Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program Publications, an imprint of Cornell University Press, 2022. xx, 247 pp. (Tables, graphs, figures, maps.) US$30.00, paper; US$20.00, ebook. ISBN 9781501764684.
Winning by Process can be seen as almost two distinct works. On one hand, it is an objective, scholarly work that fits well into the field of international relations, detailing the manner in which a stalled conflict can be won off the battlefield by one of the parties, even as formal hostilities have ceased or died down. On the other hand, Winning by Process is also a work of political activism, as the authors demonstrate a strong preference for a particular outcome in the conflict in Myanmar. As such, this review will critique the book as to each of its two identities, as it is very successful on one hand, and less so on the other.
As a neutral piece of scholarship that fits well into conflict and international relations literature, Winning by Process shines. The authors assert that in a conflict we can see three key arenas, formal negotiations, state institutions, and war, and five mechanisms for parties to the conflict to use to obtain their preferred outcome, which the authors call “process”: locking in, sequencing, layering, outflanking, and outgunning. Thus, as the authors define it, winning by process “is a dynamic outcome that is neither final nor irreversible but that clearly gives a firm advantage to one side in a conflict…” (19). This is a solid framework to use when exploring armed conflicts, current or past, and while the authors use it to discuss and explain the conflict in Myanmar, it can be used in the classroom or in research to illustrate other armed conflicts, as well.
In short, while a civil war is in a period of ceasefire or diminished hostilities, an actor can still maneuver the situation to their advantage. First, an actor engages in “locking in” the parameters of the negotiation, setting the agenda, establishing the rules of order, and deciding who the legitimate voices are for each party to the conflict. With these bureaucratic decisions in place, a cunning party can then take advantage of the established order of events (“sequencing”), the creation and intertwining of new sites of negotiation, such as “regional parliaments, courts, civil society groups, and political parties…” (32) (“layering”), undermining the power of one party by building ties to the civilian populations that side claims to represent (“outflanking”), and, when in doubt, using force to gain what negotiations have failed to yield (“outgunning”). The authors create here a detailed and sophisticated rubric that can be applied to civil conflicts throughout time and history.
It is in its role as a polemic that Winning by Process is less persuasive. The authors have a clear desire to see a Myanmar state where centralized authority is diluted in favor of the various ethnic states within Myanmar. The authors repeatedly accuse the central government—both under the Tatmadaw and the National Unity Government (NUG)—of being reluctant to establish a “genuine federal system” (102) or a “truly federal state” (111). However, is the ability of a state government to use racial quotas in hiring (167) or to enforce specific language laws (167) a necessary condition for a “genuine federal system”? It would have been helpful for the authors to point to an existing nation that has something resembling the federal, or confederal, model that they wish to see implemented in Myanmar.
In the book itself, the authors present the case that the people of Myanmar seem to favour a different vision for the future of their nation. In chapter 5, the authors cite surveys conducted in 2018 showing only 33 percent of respondents thought the states and regions should have more power in the Constitution, and only 14 percent thought the states and regions should have sole control over specific areas, such as health care, education, and natural resources. In the same chapter, the authors quote an additional survey conducted in 2018 where it seems that, while ethnic minority groups in Myanmar wish to retain their ethnic identity, they no longer had a strong desire for “ethnofederalism” (113). Is this what the authors mean all along when they speak of a “genuine federal system”?
In chapter 6, the authors decry the central government of Myanmar providing services to citizens of the non-Bamar majority states (contra the Bamar majority “regions”), including free public education and improved health care, while also lowering the taxes and rents extracted from the population, as this eroded popular support for the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) that had previously controlled the states and provided such services. It is incontrovertible that the central government of Myanmar under the Tatmadaw long treated the non-Bamar majority states with neglect, if not abuse. It nonetheless seems strange to then decry the efforts of the central government to supply badly needed services, even if the providing of such services erodes popular support for the EAOs. The authors even acknowledge that the infrastructure projects were welcomed by “many communities” (137), and that the health care systems provided by the EAOs were many times substandard. As one villager was quoted as saying, “the [Karen National Union] only set up empty clinics, but they are nowhere to be found when we are really sick” (138).
The authors of Winning by Process note in the introduction that just as their research was coming to a conclusion, the Tatmadaw launched a coup, thereby breaking the deadlock that the state seemed to be winning via “process.” As the authors note in both the introduction and the conclusion, the coup interrupted what was a “winning strategy” for the central state, one where the civil war was going to be won slowly off the battlefield through a series of negotiations and agreements, rather than quickly in pitched combat. I do not know what the situation will be in Myanmar when this review goes to print, but as of this writing—spring, 2024—it seems that the Tatmadaw grossly miscalculated. The EAOs that were previously warming towards accepting government proposals that were far less than what the EAOs were initially demanding, are now in the process of battering Tatmadaw forces throughout Myanmar, with the NUG also pushing Tatmadaw forces out of key enclaves. I would like to join the authors in hoping for a quick resolution that provides peace, stability, and dignity to all the people of Myanmar.
Salvatore J. Russo
California State University Dominguez Hills, Carson