Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2017. xi, 278 pp. (Tables, maps.) US$39.90, paper. ISBN 978-981-4762-64-9.
Suryadinata’s work offers readers an interesting look at overseas Chinese, and at how China views these communities in light of their growing economic and global clout. The book begins by detailing the structural and policy changes within China towards Chinese living abroad. China’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) has expanded its activities and influence since the 1990s to help promote investment in China from the Chinese diaspora; to advocate for Chinese soft power by helping to fund and staff Confucius Institutes overseas to teach Mandarin Chinese and promote Chinese cultural activities; and to connect China’s larger foreign policy goals to the state’s treatment of overseas Chinese.
Suryadinata aims to show how China’s policies towards overseas Chinese have changed and how this reflects China’s larger foreign policy goals and ambitions. In 1998, violence rocked Indonesia; Chinese Indonesians were targets of riots, arson, looting, and rape. China’s response was minimal. Beijing framed the tragedy as an Indonesian internal affair and offered little assistance or condemnation of events. This is in sharp contrast to more recent examples of violence against Chinese in the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, where China evacuated nationals and recent Chinese migrants to safety.
There are significant differences in the circumstances surrounding these examples and China’s responses. In the case of the 1998 Indonesian riots, the Chinese targeted were Indonesian citizens. Chinese have lived in Indonesia for many generations and as Suryadinata explains, have become Indonesian citizens, taken Indonesian names, and become part of the multi-ethnic fabric of Indonesian society. China’s lack of response stemmed from the understanding that their intervention could make things more complicated for Chinese in Indonesia, and (not mentioned by Suryadinata) that for many Chinese in Indonesia their ties to mainland China are tenuous or non-existent. Yes, some Indonesian Chinese businessmen have reconnected with their Chinese roots and have invested in China and rediscovered ancestral villages. For many Chinese in Indonesia this sense of connectedness did not and does not exist. Thus, there were very few reasons for China to evacuate or offer to intervene in the violence of 1998. Suryadinata claims that if similar violence was to occur in Indonesia today, China would intervene more forcefully. I disagree. In the 2017 Jakarta mayoral election there was extensive mobilization against the Christian and Chinese sitting mayor, Ahok; China was largely silent. Chinese living in the Solomon Islands and Tonga were much more recent migrants and they still had ties to China. It is worth noting that these Pacific islands are small states, less important economically and strategically to China than Indonesia. It would have been a larger diplomatic issue to act forcefully in Indonesia in 1998 than it was to evacuate Chinese from the Pacific islands in 2006. Likewise, given the level of chaos during the upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa during the Arab Spring, and noting the Chinese affected were Chinese nationals visiting or working overseas, it is completely understandable that China would go to greater lengths to protect and evacuate their citizens from violent situations.
Suryadinata also looks at a number of diplomatic scuffles where anti-Chinese actions have triggered various responses from Chinese officials. From a restrained Chinese response to Burmese actions against the Kokang Chinese, to an ambassador’s outspoken speech in Malaysia (including Malaysia Chinese in the category of haiwai qiaobao, Chinese compatriots overseas), to a measured response to anti-Chinese violence in Vietnam, we see China making subtle distinctions among Chinese living outside of China and how Beijing views and relates to them. Vietnam is a perfect example: when riots broke out in response to Beijing’s aggression in contested waters of the South China Seas, China repatriated Chinese workers on the affected oil exploration projects, but there was little Chinese action in response to anti-Chinese violence within Vietnam. China did not withdraw investments, nor do anything to protect ethnic Chinese who have been living in Vietnam for generations and who are integrated into Vietnamese society. Suryadinata argues that China intervenes to protect overseas Chinese if doing so does not conflict with higher priorities in China’s national interest (territorial integrity and protecting strategic foreign relations). Thus, we would be even more likely to see intervention if doing so coincided with higher foreign policy priorities.
This book contributes to two fields of inquiry: understanding China’s foreign policy, and understanding the varied position of Chinese overseas. These fields are rarely linked together and that’s where Suryadinata’s book offers a valuable contribution. There are some shortcomings. There should be more acknowledgment of the differences between Chinese communities overseas and their attitudes toward China. It is not enough to note that communities in Southeast Asia have been there for generations and are fairly densely connected to host societies. The reader also wants to know how communities view mainland China and their connection to it. Would these citizens expect or want China to intervene on behalf of co-ethnic solidarity? Unclear. Second, no mention is made of the fact that as China’s role in global affairs increases, it is normal to think that they would do more to protect Chinese citizens living, working, or travelling overseas. It is not surprising that China is now able to do what other developed countries do when their citizens are stuck in conflict zones. This reflects a greater global presence and improved capabilities rather than a shift in policies towards co-ethnics per se. It might have been a fruitful approach to link Chinese foreign policy to the Chinese diaspora and focus more on extensive economic ties that China has worked to develop between ethnic Chinese outside of China and the booming mainland Chinese economy. This could have been done through a discussion about the meaning of “greater China” in an economic and soft power sense, or through business case studies linking overseas Chinese to Chinese economic opportunities. Although this was a missed opportunity, the book should still be read and valued by scholars and students interested in Chinese foreign policy and overseas Chinese.
Amy Freedman
C.W. Post Campus of Long Island University, Brookville, USA
pp. 185-187