Studies of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017. xvii, 244 pp. (Graph.) US$120.00, cloth. ISBN 978-1-5036-0141-3.
China’s rise has rightfully attracted great attention, resulting in countless monographs and articles of vastly varying quality. Uneasy Partnerships stands out as a good collection of essays by seasoned scholars and analysts from five countries focusing on China’s foreign relations in Northeast Asia. This region is wisely selected for its potential to test, forecast, and shape the characteristics, ability, and trajectory of the new Chinese power.
Edited volumes tend to have an inherent tension of disagreement that can threaten their cohesion. This book is no exception. Two things, however, have not only amply mitigated that problem, but also turned it into a strength, making this volume a valuable and insightful contribution to our understanding of Chinese foreign policy. The editor first lays out and tries to apply a clear analytical framework (2–5; 32–34) that in itself is a good read of methodology about the study of China. The editor then discusses the representative perspectives on Chinese power from various countries and explores the possibility of framing the inherent conflicts and contradictions in foreign policy studies. It is thus “multifaceted,” and indeed “more accurate” (45) in shedding light on the subject under discussion.
Buttressed by his experience and connections, in his chapter, Liru Cui presents a skilled amalgam of Chinese official lines, coded thinking, and sensible opinions meant to win China friends and support abroad. Cui’s insistence that the world has become multipolar, that China is rising peacefully, that there are “different types of state-to-state relations and multiple patterns of development” in the world (46), and that China recognizes the benefits of globalization (64) all serve to successfully situate and explain Beijing’s stances and wishes. The argument that the “Chinese have always doubted the sincerity of Western rhetoric professing to welcome China’s arrival [rise]” (60) appears accurate if incomplete. Given my knowledge of Cui and his work, I have no doubt that he, and indeed many others in Beijing, realize that the West is apprehensive and ambivalent about the rise of a China led by the CCP (Chinese Communist Party), rather than by the modernization and empowerment of the Chinese nation per se. The standard equation of the CCP regime to the nation of China and the Chinese people speaks volumes about the perceptional differences in the study of Chinese foreign policy. This stands in contrast to the editor’s striking point about regime survival as being a key (I would suggest the key) objective of Chinese foreign policy (4–5).
In their chapters, Suisheng Zhao and Seiichiro Tagaki provide rich and nuanced portraits of the all-important Sino-Japanese relations. The fact that the arguably artificial flare-up over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has easily neutralized the very real interests shared by the two neighbours as friendly partners reveals the deep-rooted “strategic distrust” between Beijing and Tokyo (106–112). I would have appreciated if the topic of Japanese suspicions regarding China’s “Middle Kingdom Syndrome” (109–111) could have been more directly addressed. Are China and Japan fated to be the “two tigers on the same hill” that cannot manage a peaceful coexistence as equals, or could they learn from and transcend history to become mutually appreciative partners like France and Germany after World War II? Or perhaps the deterioration of China-Japan relations is simply an unavoidable part of the overall Sino-American rivalry?
Thomas Fingar, Myung-Hwan Yu, and David Straub expertly analyze Sino-Korean relations. As of now (2018), in the shadow of the continued North Korean nuclear program that threatens to literally blow up everything in the region, South Korea’s reliance on the US-ROK military pact for security and its dependence on China for economic benefits sustain both Seoul’s diplomatic acrobatics and Pyongyang’s hope for regime security through possession of the bomb. China has a great stake in this, yet Beijing’s political rivalry with Washington and Tokyo has so far made the situation far from peacefully resolvable. The authors offer many insights on these and other issues, including the discussion on the North Korean mistrust of the Chinese and “Pyongyang’s desire to counterbalance China” (183). Beyond that, perhaps a chain reaction of nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia may be what it takes for Beijing to get really serious about the North Korean bomb. Another change, as drastic and as consequential, could be that Pyongyang switches sides abruptly if necessary, just as China did to Moscow decades ago.
In another chapter, Artyom Lukin offers an informative survey of China’s relationship with Russia. Bilateral ties between Beijing and Moscow seem to be coming full circle as these two countries enter upon a new entente, or “quasi-alliance,” resembling the Soviet-Chinese alliance of the 1950s—both anchored by a shared antagonism towards the United States (210). Lukin reports that such a Beijing-Moscow axis, formal or not, may still lack a solid foundation in both countries but “will grow still stronger” (211) as long as the political regimes remain unchanged.
Finally, Thomas Fingar provides concluding observations and sound advice about China’s rise in Northeast Asia and beyond; his input should be valuable to decision makers in Washington and elsewhere. The point about a possibly effective leveraging of North Korea (228–229) in balancing and hedging against China is especially enterprising and intriguing.
In short, Uneasy Partnerships well captures the reality of China’s relations with its northeast Asian neighbours and presents diverse views from the field. It offers abundant cool-headed analyses that could easily form actionable policy advice for the United States and others. It is especially meaningful and valuable to read between the lines and contrast the diverse views presented in the volume. It seems it is far from guaranteed that China’s rise will be peaceful, or even successful, and the United States is far from helpless in its response, as seen in the reactions of Northeast Asian countries to Beijing.
Fei-Ling Wang
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, USA