Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. ix, 192 pp. (Maps, illustrations.) US$99.99, cloth. ISBN 978-1-107-17751-2.
At a time in Indian politics when the talk is all about centralization of power and presidential-style politics, Anoop Sadanandan’s book brings a welcome focus back to grassroots democracy and to villages. The author seeks to develop a theory as to why some governments decentralize and some do not. His central thesis is that “democracy deepens when central leaders share power with elected local politicians to use their intimate knowledge of voters to mobilize support” (7).
Sadanandan uses an interesting device to drive home the importance of decentralization in India. He compares two neighbouring panchayats—Laguadasgram in Bihar and Gouri in West Bengal—to illustrate the contrasting impacts of decentralization. In West Bengal, where decentralization has a long history, the Gauri panchayat is a “microcosm and an extension of the Indian democratic state—with its attendant welfarist impulses, myriad development programs, lively elections, partisan politics, and corruption” (2). In Laguadasgram, located in a state where decentralization has been less successful, local democracy is not much visible. In fact, Sadanandan uses eight indicators, such as panchayat autonomy and local capacity building, to measure “democratic deepening,” where states like Karnataka and Maharashtra are the most decentralized, with Bihar and Uttar Pradesh are at the other end of the spectrum. He draws on materials since 1992 because that was the year the seventy-third amendment to the Indian Constitution, or the so-called panchayati raj or village council amendment, was passed.
Sadanandan finds that party ideology is not the single most important factor behind democratic deepening. Instead, he posits that “voter-related informational asymmetries” that exist between state leaders and local politicians offer a better explanation.
Sadanandan argues that central leaders are likely to decentralize in two-party states where “informational asymmetries” exist. Put simply, central leaders decentralize in states where the likelihood of defection—or politicians changing parties—is low and hence the costs of decentralization are also lower. However, in states where chances of political defection are higher, the costs associated with decentralization are also higher. In multi-party states, therefore, the opportunities for defection are higher and the situation less conducive for decentralization.
Sadanandan begins the book by comparing Bihar and West Bengal, states characterized by differing levels of decentralization. In a later chapter, he examines politics in West Bengal and Kerala, which are among the two most decentralized states. Using data on panchayat elections and spending from the two states, the author examines three elements of voter mobilization: the way local politicians identify pivotal voters; how local politicians target influential voters; and how this impacts the prospects of politicians higher up the pecking order.
The comparison between Bengal and Kerala is interesting since, besides being the two most decentralized states, they have also had very different kinds of political competition. In Bengal, the Left Front ruled continuously from 1977 to 2011 whereas in Kerala the Congress and the Left Front have alternated every five years from 1977. According to Sadanandan, however, decentralization has helped incumbents in both states to target voters. In Kerala, which has a high turnover of governments, this has meant local politicians targeting competitive panchayats to get the votes of uncommitted voters. In West Bengal, where the Left Front had an uninterrupted tenure for over three decades, politicians targeted their core supporters in an effort to retain their support.
On balance, Sadanandan believes decentralization has served rural development in India reasonably well. Though there are consequences such as the decentralization of corruption, he thinks that local governance has been positively affected. One of the notable impacts of decentralization has been the establishment of a career trajectory for politicians from local councils to state legislatures. By Sadanandan’s calculation, in 2011, two in five state legislators and a quarter of state ministers in Kerala were drawn from the ranks of panchayat members or councilors. In other decentralized states like Maharashtra, since the 1960s, half the state’s chief ministers had risen from a panchayat member or municipal councilor. However, for the less decentralized states, such as Bihar or Haryana, these numbers were negligible.
In the concluding chapter, Sadanandan extends his “informational thesis” about decentralization beyond India by giving examples from Mexico, Uganda, Indonesia, and North Carolina in the United States. While the effort to widen his thesis is laudable, the treatment is somewhat perfunctory. One would have liked to see more of Sadanandan’s field work in the book. Voices of local politicians like Mohan in Sreekaryam in Kerala do not find much space. In the thicket of numbers and graphs, we also do not get a good sense of how panchayats function and the intense politics around them.
Sadanandan’s explanation of decentralization and democratic deepening is an attractive one. Looking ahead, the question is how well his thesis stands up to the rapid expansion of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India over the last few years. With claims of membership of over 100 million and backed by an army of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh volunteers as well as an extensive social media machinery, is the BJP going to upend the earlier model of political decentralization?
Ronojoy Sen
National University of Singapore, Singapore