaneous expression that appeals to artists but draws the ire of autocrats and bureaucrats who are not inclined to tolerate its unrestricted vitality. Moralists, too, are unimpressed with Daoism’s disregard for ethical standards and conventional norms” (66). This claim seems counterintuitive, as a tradition emphasizing individuality and personal freedom is precisely what contemporary China could benefit from in countering authoritarianism and conservative social norms. Notably, Welter overlooks the fact that in the 1980s, liberal intellectuals invoked Daoism’s hands-off approach to governance to justify free market reforms in China. More recently, Tao Jiang, a philosopher at Rutgers, argues that Zhuangzi’s philosophy, which also belongs to the Daoist tradition, could help China create a meaningful space for the affirmation of negative freedom (Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China, Oxford University Press, 2021). In the twentieth century, Zhuangzi was also a source of inspiration for anarchist movements both in China and globally. Perhaps Zhuangzism is indeed not “modern,” but it is more “postmodern” than “premodern.”
This oversight ties into a broader flaw in the book: while Welter provides a thorough account of how the CCP uses Confucianism to legitimize its rule and shows how Chinese authoritarianism aligns with the Legalist defense of centralized absolutism, he largely omits how Chinese intellectuals and activists have used indigenous traditions to challenge authoritarianism and promote liberal democratic values. This omission is understandable given that Welter seeks to emphasize the deep divides between Chinese traditions and modern Western values, particularly the tensions between Confucianism and liberal democracy. However, it would still be helpful for readers to know about efforts by Chinese intellectuals (and their allies in Western Sinology) to reconcile these traditions with modern liberal values.
For example, Welter discusses the debate between Mind Confucianism, which emphasizes personal cultivation, and Jiang Qing’s Political Confucianism, which promotes Confucian-style institutions over democratic ideals (109–113). However, he overlooks the fact that many Confucians, previously focused solely on moral issues, have engaged with politics and institutional design since Jiang Qing’s challenge. Some of their proposals—while rooted in Confucian thought—show a strong sympathy for certain aspects of liberal democracy (Tongdong Bai, Against Political Equality, Princeton University Press, 2020). Similarly, Legalism has been reinterpreted to resonate more closely with Weberian ideas of bureaucratic professionalism and the rule of law (Nalei Chen, “Han-Wei-Zi: Bureaucratic Administration in Han Feizi and Max Weber [Wei Bo],” Philosophy East and West 73, no. 4, 2023). When combined with a liberal reading of Daoism, it becomes possible to envision a political ideal that incorporates liberal rights, democratic participation, the rule of law, and government efficiency, grounded in Chinese traditions.
Welter might reasonably argue that these liberal interpretations are marginal, mostly vocalized among overseas Chinese, and limited to academic circles. However, in an era of authoritarian tightening in China, these alternative interpretations offer a glimmer of hope for China’s democratic future. Mentioning them, even briefly, would show readers that despite the repressive intellectual environment, efforts to harmonize Chinese traditions with modern liberal values persist, and they could play an important role in China’s future.
Dongxian Jiang
Fordham University, New York City