New York: Columbia University Press, 2018. ix, 271 pp. (Graphs, map.) US$65.00, cloth. ISBN 978-0-231-17654-5.
At first glance, The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics seems to be an old-fashioned book addressing bipolarity, geopolitics, and balance of power in twenty-first century Asia. But it turns out to be remarkably relevant, and in many ways, prescient. The book argues that with China’s rise, Asia is now under the US-China dominance, much like the bipolarity of the Cold War. What separates the new bipolarity in Asia is its distinctive geopolitics. Incorporating geography into international structure, Øystein Tunsjø develops a geo-structural realist theory, which is “a refinement of structural realism” in international relations (15).
The book is divided into two parts, the first devoted to establishing “the return of bipolarity” and the second on how bipolarity matters in shaping conflict and stability in Asia. Following a review of the structural realist theory on bipolarity, Tunsjø shows that China is now powerful enough to become the sole peer competitor to the United States, thus marking a return of bipolarity in world politics. To further make his case, Tunsjø compares the contemporary distribution of power with the prototypical bipolarity of the Cold War. This comparison leads to his geo-structural realist theory. With the belief that “geopolitics trumps structure” (94), Tunsjø shows how East Asian geopolitics may generate different behavioural effects on international relations under the new US-China bipolarity. Of the unique geographical features in East Asia, Tunsjø emphasizes what the political scientist John Mearsheimer calls, “the stopping power of water” in shaping the US-China maritime competition. The term is cited so frequently that at times one gets the impression that it is the only geographical factor that matters.
Then Tunsjø applies geo-structural theory to examine how this new bipolarity affects balance and stability as compared to the old bipolarity. Because East Asian geopolitics favours defense over offense, and creates security buffers, a strong balance can be avoided in the short term. While full-scale war is less likely, limited war is imminently possible. According to Tunsjø, the enduring and intense competition in East Asia will preoccupy the US-China rivalry thereby limiting its scope to East Asia.
The book offers a fine-grained view of balancing behaviour, differentiating it into different levels of intensity. The most remarkable and dangerous effect of the new bipolarity is a likely militarized US-China conflict in the maritime domain. Exactly because there is less fear of uncontrollable escalation, Tunsjø reasons, inadvertent or preventive conflict would likely occur in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Tunsjø warns, “Geopolitics and water barriers may prevent a major war in East Asia, but they also raise the risk of a limited war between the two superpowers” (128).
Amidst the fluid power dynamics and globalization, the book’s claim of the return of bipolarity in Asia inevitably raises more questions than it answers. In evaluating the power distribution, Tunsjø relies on the “combined score” (76) of economic, military, demographic, geographic, natural endowment, and political factors. He clearly privileges economical metrics over other factors. The United States and China may have surpassed others in terms of comprehensive power, but without a clearly developed weighted system to compare power, the bipolarity claim is hardly conclusive. One may question whether China is now towering so much over Russia and India as to put them down next in rank. Certainly, neither India nor Russia (or for that matter Japan) would accept such a pecking order.
In focusing on the structure, one risks underestimating the agency of East Asian countries in shaping international relations in Asia. From the Korean Peninsula to Southeast Asia, there is hardly any country that prefers a bipolar division in the region. And in many instances the regional states have taken the initiative to proactively shape the evolving regional order. Most notably the latest diplomatic thaw on the Korean Peninsula was largely energized by inter-Korean reconciliation and enterprise. Regarding the South China Sea dispute: China did not violate the “code of conduct” with Southeast Asian nations as the book claims (175), because the legally binding code is still being negotiated. The initiative in and of itself is yet another example of how Southeast Asian nations are hardly pawns in the great power game.
Whether one agrees with Tunsjø’s thesis on the return of bipolarity in world politics or not, both political scientists and policymakers should take the book seriously. Based on impressive comparative studies of the Cold War in European history and the emerging US-China rivalry in East Asia, the geo-structural realist theory presented here forces us to rethink the relevance of bipolarity in the twenty-first century. The book’s many arguments have already proven prescient. The Trump administration’s national security and defense strategies have labeled China a long-term strategic competitor while declaring the return of traditional great power politics. As the US-China balancing and competition heat up, all of us can benefit from the book’s insights and warnings.
Yong Deng
United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, USA