Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2024. US$26.00, paper. ISBN 9781501776588
Neil Loughlin’s The Politics of Coercion: State and Regime Making in Cambodia presents a compelling examination of Cambodia’s political regime under Hun Sen’s leadership. The book extends the study of authoritarian regimes by analyzing how coercive strategies sustain regime durability, using Cambodia as a case study. Drawing on 18 months of field research in Cambodia—including interviews, field observations, primary sources such as government documents, reports, and media articles as well as an extensive body of literature—Loughlin organizes the book into six chapters.
The opening chapter traces the origins of Cambodia’s coercive ruling coalition, rooted in the Khmer Rouge regime (1975–1979) and the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) (1980–1989). Chapters 2 and 3 detail Cambodia’s political transition after the Paris Peace Agreement (PPA) and the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP)’s consolidation of power following the 1997 coup and subsequent election victories. Chapter 4 explores the CPP’s efforts to legitimize its dominance, while chapter 5 discusses the party’s cooptation of the armed forces to maintain regime security. Chapter 6 examines the economic dynamics controlled by CPP-aligned elites.
Taking a different approach from other scholars of Cambodian and Southeast Asian politics, Loughlin argues that institutional, cultural, or electoral patronage factors alone are insufficient to explain authoritarian regime durability. Instead, he emphasizes the importance of examining the “monopoly of coercion” that the CPP has built since its inception in 1979, which Hun Sen has consistently employed throughout his tenure (15). Led by this argument, the author begins with the establishment of the Vietnamese-backed PRK in 1979, following Vietnamese ousting of the Khmer Rouge, which laid the foundation for Cambodia’s authoritarian regime. Key PRK figures include Hun Sen and Hen Samrin, who were defectors from the Khmer Rouge recruited by the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). Loughlin convincingly argues that the VCP played a vital role in laying the institutional groundwork for what enabled CPP’s authoritarian regime today. The highlight of the PRK’s origins underscores how Cambodia’s political trajectory has been shaped by its early dependence on Vietnam’s support and its adoption of a centralized, coercive state apparatus.
Loughlin’s description of Hun Sen’s rise to power since 1985—marked by his pragmatic navigation of VCP oversight—is meticulously analyzed. He highlights Hun Sen’s strategic acumen during the reconciliation process (1989–1991) and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)-monitored elections in 1993. These efforts allowed Hun Sen to consolidate power by aligning individual agency with structural advantages, showcasing how authoritarian regimes are shaped by both institutional and individual factors.
Loughlin’s critical examination of the Paris Peace Agreement (PPA) and the subsequent creation of UNTAC makes a significant contribution. While these efforts aimed to bring peace and democratize Cambodia through free elections and pluralism, Loughlin argues that they failed to address the power structure of the PRK, which enabled the CPP (rebranded from PRK) to retain control over key state apparatuses including the military and internal security forces. Such control allowed the CPP to use these forces to coerce opponents and manipulate electoral processes to its own advantage, leading up to a coalition government with the winning party, the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), even while under UNTAC supervision. Loughlin also discusses how the coalition government was merely a strategic victory for the CPP that allowed it to maintain its grip on power during a precarious time while projecting an image of compromise. Loughlin’s analysis coincides with Sophal Ear’s argument that UNTAC did more harm than good, having theoretical power but lacking the ability to compel Cambodian authorities to comply with its mandate, sowing “the seeds of failure for democracy in Cambodia” (Sophal Ear, Aid Dependence in Cambodia: How Foreign Assistance Undermines Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). This is evident by the 1997 coup orchestrated by the CPP to depose FUNCINPEC from the coalition using its entrenched control of state resources and security forces.
Subsequently, the CPP legitimized its rule through an unmonitored election in 1998 and a new propaganda strategy calling themselves the party of victory over Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge regime in 1979, the party of reconciliation, and the party of development (60). From 1999 to 2018, the CPP systematically dismantled the opposition, co-opted military and internal security forces, extracted economic resources, and manipulated legal frameworks to consolidate power. Loughlin’s detailed analysis of the interplay between coercion strategies against all forms of opposition and institutional control provides a compelling explanation of CPP’s authoritarian regime durability.
Despite its strengths, the shortcoming of this book is its relative neglect of grassroot perspectives, such as those of civil society and local communities. Incorporating perspectives of the ordinary Cambodians who have lived under this authoritarian regime would enrich the analysis and provide a more comprehensive account of Cambodia’s political realities. Additionally, while Loughlin’s critique of international interventions is well-founded, his discussion of alternative strategies remains underdeveloped. For example, he critiques UNTAC’s failure to neutralize the CPP’s coercive apparatus but does not offer solutions into how such problems could have been addressed. Providing pathways to solutions for democratizing Cambodia would have strengthened the book’s practical implications.
Nonetheless, the book makes a significant contribution to the study of authoritarianism, state-building, and Southeast Asian politics. Loughlin’s emphasis on the role of coercion in regime consolidation offers valuable lessons for understanding similar dynamics in other contexts. The book’s detailed case study of Cambodia serves as a cautionary tale for policymakers and practitioners in post-conflict settings, highlighting the importance of addressing entrenched power structures and the limitations of externally driven democratization efforts. Moreover, Loughlin’s examination of how the CPP navigated international intervention underscores the adaptability of authoritarian regimes in co-opting external actors to serve their interests.
Finally, The Politics of Coercion is an in-depth researched account of Cambodia’s political trajectory. By tracing the roots of the Cambodian People’s Party’s coercive regime and critically analyzing the limitations of international interventions, Loughlin offers a nuanced understanding of authoritarianism’s persistence. While the book could benefit from a more inclusive perspective and deeper exploration of alternative strategies, its strengths far outweigh its shortcomings. This work is an important read for scholars of Southeast Asian politics, authoritarianism, and international relations providing invaluable insights for understanding the political dynamics of Cambodia and beyond.
Soksamphoas Im
Michigan State University, East Lansing