New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. xi, 374 pp. (Tables, graphs.) US$34.95, paper. ISBN 978-0-19-067539-4.
The proliferation of media coverage and scholarly literature on China’s rise, and the challenges this rise poses, is a remarkable phenomenon. The growing literature presents its own challenge, making it increasingly difficult for scholars to keep up with the copious research being produced on China’s international relations. Despite this, Asle Toje’s edited volume Will China’s Rise Be Peaceful? easily stands out, not only because of its focus on an important question of our times, but also because of its impressive lineup of contributors, all eminently qualified to deal with the central question raised in the book.
The book centres on five core debates over China’s rise: whether China aspires to be a global power or is content to be a regional hegemon, what kind of power China is, how to characterize the nature of the international order, how other powers respond to China’s rise, and whether political science theory or historical analysis offers the best explanation of China’s future trajectory. The five parts of the book are roughly organized around these debates. The first part examines the implications of China’s rise for the international order. From a realist perspective, Stephen Walt argues that the shifting balance of power, precipitated by China’s rise, does not augur well for Sino-American relations. In his chapter, John Ikenberry draws attention to variations of power transition and particularly the uniqueness of the existing order, which has a greater capacity to peacefully absorb the rise of new powers. William Wohlforth’s analysis casts doubt on the popular thesis of power transition vis-à-vis China, arguing that the power shift in question is largely one-dimensional (GDP), and that American hegemony is more durable than many observers believe. Also contesting power transition theory, Rosemary Foot highlights several important factors that act as restraints on violent power transition, ranging from historical awareness of the danger of the Thucydides trap to economic interdependence.
Part 2 features three chapters, all from historical perspectives. Geir Lundestad argues that (realist) history is not destiny, meaning that the US and China are not destined for war. Christopher Layne, however, contends that the two superpowers, much like their pre-WWI Anglo-German counterparts, are on a collision course. Calling for a better understanding of the international history of East Asia, Odd Arne Westad insists that China’s rising supremacy will face resistance from its neighbours. Part 3 focuses on the domestic dimensions of China’s rise. Minxin Pei suggests that the Chinese Communist Party’s survival strategy is facing a challenge domestically, which makes a weakening China more dangerous than a strong China. Johan Lagerkvist zeroes in on a principal-agent dilemma facing the party-state, arguing that such a challenge may derail China’s rise as a global power. Part 4 continues the discussion on domestic factors, but with a focus on their international implications. In assessing China’s capabilities relative to those of the US, David Shambaugh concludes that China is more of a partial (and regional) power than a global power. Zhang Ruizhuang’s chapter sheds new light on China’s Achilles’ heel: domestic instability and disunity, which limit Beijing’s global ambition.
The final part of the book turns to relations between China and its regional as well as global competitors. Liselotte Odgaard suggests that while China’s coexistence strategy can allow the US and China to manage their differences on a pragmatic basis, it has yet to convince its neighbours of its peaceful intentions. Discussing Japan’s response to China’s rise, Yoshihide Soeya argues that Japan should serve as a nexus of “middle power” cooperation in the region. Evaluating India’s role as a regional counterweight to China, Jonathan Holslag maintains that overall, India’s performance is less than impressive, due to both its nonalignment policy and lack of capacity. In chapter 15, Michael Cox questions the conventional wisdom that China and Russia are uneasy bedfellows, arguing that their cooperation is more robust given their opposition to the West as a common target. In the final chapter, Steven Lobell offers a “components of power” perspective on power balancing. He argues that what matters most is not China’s aggregate power, but the specific components of its power that could pose a threat to US dominance.
No consensus emerges from these contributions as to whether China’s rise will be peaceful, which testifies to the diversity of theoretical perspectives and variation in interpretation. For readers who value the contending insights in the China debate, this is clearly to be welcomed. However, I wish the editor and contributors had pushed further in this direction. For all the differences in perspective, this project is still largely Western-centric, with China seen as a rising “object” whose international and regional impact is already assumed to be uncertain at best or threatening at worst. More Chinese contributions and more genuinely regional perspectives could have made the book more intellectually diverse and stimulating.
The book has fruitfully engaged with the debate of history versus theory. However, with few exceptions, by “history” most contributors subconsciously mean Western or European history, which is extensively used to understand China’s future. And the book’s theoretical spectrum remains limited to mainstream international relations (IR) theories, notably realism, neorealism, neoclassical realism, and neoliberal institutionalism. Though perhaps still dominant in the discipline, these perspectives now hardly represent the latest frontiers of IR theory. In this context, one is curious how China’s rise could be understood from, say, constructivist, critical theory, poststructuralist, postcolonial, and/or relational perspectives. Even if showcasing a more diverse range of theoretical perspectives on China’s rise goes beyond the remit of this book, it is worth giving a brief nod to these possible approaches. Finally, the dominant levels of analysis in the book are the state and the international system, but given the turmoil in US-China relations after Donald Trump’s election (which admittedly were not as evident at the time of this book’s conception), some focus on the importance of leadership and personality would have added a missing piece in the great power rivalry puzzle.
Chengxin Pan
Deakin University, Geelong, Australia